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Chapter 1
Introduction
Just after the beginning of my master courses in “Financial Market and Interme-
diaries” at the Toulouse School of Economics, the worst moment of the 2007-09
financial crisis had been reached. Bear Stern had disappeared from the stage
of the Wall Street six months before, and Lehman Brother filed for bankruptcy
while Bank of America announced the purchase of Merrill Lynch. Wall Street
investment banks were completely annihilated and commercial banks were hit
hard. Hence, I got my master’s degree with a curious and anxious mood . Curi-
ous because my personal understanding of the financial crisis was only a partial
view from some newspapers or television programs, having no clue about why
it happened and how it was devastating. However, I was also anxious just like
most students in the finance faculty during that time, unrealistically expecting
that there would be a negative correlation between the job market and the finan-
cial market at least until my own graduation. But obviously, this is not an idea
that a rational agent would have. Fortunately, both because of this curiosity and
anxiety, I started my Ph.D thesis. Of course, I am not going to say what I was
anxious about, but I would better say what I was curious about - what is the
financial crisis?
The financial crisis is a very large concept to describe a situation in which
some financial assets suddenly lose a large part of their nominal value. Until
1930s, many financial crises were associated with “banking crisis”.1 Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) has very well explained why this kind of panics may happen in
the banking sector. Since depositors are not insured, they are willing to run the
banks if they realize that the other depositors are going to run as well. This
1Alternatively speaking, banking panics.
1
2bank run may trigger a liquidity problem in the banks, eventually turning into
a solvency problem. Then the classic banking crises have been prevented by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in U.S., which guarantees
depositor’s accounts. However, the modern banking crises are characterized by
the wholesale investors run on the shadow banking system. See chapter 2 for
details.
The financial crisis is also linked to a stock market crash. These crashes
can be observed as a sudden dramatic decline of stock prices across a significant
cross-section of stock markets, resulting in a significant loss of monetary wealth.
Note that they often follow speculative stock market bubbles. An example is
the so called “Black Monday”, which refers to Monday October 19, 1987, when
stock markets around the world crashed, shedding a huge value in a very short
time. The crash began in Hong Kong and spread west to Europe, hitting the
United States after other markets had already declined by a significant margin.
Another example is that the stock market crash of 2000-2002, which caused the
loss of 5 trillion dollars in the market value of companies between March 2000 and
October 2002. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) document that the sophisticated
market participants, like hedge funds, did not exert a correcting force on stock
prices during the technology bubble; instead they rode bubbles and questioned
the efficient market hypothesis that rational speculators always stabilize prices.
Sovereign crisis is becoming an important factor for financial crisis. When
a country fails to pay back its sovereign debt, this is called a sovereign default.
It is well known that from May 2010, the southern European countries have
suffered such a sovereign crisis. As the probability of default increases, the yield
of government bonds increases as well, which increases the funding cost of the
country and worsens the initial situation, which in turn increase the yield further
and so on. The sovereign crisis is not just an economic problem, but also a
political issue. On one hand, these European countries follow the same monetary
policy but different fiscal policy, which limits the macroeconomic tools available
to deal with their domestic problem,2 while the fiscal policy serves more as a
“presidential election” tool than as a stabilizing force. On the other hand, during
a quite long a time, the Euro area has been implementing a low interest rate
policy, which allowed countries like Greece to benefit from cheap funding cost
to stimulate their economic growth, but they cover the structural problems of
low productivity and high labor cost. The global financial crisis uncovered these
2The monetary policy is implemented by European central bank.
3problems, which triggered massive defaults.3
The current financial crisis (late 2000s financial crisis) has shown its
huge negative impact on the real economy. This is because this financial crisis
is an interplay of a banking crisis, a bubble burst which led to the financial
market crash and a sovereign crisis. It is well known that the subprime crisis was
triggered by the burst of US housing bubble and shortly swept the whole financial
system. Furthermore, its destructive capacity might eventually be seen to have
been systemic rather than merely specific to one failed financial institution. This
new feature of financial crisis has given rise to the research on this phenomenon
by many economists and this is also the main topic of my Ph.D thesis - systemic
risk.
Systemic risk is the risk that is posed to the financial system or/and the
economy, as opposed to the risk that is faced by an investor or a portfolio.
Systemic risk is most commonly discussed in relation to the risks posed
by banks and financial institutions. The failure of a major financial institution
can have serious consequences. If a bank fails, not only will its depositors lose
money, but it is also likely to renege on obligations to other financial institutions.
Both the depositors and the other institutions are then likely to be under financial
pressure, which can lead to further failures of both banks and other businesses.
The resulting ripple effect can bring down an economy. Controlling this systemic
risk is a major concern for regulators after the current financial crisis, particularly
given that consolidation in banking industry has led to the creation of some
extremely large banks. Even though governments usually bail out those banks
that are “too big to fail” (TBTF) or “too connected to fail”, the cost of doing so
would have its own effects: the encouragement it gives them to be less cautious
because they know that they are going to be bailed out. This creates a problem
similar to the conflicts of interest between debt and equity holders. In this case
the shareholders of big institutions take the gain if the risk pays off, government
pick up the cost if it goes wrong.
However, systematic risk is sometimes confused with systemic risk,
but their distinction is crucial for both risk quantification and economic inter-
pretation. As Hansen (2013) has also pointed out, systematic risk was well
studied throughout almost 50 years. This is the macroeconomic or aggregate
risk that cannot be avoided through diversification. In the perspective of risks,
it is exogenous, since the sources of systematic risk are the exposures to the
3The financial crisis was associated with other crises such as currency crisis etc.
4macro/aggregate shocks which are out of control by individual market partici-
pants. Investors and risk managers often use financial econometric models to
calculate the potential losses and charge the related reserve to hedge this risk.
However, systemic risk has just gained the attention of world-wide economists
and regulators during the recent financial crisis.4 Unlike the former, systemic
risk is endogenous, since one financial institution’s risk contribution to the
whole system (or to the other financial institutions) can be controlled by it-
self ex-ante. According to Lorenzoni (2008), the fire-sales externalities can be
reduced if institutions borrow less short-tern debt ex-ante or take less risk on the
balance-sheet when they make their investment decisions. This leaves a room
for regulators to stabilize the financial system as a whole, and this new policy is
called - Macroprudential policy. Before the late 2000s financial crisis, regula-
tors paid most attention on the traditional microprudential policy that seeks to
enhance the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions, as opposite
to the macroprudential view which focuses on welfare of the financial system as
a whole. Several aspects of Basel III reflect a macroprudential approach to finan-
cial regulation. More concretely, under Basel III banks’ capital requirements have
been strengthened and new liquidity requirements (liquidity coverage ratio and
net stable funding ratio), a leverage cap and a countercyclical capital buffer have
been introduced. Also, the systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs)
are required to hold more and higher-quality capital, which is consistent with the
cross sectional aspect of macroprudential approach. In chapter 2, I will illustrate
why there are systemic risks in the financial system and what kinds of regulatory
view we should have to cope with these risks.
In order to efficiently implement the macroprudential tools, regulators
need to use the risk measures to accurately estimate the systemic risk for each
financial institution. The common measure of risk used by financial institutions
is the Value at Risk (VaR), which focuses on the risk of an individual institution
in isolation. The q%-VaR is the maximum dollar loss within the 1- q% confidence
interval. However, such a measure of a single institution’s risk does not necessarily
reflect the risk that the stability of the financial system as a whole is threatened.
Several measures of systemic risk have been put forward, such as the CoVaR,5 in
an attempt to capture externalities inflicted by some institutions on others. For
example Goldman Sachs could affect JP Morgan or the investment banking sector
could affect the insurance sector as a whole institutions. Some economists have
4Rochet and Tirole (1996), Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000), Allen and Gale (2000) and
Borio (2003) among others had noticed the systemic risk before the current financial crisis.
5The Value at Risk (VaR) of the financial system conditional on institutions being under
distress. See section 2.5 for details.
5also argued that regulatory capital requirements could be based on the ∆-CoVaR,
capturing an institution’s (marginal) contribution to systemic risk. Regulation
should take into account institutions’ characteristics such as leverage, maturity
mismatch and size that predict systemic risk contributions. As mentioned before,
there are some measures which targeted at measuring systematic risk, such as
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES),6 in an attempt to capture the one financial
institution’s exposure to an aggregate shock on the system/market. I propose a
new measure which is based on CoVaR measure and Shapley value methodology
in chapter 3.
Many papers have identified the over-borrowing on short term debt as
being the root of the externality in the banking sector. But why do banks have a
funding structure so relied on short term debt? My coauthor and I developed a
theoretical banking model in order to have a better understanding on the funding
structure of banks in chapter 4. In this chapter we have also mentioned that
when using short term debt, banks’ refinancing need is triggered by an exogenous
macro productivity shock. While by using long term debt, banks do not need
to refinance, yet, they may misbehave due to a lack of interim discipline. Banks
choose short term maturity when they expect a macro shock to occur with a
small probability. From a social perspective, the externalities caused by over
borrowing in short term debt exist only in the case where the probability of a
macro shock is large; otherwise, the social optimum coincides with the market
equilibrium. This suggests that regulators should be “prudent” in implementing
liquidity regulations.
Below, I provide a timing of the crisis.
04/22/2007 Second-largest subprime lender, New Century Financial, de-
clares bankruptcy.
06/22/2007 2 hedge funds run by Bear Sterns have trouble meeting their
margin calls : Bear Sterns injects $3.2bn to protect one of them but does not
support another.
08/09/2007 BNP Paribas suspends calculation of asset values of three
money market funds exposed to subprime and halts redemptions. AXA had
earlier announced support for its funds.
08/09/2007 European Central Bank (ECB) injects €95 billion overnight
to improve liquidity. Injections by other central banks.
6See Acharya, Pederson, Phillipon, and Richardson (2010) and Brownlees and Engle (2011).
609/14/2007 Bank of England announces it has provided a liquidity sup-
port facility to Northern Rock.
09/14/2007 Moody’s announces it will re-estimate capital adequacy ratio
of U.S. mono-line insurers/financial guarantors.
01/24/2008 Société Générale reveal trading losses resulting from fraud-
ulent trading by a single trader.
03/14/2008 JP Morgan Chase &Co. announces that it has agreed, in
conjunction with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to provide secured
funding to Bear Sterns for an initial period of up to 28 days.
06/16/2008 Lehman Brothers confirms a net loss of US$2.8bn in Q2.
09/15/2008 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy. Bank of America
announces purchase of Merrill Lynch.
09/16/2008 U.S. government provides emergency loan to AIG of US$85bn
in exchange for a 79.9 percent stake and right to veto dividend payments.
09/21/2008 The Federal Reserve approves transformation of Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley into bank holding companies.
11/09/2008 Chinese authorities declares an economics stimulus plan for
4000 billions yuans (around $650bn).
01/11/2009 Citigroup confirms a net loss of US$8.29bn in Q4 2008. Fed
injects $20bn into the capital of Bank of America.
02/11/2009 UBS and Credit Suisse confirm a net loss of 13.3bn euros
and 5.5bn Euros in 2008 respectively.
03/11/2009 Freddie Mac confirms a net annual loss of US$50.1bn.
03/07/2009 Société Générale registers a net loss of 278 millions euros in
Q1.
05/08/2009 Commerzbank confirms a net loss of 861 millions euros in
Q1.
09/24/2009 The 2009 G-20 Pittsburgh Summit.
10/02/2009 The publication of the results of European stress test for 28
big banks.
03/24/2010 Fitch downgraded Portugal’s credit rating (from AA to AA-
).
704/09/2010 Fitch downgraded Greece’s credit rating (from BBB+ to
BBB-).
04/22/2010 Moody’s downgraded Greece’s credit rating (from A2 to
A3).
04/27/2010 Standard & Poor’s downgraded Greece’s credit rating (from
BBB+ to BB+). Standard & Poor’s downgraded Portugal’s credit rating (from
A+ to A-).
04/28/2010 Standard & Poor’s downgraded Spain’s credit rating (from
AA+ to AA).
05/18/2010 Greece receives the first aid plan for 14.5 billion euros.
05/28/2010 Fitch downgraded Spain’s credit rating (from AAA to AA+).
06/14/2010 Moody’s downgraded Greece’s credit rating (from A3 to
Ba1).
06/27/2010 The 2009 G-20 Pittsburgh Summit. An agreement has been
made to increase the banks capital ratio (Basel III).
07/12/2010 The Dodd-Frank Act has been promulgated.
07/13/2010 Moody’s downgraded Portugal’s credit rating (from Aa2 to
A1).
08/24/2010 Standard & Poor’s downgraded Ireland’s credit rating (from
AA to AA-).
09/30/2010 Moody’s downgraded Spain’s credit rating (from Aaa to
Aa1).
12/09/2010 Fitch downgraded Ireland’s credit rating (from A+ to BBB+).
12/23/2010 Fitch downgraded Portugal’s credit rating (from AA- to
A+).
01/14/2011 Fitch downgraded Greece’s credit rating (from BBB- to BB+).
02/02/2011 Standard & Poor’s downgraded Ireland’s credit rating (from
AA- to A-).
03/07/2011 Moody’s downgraded Greece’s credit rating (from Ba1 to
B1).
803/10/2011 Moody’s downgraded Spain’s credit rating (from Aa1 to
Aa2).
03/15/2011 Moody’s downgraded Portugal’s credit rating (from A1 to
A3).
03/29/2011 Standard & Poor’s downgraded Greece’s credit rating (from
BB+ to BB-) and downgraded Portugal’s credit rating (from BBB to BBB-).
04/01/2011 Standard & Poor’s downgraded Ireland’s credit rating (from
A- to BBB+). Fitch downgraded Portugal’s credit rating (from A- to BBB-).
04/05/2011 Moody’s downgraded Portugal’s credit rating (from A3 to
Baa1).
04/15/2011 Moody’s downgraded Ireland’s credit rating (from Baa1 to
Baa3).
05/08/2011 Standard & Poor’s downgraded Greece’s credit rating (from
BB- to B).
05/20/2011 Fitch downgraded Greece’s credit rating (from BB+ to B+).
06/01/2011 Moody’s downgraded Greece’s credit rating (from B1 to
Caa1).
06/13/2011 Standard & Poor’s downgraded Greece’s credit rating (from
B to CCC).
06/30/2011 Fed launched QE2.
07/05/2011 Moody’s downgraded Portugal’s credit rating (from A3 to
Baa3).
07/13/2011 Fitch downgraded Greece’s credit rating (from B+ to CCC).
07/25/2011 Moody’s downgraded Greece’s credit rating (from Caa1 to
Ca).
07/27/2011 Standard & Poor’s downgraded Greece’s credit rating (from
CCC to CC).
908/05/2011 Standard & Poor’s downgraded United State’s credit rating
to AA+ for the first time in history.
09/19/2011 Standard & Poor’s downgraded Italy’s credit rating (from
A+ to A).
10/04/2011 Moody’s downgraded Italy’s credit rating (from Aa2 to A2).
10/07/2011 Fitch downgraded Italy’s credit rating (from AA- to A+)
and Spain’s credit rating (from AA+ to AA-).
10/13/2011 Standard & Poor’s downgraded Spain’s credit rating (from
AA to AA-).
10/14/2011 Standard & Poor’s downgraded BNP Paribas’s credit rating
(from AA to AA-).
10/18/2011 Moody’s downgraded Spain’s credit rating (from Aa2 to
A1).
11/11/2011 Standard & Poor’s confirms the France credit rating (AAA).
Chapter 2
Systemic Risk and Macroprudential Policy: A
Survey
2.1 Introduction
The integration of global financial markets has delivered large welfare gains
through improvements in static and dynamic efficiency - the allocation of real
resources and the rate of economic growth. However, these achievements have
come at the cost of increased systemic fragility, as experienced during the re-
cent 2007-2009 financial crisis. We must now face the challenge of re-designing
the regulatory overlay of the global financial system in order to make it more
resilient without crippling its ability to innovate and spurring economic growth.
Recent financial crises have also revealed the failure of current financial regulatory
framework, which pushes towards public authorities paying the more attention
to the financial stability in a macroprudential perspective (Borio (2003)). This is
because when large financial institutions encounter financial problems a negative
externality can arise in the financial system, since they expect to be bailed out
by the public authorities. This leads two serious consequences: 1) the global
risk in the financial system is underestimated by many market participants, who
have no incentives to reduce systemic risk, since this has not been written in the
regulatory framework yet; 2) once a bail-out occurs, the tax payer will pay the
bill for those bank managers who misbehaved and decided for the wrong balance
between risk and profit; but if the public should not pay for these gamblers, they
have to do so, since these institutions are too big to fail (TBTF) . How to correct
the incentives of these market participants has been put on the top of the agenda
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of public authorities. To deal with these issues, we need to gain a deep under-
standing on why and how a systemic event could occur in the financial system
through specific mechanisms and what adverse consequences would happen to
the financial system and the real economy.
In this article I try to identify the sources of the fragility of the financial
system as a whole by surveying the growing literature that studies systemic risk
and macroprudential policy. This is important, because it is just like diagnosing
a patient: the problem can only be efficiently addressed once the pathology is
determined. The objective of this survey is to present the mechanisms that may
trigger a systemic event and also introduce the possible regulation framework to
cope with this issue - the macroprudential policy. As we are standing at the
research frontier on the topic, this article is far away from a definitive version on
the field.
Like any contagious disease it always starts from an individual patient,
we observed during the 2007-2009 financial crisis that the individual liquidity
problem of a financial institution plays an important role in the vulnerability
of the financial system. More specifically, this liquidity problem is compounded
with the solvency problem in the financial institution. A financial institution is
insolvent when its ’going concern’ value does not exceed the expected value of
its liability. During normal times, it is fairly easy to identify insolvent financial
institution, since financial markets are strong. However, during crisis period, it is
difficult to do so, because insolvency can be triggered by liquidity issues (Rochet
and Vives (2004) and Morris and Shin (2009)). A crucial characteristic of modern
liquidity problem is that the traditional mechanism in the model of Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) is no suitable anymore to explain the current financial crisis.
This is because the deposit base of financial institution can be fully covered by
the deposit insurance provided by the authorities, and also because the interbank
lending market is now well developed. But why is the liquidity problem still there
in the financial system? This is because nowadays the more and more financial
institutions’ debts are funded by wholesale investors, who usually have a very
short maturity and are not covered by any insurance. Therefore, the modern
bank run is mainly embodied in the wholesale market where investors are not
willing to rollover the short-term debt of financial institutions. In this case, the
financial institutions have to liquidate their assets on the market to raise funds,
which may generate huge losses, potentially harmful to social welfare.
The short-term debt holders have to sell their asset in order to meet
12
their obligations, the price of assets become disconnected from the estimates of
expected cash flow. Since, in bad times, the short-term creditors observe the
losses on financial institutions, which in turn decreases the the likelihood of a
short-term debt creditor roll over their funds (funding illiquidity1). Due to the
market illiquidity2, they can only sell their assets at a fire sale price, this leads
to a loss on existing positions on the asset side of institutions’ balance sheets,
then worsens the situation of funding liquidity. On the other hand, due to the
presence of adverse selection on the secondary market, when financial institutions
anticipate a low price, which is very possible during the crisis period, it may
lead to a market freeze because there are only “lemons” in the market. This
worsens the market illiquidity further. This loss spiral will not stop until relevant
authorities intervene in this situation, and this is exactly what happened during
the recent financial crisis. This is an illustration from an individual institution’s
perspective, however, it is clear that the level of market and funding liquidity
is not exogenously given but determined in the economy as a whole and thus,
important adverse feedback effects might arise. This requires a more systemic
view of liquidity crises, but identifying the sources of individual liquidity fragility
is indispensable (Allen and Gale (1994), Allen and Gale (1998), Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009) and Malherbe (2012)).
Macroprudential policy is a complement to microprudential policy, which
focuses on the stability of a single financial institution, and is meant to interact
with other types of public policy that have an impact on financial stability (e.g.
monetary policy, fiscal policy, etc.). Its goals are to address two dimensions of
system-wide risk: first, the evolution of the risk over time – the “time dimension”
- and second, the distribution of risk in the financial system at a given point in
time – the “cross-sectional dimension”.
A simple explanation of the time-dimension aspect of the macropruden-
tial policy is to deal with the procyclicality issue. Because of asymmetric informa-
tion (borrower’s human capital is inalienable), when investors lend their money,
a credit constraint is always imposed in the economy, therefore small shocks to
the economy might be amplified into a large credit fluctuation. This is because
the borrower’s assets play a role as the collateral against the amount borrowed, in
the present case, the credit ceiling of each financial institution positively depends
on the value of their asset. When a negative shock occurs, the value of the asset
decreases and financial institutions will borrow less as a response to the initial
1This also can be seen as the financial institutions have some difficulties to borrow more
funds or raising funds is becoming highly costly.
2It is difficult to raise money by selling assets at reasonable prices.
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shock, which in turn reduces the credit volume in the economy. The credit vol-
ume is high during the boom period and becomes low during the recession, which
lowers the pace of the recovery. On the one hand, the procyclicality is triggered
by the over-borrowing ex ante along with the over-investment, which generate an
externality that financial institutions will not internalize when they make their
decisions. On the other hand, an “only-risk-targeting” regulation, such as Basel
II, could be another reason why such a procyclicality may take shape. Normally,
the purpose of bank capital regulation is to minimize the market failure and make
the financial system more stable. From this perspective, when the economic en-
vironment becomes bad, it is quite natural for a social planner to increase the
capital. However, this is not the only important factor in a social planner’s ob-
jective function; he should also put some weight on those objectives of banks
that were properly taken into account in the first place (e.g. making positive
net present value (NPV) loans). Therefore by imposing the same level of capital
regulation during booms and recessions would generate procyclicality and it is
suboptimal.
Empirically, the evidences show that financial intermediaries adjust their
balance sheets actively, and do so in such a way that leverage is high during booms
and low during busts. That is, leverage is procyclical. Procyclical leverage can
be seen as a consequence of active management of balance sheet by financial in-
termediaries who respond to changes in prices and measured risk. For financial
intermediaries, their models of risk and economic capital dictate active manage-
ment of their overall Value-at-Risk (VaR) through adjustments of their balance
sheets. One main consequence of procyclical leverage is that, during a crisis pe-
riod, for a fall in the price of an asset widely held by hedge funds and banks,
the net worth of such institutions falls faster than the rate at which the value
of assets falls, eroding its equity cushion. One way for the bank to restore its
equity cushion is to sell some of its assets, and use the proceeds to pay down its
debt. Note the importance of marked-to-market. By synchronizing the actions
of market participants, the feedback effect is amplified.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has introduced
a counter-cyclical capital requirement à la Basel III in September 2010 whose
purpose is to cope with the procyclicality. Different from the “only-risk-targeting”
capital requirement, this new regulation can been seen as the cyclical-adjusted
capital requirement, which does consider the trade-off between the stability of
financial institutions and the financial activity in the system.
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The cross-sectional dimension of macroprudential policy focuses on the
interbank contagions and fire-sale externalities as well as the common exposure
of financial institutions to an aggregate uncertainty. As mentioned above, the
interbank lending can reduce banks’ individual liquidity problem, but it exposes
banks to a systemic risk. That is to say, if a single bank is about to fail, due
to the interbank linkage, the balance sheet of the other banks, which have lent
to it, will be weakened and thus in a danger of failure. Usually interbank lend-
ing provides a peer monitoring among banks in order to reduce the asymmetric
information effect; however, the potential bailout by the central bank in the cri-
sis period may destroy this peer-monitoring and give a chance of systemic crisis
to occur. The fragility may also come from an insufficient capital buffer of a
representative bank. The fact that interbank market may reduce the liquidity
problem of an idiosyncratic liquidity shock in a financial institution is well known
by economists, but, in case of an aggregate liquidity shock, if the banks’ capital
buffer is insufficient to cover the liquidity needs, a contagion effect will arise in
this market; furthermore, if the aggregate shock is large enough the whole system
could be swept out.
Fire sales externality is at the core of recent financial crisis. When banks
face the liquidity demands, sometimes they have to liquidate part of their long
term assets (illiquid assets), and given that the market’s demand for long term
assets is less than perfect elastic, marked-to-market asset prices will decrease.
This low level of prices may endogenously generate another round of asset sales,
which would depress prices further and induce further sales. Since the assets are
marked-to-market, a small initial shock may generate contagious failures in the
whole system. The basic idea of fire sale externality is as follows. An increase
in ex-ante investment will imply an increase in ex-post sale of assets during a
crisis, therefore lowering the price of asset. If the seller of asset has a larger
marginal utility than the buyer and the insurance market is missing, this ex-
ante investment generates a negative pecuniary externality. This implies that
equilibrium is constrained inefficient and there is an over-borrowing and over-
investment ex-ante, which provides a rationale for appropriate regulation.
Two approaches have been proposed to deal with the liquidity problem
in order to make individual banks internalize this externality ex-ante. The first is
a price-based approach, by imposing a Pigouvian tax on short-term debt, which
aims at equating private and social liquidity cost in order to reach the social
optimal allocation. The second is a quantity-based approach with instruments
such as liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio introduced in Basel
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III. Both liquidity ratios have the objective to lower the probabilities that a bank
runs into liquidity difficulties.
However, there is a sector which is not subject to financial regulation -
the shadow banking system. The shadow banks can reduce their idiosyncratic risk
by trading or securitizing the loans to diversify their portfolio. Consequently, this
behavior exposes their portfolio to systematic shocks. It decomposes the simple
process of deposit-funded, hold-to-maturity lending conducted by banks into a
more complex, wholesales-funded, securitization-based lending process. Through
this intermediation process, the shadow banking system transforms risky, long-
term loans (e.g. sub-prime mortgages) into seemingly credit-risk free, short-term,
money like instruments, etc. By doing so, it makes the financial stability become
more unstable and fragile in the sense that not only make FIs expose to an
aggregate uncertainty but also leave an opportunity for financial institutions to
evade prudential regulation. Whether to regulate the shadow banking system or
not is still under debate among economists and policy makers.
On all account, the appropriate risk measures are indispensable to help
policy makers propose the relevant regulation framework to stabilize the finan-
cial system. Based on their characteristic I divide these risk measures into two
categories - systematic risk measure and systemic risk measure. The former has
received a lot of attention after the crisis; although the fall in US property prices
(which is probably the fundamental cause of the crisis) was widely predicted, its
huge impact on banks and financial markets were not. This is because financial
intermediaries are highly exposed to the financial system. Before the crisis, the
most popular measure of risk used by the financial profession is the Value at Risk
(VaR), which focuses on the risk of an individual institution in isolation. There
was no measure which could provide some information about an institution’s ex-
posure to the whole financial system when an extreme event happened. From a
theoretical point of view, it is akin to a Beta computed within the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM). The difference rests on the fact that the MES measure,
so-called “tail-Beta”, is a projection of institution’s return to a space where the
market return is lower than a specific threshold. By contrast, in the CAPM,
the Beta is simply the projection of an institution’s return to the market return,
without any threshold.
However, these measures do not provide any information about the con-
tagion risk among financial institutions. The latter category of risk measures -
systemic risk measures - which allows to measure the contagion risk to which each
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bank contributes with respect to the financial but also with respect to other banks
bilaterally. These measures can capture the systemic importance of individual
banks and provide useful information for regulators to design the macroprudential
policy.
This survey mainly focuses on the micro mechanism with which the sys-
temic risk formed and what can be done by policy makers to stabilize the financial
system by providing an efficient regulatory framework. The structure of the paper
is organized as follows: the liquidity fragility of financial institutions is studied
firstly in section 2.2. In section 2.3 the time-dimension of systemic risk is ana-
lyzed and is followed by the cross-sectional dimension of systemic risk in section
2.4. In section 2.5 several empirical risk measures are presented and Section 2.6
gives the relationship of macroprudential policy and monetary policy. Section 2.7
concludes. Given the focus oh this survey, I do not consider many topics in the
financial stability literature such as the financial asset “bubbles”, the “monetary
policy” implemented by central banks. For a more comprehensive literature on
bubble I refer to Tirole (1985) and Brunnermeier (2008), and on monetary policy
I refer to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and Blinder, Fratzscher, Haan, and
Jansen (2008). As this survey focuses mostly on the microeconomic models to
illustrate the instability of the system as a whole, it leaves apart the macroeco-
nomic perspective on the field, for this reason I refer to Brunnermeier, Eisenbach,
and Sannikov (2012) to fill in the gap this missing part.
2.2 Liquidity
The 2007-2009 financial crisis shows that the liquidity issue plays a crucial role
in the (in)stability of the financial system. If one wants to mitigate the impact
of liquidity problems on the financial system, it is worth to that by identifying
the determinants of liquidity problems.3
3In this section, I only talk about the individual liquidity problems. However, a financial in-
stitution’s individual liquidity problem has also contagion effects to other financial institutions.
This secondary effect will be presented in section 4.
17
2.2.1 Bank runs
Preference shocks. Creditor’s/investor’s preference shocks may create bank
run as illustrated by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) who build on Bryant (1980)
(hereafter BDD). In BDD, investors may face a sudden preference shock, then a
bank run may destroy the value of the banking sector. More precisely, they con-
sider a framework with a fractional reserve system, where banks finance profitable
but illiquid projects. Lenders are uncertain about their future liquidity prefer-
ence. Compared to the market economy, banks can efficiently pool resources
together and insure the liquidity risk thus attain the social optimum. However,
there is also another possibility: a lender may expect that all the others may
withdraw their funds together, thus the rational behavior for her is also to with-
draw immediately. If all lenders no matter their actual liquidity preference are
doing so, the bank goes bankrupt.
With the uncertain future consumption needs, investors allocate their
savings in long-term to gain a higher return against in short-term to guarantee
the availability of their money. The model has three date t = 0, 1, 2, and a
continuum of ex-ante identical agents, each of them is endowed with one unit
good only at t = 0. At interim date t = 1, impatient agents need to consume
early, whose utility function is u(C1); patient agents consume late, whose utility
function is u(C2). At t = 0, each agent with probability λ of being impatient and
with probability 1− λ of being patient, so each agent’s expected utility function
is U = λu(C1) + (1− λ)u(C2).
There are two investment technologies: at t = 0, investors can allocate
their consumption good either to a storage technology, which stores the consump-
tion good from one period to the next without cost and gives a return of 1; or
to a long-run technology, which delivers a return R > 1 at t = 2 but only pays a
salvage value l ≤ 1 if liquidated early at t = 1.
To obtain Pareto-optimal allocation, we need to find the amount of in-
vestment I in illiquid technology such that
max
I
λu(C1) + (1− λ)u(C2), (2.1)
subject to λC1 = 1 − I and (1 − λ)C2 = RI. The optimal allocation
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(C∗1 , C∗2) satisfies the following condition,
u
′(C∗1) = Ru
′(C∗2). (2.2)
First, consider the allocation in an autarky case where there is no trade
between agents, each investor invests I in the long-run investment and stores the
remaining 1 − I. If some of investors early liquidate their investment yields in
C1 = 1 − I + lI, while the others end up with C2 = 1 − I + RI. In this case,
the autarky allocation is inefficient because λC1 + (1−λ)C2R < 1. Now, consider
a bond market is open at t = 1 allowing agents to sell their claims in the long-
run technology at price p without it have to be liquidating. In this case, The
consumption levels C1 = 1−l+pRI and C2 = RI+ 1−lp can be achieved. The non-
arbitrage condition between long-run technology and storage technology implies
that the interior equilibrium price satisfies pR = 1, and equilibrium allocation
with a bond market is Cm1 = 1, Cm2 = R and Im = 1− λ. Note that, the market
allocation is not efficient because u′(Cm1 ) > Ru
′(Cm2 ).4
The main contribution of BDD is that they show that the financial in-
termediaries (henceforth FIs) can efficiently pool resources together and insure
the liquidity risk thus attain the social optimal solution in the following way:
the Pareto-Optimal allocation (C∗1 , C∗2) can be implemented by a FI who offers
a deposit contract stipulating that in exchange for a deposit one unit at t = 0,
individuals can get either C∗1 at t = 1 or C∗2 at t = 2. To fulfill its debt obligation,
the FI stores λC∗1 and invest I = 1− λC∗1 in the long-run technology.
It is natural to ask the question: “is this fractional reserve system stable”?
The answer depends very much on the behavior of patient consumers. Note that
the optimal allocation is a Nash equilibrium since C∗2 > C∗1 and it is optimal for a
patient agent not to withdraw early if other patient agents don’t withdraw early.
However, the patient agent will withdraw early if she anticipates that all other
patient agents want to withdraw early, thus it generates another inefficient Nash
equilibrium corresponding to a bank run where all agents withdraw early. In this
case bank will be forced to liquidate its long-run investment with the total value
λC∗1 + (1− λC∗1)l < 1 < C∗1 , and bank will be insolvent, so the optimal strategy
for the patient agents is to withdraw, which implies an inefficient bank run.
Signals on fundamental. However, the traditional bank run triggered by the
4This result holds under the assumption that −Cu
′′
(C)
u′ (C) > 1, i.e., the function C → Cu
′(C)
is decreasing.
19
early withdrawal of uninformed depositors is prevented by imposing a deposit
insurance. The modern form of bank run is mostly characterized by the case
where large well-informed wholesale investors refuse to renew their credit on the
money market (repo for example). 2007-2009 financial crisis is mainly suffered
from this type of bank run. Even several years before the crisis, Rochet and
Vives (2004) (Hereafter RV04) had shown that there is a coordination problem
between investors, and even in a sophisticated financial market, a bank run will
take place if the bank is solvent, therefore they claim that Bagehot’s doctrine
is still hold in nowadays. More specifically, in RV04, each investor’s decision of
renew the credit is based on two factors: i) his own opinion about the bank’s
fundamental risk, which is captured by the signal on fundamental he received is
whether larger than some threshold; ii) his expectation of what others do, that
is a higher threshold used by others induces a manager to use a higher threshold
also and there is a strategy complementarity between investors’ decision. The
intuition behind is that a large withdrawal by other investors might force the
bank to to liquidate some of its assets at a loss (“fire sales”) or for for an amount
strictly lower than the value of the assets that the bank can offer as collateral
(“high margin/haircut”). As a consequence, liquidity problems might provoke
the initial solvent bank become insolvent, there is an inefficient bank run.56
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) presents a modified version of BDD model,
in which the fundamentals determine which equilibrium occurs. Morris and Shin
(2009) use the similar set up and technology show that liquidity risk is the prob-
ability of a default due to a run when the institution would otherwise have been
solvent. He and Xiong (2012) presents a model where the coordination problem
between investors has been dynamically studied. Unlike in BDD model, they
derive a unique monotone equilibrium, in which the investors coordinate their
asynchronous rollover decisions based on the publicly observable time-varying
bank fundamental.
5By using global games techniques as in Morris and Shin (2001), RV04 show that in the
imperfection information case, where investors have different opinions about the bank’s solvency,
there is a unique equilibrium.
6Another main contribution of RV04 is that they show that the Bagehot’s Lend of Last
Resort might increase social welfare by avoiding inefficient closures of solvent banks. But, the
main purpose of this sector is to identify the sources of liquidity fragility, so I don’t mention
this in the main body. For details, see Rochet and Vives (2004).
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2.2.2 Self-fulfilling liquidity dry up
Unlike the bank run literature, in which the liquidity problem mainly results from
a coordination problem between creditors. Malherbe (2012) shows that, due to
the adverse selection problem in the secondary market, liquidity dry-up can en-
dogenously arise because FIs self-insure against it (self-fulfilling liquidity dry-up).
This is because hoarding behavior and adverse selection may reinforce each other.
The intuition behind this logic is that, i) if FIs anticipate that secondary market
will be illiquid then they will hoard liquidity; ii) next, this hoarding behavior
will worsen the adverse selection problem in the secondary market (only lemons
in the market); iii) with limited participation, the secondary market is indeed
illiquid, which provides a rational for hoarding ex-ante. The liquidity problem
generally has a negative impact on social welfare. In BDD, the liquidity problem
comes from an early withdrawal of patient consumers, force FIs to liquidate their
productive investment, generating a loss. However, in Malherbe (2012), liquidity
problem will break FIs’ incentive to invest in the long-term investment, therefore
reducing social welfare. The model is summarized below.
There are three dates, t = 1, 2, 3, and a measure one of ex-ante identical
FIs7, who are initially endowed with one unit of consumption good and maximize
the expected utility function E[lnC1 + lnC2], where Ct is their consumption at
date t. FIs can invest in two technologies ex-ante (t = 0): a storage technology
as in BDD, and a risky long-term technology, which yields RH per unit invested
with probability pi if it is a good project (good asset) or RL per unit invested with
probability 1− pi if it is a bad project (bad asset) at date t = 2. By assumption,
the expected return of long-term technology is better than storage technology,
and in case of failure, the storage technology is better.8 At interim date, t = 1,
the type of the project is privately revealed by FIs. They may issue claims to the
payoff of their project in a competitive market with price q, and this is the only
way to raise fund at interim date. There is also a measure one of risk-neutral
“deep pocket” buyers, who ensures that the market clears at the expected value
of the underlying payoff and only have access to storage and the interim market.
Due to the adverse selection (Akerlof (1970)), the market unit price q is given
by:
q(α) = RL + α(RH −RL), (2.3)
where α denotes the proportion of good assets in the market. The interim market
7More generally, this can be seen as a measure one of ex-ante identical investors, or banks
or SIV (Structured investment vehicle).
8That is characterized by RL < 1 < piRH + (1− pi)RL.
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is a source of liquidity provision, since for a unit invested in long-term asset may
yield q units of consumption good at date 1. Therefore the market liquidity is
measure by this price p, and the equation (2.3) implies that adverse selection
undermines liquidity provision. The market is said to be illiquid if q < 1, which
take place when α < 1−RL
RH−RL .
From ex-ante perspective, FIs need to choose y ∈ [0, 1] as the initial
investment decision, they also have to choose xi ∈ [0, y] as the amount of long-
term asset to sell at market price q at interim date as well as how much to store
until date 2 si. Note that i ∈ {L,H} for different types of FIs. Therefore the FIs
seek to maximize
E[ln(C1i) + ln(C2i)],
subject to C1i = 1− y + qxi − siC2i = (y − xi)Ri + si , (2.4)
the budget constraints (2.4) state the following: date-1 resources consist of storage
from date-0, plus the revenue from asset sales. This resources can be consumed
or stored until date 2. At date 2, resources available for consumption consist of
the output of the remaining share of long-term asset, plus the storage from date
1. This problem is solved by backward induction.
At interim date, the types of the projects are privately revealed to FIs, y
is predetermined and q is taken as given. FIs maximize ln(C1i) + ln(C2i), subject
to the budget constraints(2.4). Now, let’s discuss the behavior of different types
of FIs. L-type FIs will obviously sell all their assets, since they can always gain
more by selling their bad assets on the market and store, instead of waiting the
long-term project matured.9 Given the couple (q, y), the optimal asset sale for
L-type FIs is
xL(q, y) = y. (2.5)
To equate their marginal utility of consumption over time, they then set sL(q, y)
so as to split their resources equally across two dates. Hence, their optimal
consumption plan is: C1L(q, y) = C2L(q, y) = 1−y+qy2 . For H-type FIs, it is not
optimal to have both xH > 0 and SH > 0, since q ≤ RH and store the sold assets
9Note that from equation (2.3), p ∈ [RL, RH ]. By assumption when p = RL, FIs is still
willing to sell their assets.
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will generate a loss. The first order conditions yield:
xH(q, y) = max {0,
qy−1+y
2q }
sH(q, y) = max {0, 1−y−yRH2 }
, (2.6)
Note that, the quantity of good assets to be sold, xH(q, y), increases with the
amount of initial investment in long-term project y and strictly increases if y ≥
1
1+q . This is because that the less cash they have at hand, the more they need to
sell assets.
The optimal investment level is chosen at ex-ante, at this stage, FIs don’t
know their type of projects. Define Ui(q, y) ≡ ln[C1i(q, y)] + ln[C2i(q, y)], the op-
timal level investment level given q corresponds to: y(q) = arg maxy piUH(q, y) +
(1− pi)UL(q, y), which yields:
y(q) ∈

[0, 12) ; q < 1
[12 , 1] ; q = 1
{1} ; q > 1
.
Now, plug this optimal investment level to equations (2.5) and(2.6). This gives,
xL(q, y(q)) = y;
xH(q, y(q)) ∈

{0} ; q < 1
[0, 12 ] ; q = 1
{12} ; q > 1
. (2.7)
FIs are said to be hoarding when they decide to fully cover date-1 con-
sumption needs by storing a part of their initial endowment, rather than issu-
ing claims to the payoff of their project on the interim market. That is, when
C1i ≤ 1 − y, for i = H, L. After some algebra, it is straightforward to conclude
that when FIs anticipate an illiquid market (q < 1) leads to hoarding. Given a
q, the proportion of good assets at the optimal investment level is:
α(q, y(q)) ≡ pixH(q, y(q))
pixH(q, y(q)) + (1− pi)xL(q, y(q)) ∈

{0} ; q < 1
[0, pi2−pi ] ; q = 1
{ pi2−pi} ; q > 1
(2.8)
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The rational expectation equilibrium is characterized by a triple (y∗, α∗, q∗)
which satisfies: i) y∗ is an optimal investment level given q∗, ii) α∗ is the propor-
tion of good assets in the market given q∗ and y∗, iii) q∗ = RL + α∗(RH − RL).
The equilibrium can be found by combining the buyer’s no-arbitrage condition
(2.3) with equation (2.8).
In this economy, there are multiple equilibrium that differ by the level of
market liquidity which is measured by the anticipated market price q.10 There
is a liquid equilibrium when FIs anticipate q > 1, which characterize the market
is liquid. Accordingly, they invest all their endowment in the long-term asset,
y∗ = 1. Consequently, they have to go to the market to raise funds to satisfy
the interim consumption needs. This ensures that there is also a relative high
proportion of good asset in the market, α∗ relatively high, which indeed guarantee
that the market is liquid (equilibrium price q∗ > 1). However, if FIs anticipate
an illiquid market (q < 1), they will hoard liquidity (self-insurance and y∗ < 12).
Furthermore, this hoarding behavior worsen the adverse selection problem in the
market, and only lemons are available in the market (α∗ = 0), which implies
the market is illiquid (q∗ = RL < 1). The second equilibrium is said to be a
self-fulfilling liquidity dry-up.
A very similar paper is presented by Plantin (2009), in which the author
assumes that long-term assets will distribute proprietary information to their
holders in the future, because of this “learning by holding” behavior, a lemons
problem is created in the market. The fear of such lemons problem deters par-
ticipation in the market, thus current and future illiquidity reinforce each other
and generate a self-fulfilling liquidity problem even with a large pool of potential
investors. Eisfeldt (2004) also develops a model in which long-term assets are
illiquid due to adverse selection problem, and this illiquidity is less severe when
the productivity is high.
2.2.3 Cash-in-the-market pricing
The relationship between liquidity and asset prices plays a crucial role in the
fragility of FIs. Allen and Gale (1994) and Allen and Gale (1998) first illustrate
how asset prices depend on the liquidity of the market participants’ portfolios and
then Allen and Gale (2005) (hereafter AG05) provide a review of the literature
that explores the relation between asset price and financial fragility when markets
10Here, I ignore the unstable equilibrium when p = 1.
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and contracts are incomplete. If an aggregate shock requires several FIs to sell
assets at the same time, as the assets sales push asset prices lower, FIs are forced
to sell even more assets, which exacerbates further the decline in prices further.
The idea relies on the fact that supply and demand for liquidity are inelastic in
the short-run. This concept is called “cash-in-the-market pricing”.
More precisely, in AG05 there are two basic elements about liquidity.
On the demand side (liability side of balance sheet), following Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), liquidity preference is represented by uncertainty about future
time preferences. On the supply side (asset side of balance sheet), there are two
assets exhibit a trade-off between asset return and maturity. There are three dates
indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, a single all-purpose good, and two assets, short-term asset
(invested in storage technology) and long-term asset (invested in long-term risky
technology). Both technologies are the same as in BDD, for one unit invested ex-
ante, storage technology yields unit return at each date, and long-term technology
yields R > 1 at final date. Note that the trade-off is the short-term asset offers
immediate but lower return; the long-term asset offers higher but delayed return.
There is a continuum of ex-ante identical consumers, each with an endowment of
one unit of good at date 0. At interim date, consumer receives a preference shock.
With probability λ, he becomes an early consumer who only values consumption
at date 1 and with probability 1−λ he becomes a late consumer who only values
consumption at date 2. The expected utility is the same as in formula (2.1).
The only aggregate uncertainty concerns the demand for liquidity, in which the
number of consumers who desire to consume early is binomial. In different states
of world, λ takes two values 0 < λL < λH < 1 with equal probabilities. At interim
date, the true value of λ is realized.
For the purpose of illustration, suppose at t = 0, consumers invest their
endowments in a portfolio consisting of y units of short-term assets and 1 − y
units of long-term assets. Let qs denote the price of the long-term asset at t = 1
in states s = H, L. Market clearing at interim date requires that late consumers
are willing to hold the long-term asset, which strictly dominate short-term asset,
this implies that qs < R. In a given state s, the fraction of early consumers,
λs, is known with certainty and the only uncertainty is the consumer’s liquidity
preference. As in BDD, FIs can efficiently pool resources together and insure the
liquidity risk thus attain the social optimality.
At t = 0, consumers deposit their resources with a FI that offer them a
deposit contract in exchange. If the FI offers them a fully contingent contract,
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there is no need for or possibility of default. If FIs use (non-contingent) deposit
contracts, however, the ability of FIs to meet its obligation will highly depends
on the price of long-term assets, for some prices sufficiently low, default may be
unavoidable.
Suppose the deposit contract commit to pay a fixed amount d if con-
sumers withdraw early at interim date and the residual value of the portfolio
date final date. Since a late consumer has the option to withdraw at t = 1 and
storing the good until final date, he must receive as much as an early consumer.
Then the FI is solvent at t = 1 if the present value of consumption promised to
consumers does not exceed the present value of assets:
λd+ qs
R
(1− λ)d ≤ y + qs(1− y),
where qs
R
is the present value of one unit of the good at t = 2. The FI is insolvent
if this inequality is violated, therefore it must be liquidate all its assets and give
each depositor y + qs(1 − y). If the FI is solvent, in case of λd > y (short-term
asset can’t fully cover the early consumption), it supplies S units of assets so that
qsS + y = λd, it needn’t to liquidate any long-term asset in the case of λd ≤ y
(we don’t consider this simple case in the model); if FI is insolvent, it supplies
S = 1− y. Thus, the supply of asset is
S(q) =

λd−y
P
if q ≥ q∗ ≡ y−λd(1−λ)d/R−(1−y)
1− y if q < q∗ ≡ y−λd(1−λ)d/R−(1−y)
.
This supply function is a “backward bending supply curve” and has three impor-
tant features: i) there is a discontinuity at q = q∗; ii) for values of q > q∗, the
FI is solvent and the supply of asset is decreasing in price P , since the amount
of asset to be sold as the price of asset decreases; iii) when q < q∗, the supply of
asset is constant, since the price is too low and FI defaults and has to liquidate
all its long-term asset. In an interesting case where FI has to sell off (λd− y)/q
units of long-term asset to pay for λd − y units of consumption. The lower the
asset price q, the more of the asset must be sold. Some of the long-term asset
have to be hold to meet (1− λ)d units of date 2 consumption, if the price q falls
far enough, it is impossible to satisfy both early and late consumers. Any price
lower than q∗, will cause default and FI has to liquidate all its entire stock of the
long-term asset 1− y.
In summary, FIs can pool liquidity and offer non-contingent contract de-
posit contract. However, the lower the resale price, the more long-term assets the
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FI needs to be liquidated in order to honor its commitment towards consumers.
If the resale price is low enough, the FI goes bankrupt and then its entire holding
of long-term assets are sold on the market, creating a failure and even a “crisis”.
? have also stressed that long-term assets are particularly subject to market
liquidity risk. Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2011) studied this phenomenon
combine with adverse selection of long-term assets in the secondary market, they
show that the adverse selection may inefficiently accelerate asset liquidation.
2.2.4 Liquidity spiral
In Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the main liquidity problem comes from the in-
stability of the fractional reserve system. More specifically, this is because the
patient depositors may withdraw early and cause a funding liquidity problem for
FIs. Malherbe (2012) present a “restricted” BDD model, where FI cannot pool
the liquidity, he mainly focus on the market liquidity for FIs. However, an impor-
tant feature of modern counterpart run is characterized by collateral run, based
on this, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) illustrates that a FI’s funding liquid-
ity can reinforce each other with market liquidity, due to margin spiral and loss
spiral. Note that the cash-in-the-market pricing phenomenon (Allen and Gale
(1994), Allen and Gale (1998)) also stresses the link between these two types of
liquidity problem, but it’s presented in a static way.
In Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), when FIs buy an asset, they can
use this asset as collateral and borrow against it. However, the collateral value
is lower than the price of asset, the difference is called margin/haircut, m, which
have to be financed by FIs’ own capital. Similarly, capital is used as margin for
short-selling as well. Therefore, the margins cannot exceed the capital at any
time:
Σj(xj+t mj+t + xj−t mj−t ) ≤ Ct. (2.9)
Each risk-neutral FI finance xj+t mj+t with his own capital on the long-position of
asset j, whose total value is qitx
j+
t . It is the same for short-position xj−t mj−t .
Asset j’s conditional expected fundamental value vjt is assumed to follow
an ARCH process, which is described as follow:
vjt = vjt−1 + ∆vjt = vjt−1 + σjt jt , (2.10)
σjt+1 = σj + θj | ∆vjt |, (2.11)
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where jt ∼iid N(0, 1), and σj, θj ≥ 0. A positive θj implies that the future
volatility is positive correlated with the shocks to fundamental. Denote ωjt the
deviation of asset j’s price at time t, qjt , from the fundamental value. Define
the market illiquidity measure is the absolute value of this deviation, | ωjt |=|
qjt − vjt |. Note that this gap is zero when the market is perfect liquid, however
this phenomenon can be hardly realized in a world with credit constraint, since it
limits the market liquidity provision. Then FI invests all his capital such that his
credit constraint is binding and optimally trades only in asset with the highest
expected profit per dollar used, that is the ratio of the deviation from fundamental
over the unit margin. The measurement of FI’s funding liquidity is denoted by
φt, which is equal to the marginal value of an extra dollar.
Investors finance FIs with collateralized financing. They set the margins
based on Value-at-Risk of the adverse price variation. More precisely, the margin
mt is set large enough to cover the position’s α-VaR (αis set based on the investor’s
risk aversion):
α = Pr(−∆qjt+1 > mj+t |information sett), (2.12)
with formula (2.12), an explicit expression for margins mj+t can be determined,
with the short-position case is in the same logic behind. If the investors confound
with fundamental shocks and instantaneous shocks11 (very similar in the real
world), they will generate “destabilizing margins”. In this case, margins are
increasing in market illiquidity, the intuition is that these investors may translate
price volatility into fundamental volatility and this increases margins.
As FI’s wealth falls, which can be triggered by an independent shock ηt
or a low realization of fundamental value, the price discontinuously declines. This
continuity is referred as fragility of liquidity. On top of this liquidity fragility, the
price is also very sensitive to a negative shock on FI’s wealth (ηt < 0) due to two
liquidity spirals: the margin spiral and loss spiral that leads to deleverage. This
give a procyclical effect in the economy, and Adrian and Shin (2011) shows the
evidence on this issue based on the large U.S. investment banks’ data set. This is
because an initial loss may worsen the FI’s funding problem, then the position is
reduced (formula (2.9)), further the prices move away from fundamentals (market
illiquidity increases/| ωjt | large), investors set a higher margin (formula (2.12)),
in turn worsen the funding illiquidity further (margin spiral); meanwhile when
market illiquidity increases, FI also suffer a big loss from existing positions, which
will further limit FI’s credit constraint (loss spiral), and so on.
11Only the price process of asset is observable by the investors.
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2.3 Time dimension of macroprudential policy
In the previous section we have seen the sources that may trigger a financial
fragility to an individual FI. If the analysis just ends up at this stage, our knowl-
edge about the financial fragility will be at the same level as before the 2007-2009
financial crisis. This recent financial crisis has highlighted the need to go beyond
a purely micro approach to maintain the financial stability and has intensified the
theoretical and political interest in strengthening the macroprudential orientation
of the current regulatory framework. Macroprudential policy is a complement to
microprudential policy and it interacts with other types of public policy that
have an impact on financial stability (e.g. Monetary policy, fiscal policy, etc.).
Its goals are to address two dimensions of system-wide risk: first, the evolution
of risk over time – the “time dimension;” and second, the distribution of risk in
the financial system at a given point in time – the “cross-sectional dimension.”
In this section I present the time dimension of macro-prudential policy, and the
cross-sectional dimension will be presented in the next section.
The key issue in the time dimension is to mitigate or dampen financial
system procyclicality. A common explanation for the procyclicality of the finan-
cial system has its roots in the informational asymmetries between borrowers and
lenders. When economic conditions are depressed and collateral values are low
(high margin/haircut - this is very well explained by Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009) in the previous section), informational asymmetries can mean that even
borrowers with profitable projects find it difficult to obtain a funding. When eco-
nomic conditions improve and collateral values rise, these firms are able to gain
access to external finance and this adds to the economic stimulus. This explana-
tion of economic and financial cycles is often known as the “financial accelerator”.
Moreover, another source of procyclicality could be the risk-sensitive regulation.
As a result of this risk-sensitive regulation, a widespread concern about Basel II is
that it might amplify business cycle fluctuations, allowing banks to expand their
credit volume in the booming period and forcing banks to restrict their lending
when the economy falls into recession.
2.3.1 Asymmetric information channel
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) introduce imperfect information into a real-business-
cycle framework which extends to a two-period overlapping generation model, in
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which the project outcomes are only observable by risk-neutral entrepreneurs.
They borrow funds from lenders who suffer from a costly state verification prob-
lem (Townsend (1979)). A negative shock on entrepreneurs net worth may in-
crease the financing friction and decrease the current real capital investments.
The opposite results can be obtained if entrepreneurs receive a positive funda-
mental shock.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) (hereafter KM97) show how small shocks
to the economy might be amplified into a large output fluctuations by credit
constraint. In KM97 model, in the presence of credit contract with limited en-
forcement12, durable asset (land) plays two distinct roles: (i) the role of collateral
for debt and (ii) the role of productive input. In such an economy, the level of
credit limit to each firm positively depends upon the value of land, while the
demand for land is increasing in credit provided to each firm.
More specifically, in the model of KM97, two types of households with
different time preference rates are assumed: “patient” (Gatherers) and “impa-
tient” (Farmers). As the impatient households are not satisfied with the market
interest rates, they borrow from the patient household. When borrowing money,
they have to provide durable asset (land) as collateral. As the value of durable
asset (land) declines, so does the amount of debt they can acquire. This feeds
back into the land market, driving the price of land further down.
These two types of households are risk neutral and infinitely lived with
population 1 for Farmers and m for Gatherers. Farmer are productive agents
that characterized by (i) a constant-return-to-scale production function yt+1(kt)
which yields tradable output akt and nontradable output ckt in period t + 1 for
an input of kt of assets in period t, and (ii) a discount factor β < 1. Gatherers
are unproductive agents that characterized by (i) a decreasing-return-to-scale
production technology which yields output G(k′t) in period t + 1 for an input of
k
′
t of assets in period t, where G
′
> 0 and G′′ < 0, and (ii) a discount factor
β
′ ∈ (β, 1).
As mentioned before, productive agents will want to borrow from unpro-
ductive agents, but each productive agent’s technology is idiosyncratic13 and he
cannot precommit to work, so lenders will call for the land as collateral against
the money they lend to the borrowers. By assuming there is no uncertainty for
12See Hart and Moore (1994).
13In the sense that, once his production has started at date t with land kt, only he has the
skill necessary for the land to be harvest at date t+ 1.
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the future asset price, the productive agents’ credit constraint is given by:
Rbt ≤ qt+1kt. (2.13)
In equilibrium, when there is no shocks on output, productive agents
prefer to borrow up to the maximum and invest in land, consuming no more than
their current nontradable output and the credit constraint (2.13) binding. This
gives the following demand function for assets kt in period t:
kt =
1
qt − qt+1R
[(a+ qt)kt−1 −Rbt−1]. (2.14)
The term (a+ qt)kt−1 − Rbt−1 is the productive agent’s net worth given
by value of tradable output and current asset holdings from the previous period,
net of debt repayment. This net worth is levered up by the inverse of difference
between price of land, and the amount the farmer can borrow against each unit
of land as collateral. (qt− qt+1/R) = ut is the margin requirement implied by the
credit constraint.
The unproductive agents’ technology is not idiosyncratic, that say, if one
decide to quite the project there is always another one can continue to imple-
ment the project. Therefore, the productive agents are not credit constraint and
equilibrium interest is equal to their discount rate, R = 1/β ′ . An unproductive
agent’s demand for land is determined at the point at which the present marginal
benefit of land using is equal to the opportunity cost of holding land ut:
G
′(k′t)
R
= ut. (2.15)
Denoting aggregate quantities by capital letters and the total supply of
assets byK, market clearing in the assets market at t requires the total demand of
assets of productive and unproductive agents equals the total supply, Kt+mk
′
t =
K. Given the unproductive agent’s first order condition (2.15) this implies
ut = qt − 1
R
qt+1 =
1
R
G
′ [ 1
m
(K −Kt)] ≡ F (Kt). (2.16)
In equilibrium, the productive agents’ margin requirement ut is positively
related to their demand for assetsKt, since the unproductive agent’s technology is
concave. A less Kt gives that there is more assets being used in the unproductive
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agents’ technology which implies a lower marginal product. In equilibrium, this
lower marginal product is associated with a lower opportunity cost of holding
assets.
In the steady state, the margin requirement per unit of land is equal to
the productive agents’ marginal productivity of tradable output. This implies
the asset price in the steady state is
q∗ = a R
R− 1 , (2.17)
which implies that the total demand of assets K∗ for productive agents is given
by,
G
′ [ 1
m
(K −K∗)] = aR. (2.18)
Note that the input allocation is not efficient at steady state. Given the
linearity of productive agents’ production function, their marginal production is
always equal to a+c, larger than the marginal production for unproductive agents
is aR14. Therefore, around K∗, an increase for Kt causes a Pareto improvement
in the total output, since G′′ < 0.
The main contribution of KM97 model is that then they introduce an
unexpected shock to productivity and illustrate the dynamics of the economy.
This is also the main effect that I emphasize in this subsection that how the
procyclicality may appear in the economy. The response to this unexpected shock
is studied by the reaction of the model log-linearized around steady state. Before
all, suppose at period t− 1 the economy is in the steady state and then there is
a unexpected one-period shock that increases the production of both agents by a
factor 1 + ∆15 at period t.
Denote K̂t the percentage change in the asset holdings of productive
agent Kt relative to its steady state K∗ and for a given percentage change in
asset price q̂t. We have,
K̂t = (
1 + ξ
ξ
)−1(∆ + R1 +Rq̂t). (2.19)
where ξ > 0 denotes the elasticity of the unproductive agents’ residual asset
14Given the assumption that aR < a/β < a+ c.
15Here, ∆ is taken to be positive. To illustrate an adverse shock in the economy, one can
take ∆ to be negative as well.
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supply with respect to the opportunity cost at the steady state.16 The second
bracket of (2.19) shows that there is two positive effects to productive agents’ asset
holdings. The direct effect of the productivity shock ∆; and the indirect effect
by an unexpected rise in price q̂t and an increase in the value of asset holdings
from the previous period. Crucially, the second effect is scaled up by the factor
R/(1 + R) because of leverage.17 Finally, the sum of these two effects is scaled
down by the factor ξ/(1 + ξ), as the marginal production of unproductive agents
increase, in the market clear condition, which increase the opportunity cost that
limit the demand of asset for productive agents. For the following periods t+ 1,
t+ 2, ... we have
K̂t+s = (
1 + ξ
ξ
)−1K̂t+s−1. (2.20)
This shows that the initial productivity shock persist and affect asset holdings in
the following periods.
Then, the percentage change in asset price q̂t for given percentage change
in asset holdings K̂t, K̂t+1, and expression (2.16) tells us that the asset price is
the discounted sum of future opportunity cost, we have
q̂t =
1
ξ
R− 1
R
∞∑
s=0
R−sK̂t+s (2.21)
This shows that all changes in future asset holdings have an impact on today’s
asset price.
The percentage changes in K̂t and q̂t can be expressed as a function the
size of the shock ∆:
K̂t = [1 +
1
(R− 1)(1 + ξ) ]∆
q̂t =
1
ξ
∆
We see that for the variation of asset holdings, the amplification effect appears
from the term in the squared bracket is greater than one. In particular, the lower
interest rate R and elasticity ξ, the larger the amplification effect. In terms of
asset price, the initial shock ∆ implies the percentage change of the same order
of magnitude and again the effect is negatively related to the elasticity.
16 1
ξ =
dlogF (K)
dlogK |K=K∗
17This is easily seen from expression (2.17).
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The comparison between static and dynamic multiplier effects can be
done by artificially pegging qt+1, the price of asset at periodt + 1, at the steady
state level q∗. By doing so, the dynamic responses between asset holdings and
asset price are cut off. The proportional changes with respect to the shock ∆ are
summarized as follows:
Static Dynamic
K̂t 1 1(R−1)(1+ξ)
q̂t
R−1
R
1
ξ
1
R
1
ξ
The comparison shows clearly that the dynamic effect has a greater im-
portance than static effect for both K̂t and q̂t. Next, the output and productivity
response to the shocks is expressed as follow:
Ŷt+s =
a+ c−Ra
a+ c
(a+ c)K∗
Y ∗
K̂t+s−1 for s ≥ 1 (2.22)
With the formula (2.22), a procyclicality effect is clearly presented. A
productivity positive (negative) shock leads to a growth (reduction) of output and
of the value of collateral and increase (reduction) in borrowing, which increases
(reduces) output further; the multiplier effect amplify gains (losses). Note that
the effects of shocks in KM97 are completely symmetric.
One of the key sources of the procyclicality effect is that the borrower’s
human capital is inalienable, which is identified by Hart and Moore (1994). There-
fore, a credit constraint is imposed in the economy, which makes the net worth
of the borrower’s project important. In contrast, in an unconstrained economy,
the changes in the net worth of borrower do not have a significant effect on the
value of collateral and productivity. As a result, productivity shocks will have an
effect on output only in the period when they occur.
Beyond KM97, Gersbach and Rochet (2011) shows that credit cycles
can be harmful to social welfare even if there is no financial crisis. In Gersbach
and Rochet (2011), the interplay of three ingredients: i) moral hazard, ii) high
exposure to aggregate shocks and iii) possibility to reallocate capital across sec-
tors, characterizing the activities of modern banks, which gives the explanation
that when productivity shocks take place, the banking sector tends to exacer-
bate them generating excessive fluctuations of credit, output and asset prices.
More precisely, the moral hazard issue raised from that the banks are not will-
ing to shirk on their monitoring activities only if they have received sufficient
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information rents. These rents limit the size of the investment, since investors
participation constraint is sensitive to it.18 High exposure to aggregate shocks
suggest that banks’ assets returns are positively correlated. Last, flexibility of
investment decision guarantees that banks can reallocate capital between lines of
business. Myerson (2012) have also introduced a model of credit cycles driven by
moral hazard in FI. Furthermore, Gersbach and Rochet (2012) (hereafter GR12)
shows that, even in a complete market, there is an excessive credit fluctuation in
banking sector, and then provide a rational for imposing counter-cyclical capital
ratios in this sector.
More specifically, in GR12 model, it has three dates t = 0, 1, 2 and two
goods, consumption and capital goods; the total physical capital good is normal-
ized to 1. There is a continuum of bankers, each of them is endowed with wealth
e and E < 1 for aggregate level, they can access to a lending technology with
constant return to scale. Denote R the banks’ assets expected return. Bankers
can borrow from outside investors, whose endowment is 1−E, due to the financial
friction19, but they cannot fully pledge their future cash flow to its creditor. Like
in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), the rent have to be kept by banker is a multiple
ρk of the size k of investment. Apart from banking sector, there is a traditional
sector which has a decreasing-returns-to-scale technology with production func-
tion F (·). All agents are risk neutral. The aggregate uncertainty is at interim
date. The return on banking sector is Rs with probability λS, where s = {h, l},
for Rh is called s “boom” and for Rs is called a “recession”. The traditional sector
is independent on this uncertainty.
Note that, there is a contingent markets for capital at date 0, therefore,
bankers can obtain a state contingent capital endowment es. Once the state
realized at date 1, bankers invest ks units of capital with an amount of outside
funding ks − es from investors. In exchange, bankers promise to pay qs(ks − es)
units of consumption to investors at date 2, so qs can be interpreted as the deposit
rate/price of capital. The total output in the economy is sum of the outputs in
tow sectors: F (1−Ks) +RsKs, for Ks is the aggregate level of credit volume in
the economy for state s.
The complete markets assumption holds due to the fact that modern
banks have access to complex financial instruments that allow them to hedge
against macro-shocks. Therefore, it is possible for the bank to swap eh − e unit
of capital in “boom” against e− es units of capital in “recession” at a swap rate
18See Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) for details.
19The specific form of this financial friction does not matter.
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must be equal to λhqh
λlqs
. Thus the budget constraint of the bank writes as
E[qs(es − e)] = 0. (2.23)
From the investor’s participation constraint we know that the promised expected
repayment qs(ks − es) does not excess the bank’s maximum pledgeable income
(Rs−ρ)ks. Alternatively speaking, investors are willing to borrow their money to
banks if and only if their stake of cash flow is not less than their outside return.
As bankers take on as much leverage as they can, only equality holds, which
gives
es = ks(1− Rs − ρ
qs
), (2.24)
the bank will maximize the expected rent ρE[ks] by choosing the contingent
credit volumes (kh, kl) subject to the constraint obtained by plugging (2.24) into
(2.23):
E[ks(qs + ρ−Rs)− qse] = 0. (2.25)
Since both objective function and constraint (2.25) are linear in (kh, kl). The
only possible interior solution in equilibrium is such that the coefficient of ks in
constraint (2.25) is the same in both states.20 Denoting by q ≡ E[qs] the expected
price of capital and R ≡ E[Rs] the expected return on asset, the constraint (2.25)
can be simplified:
E[ks](q + ρ−R) = qe.
By aggregating this condition over all banks, we obtain the expected demand of
capital by bank.
E[Ks] =
E
1− R−ρ
q
. (2.26)
The non-arbitrage condition guarantees that for marginal productivity of capital
in traditional sector should be equal to the price of capital qs, in state of s:
qs = F
′(1 − Ks), which can be written as Ks = S(qs). By the property of the
coefficient of ks in equation (2.25) is the same, the expected supply of capital is:
Ks = S(Rs−R+q). Therefore, the expected price of capital q can be determined
by equaling expected supply and demand:
E[S(Rs −R + q)] = E1− R−ρ
q
. (2.27)
The intersection of demand and supply implies that, the volume of credit in-
creases with banking sectors’ aggregated initial capital E and decrease with the
20Since there is no evidence have shown that in any state the credit volume will be zero, the
corner solution can be ignored in this case.
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non transparency in banking sector ρ. So, when financial markets are complete,
there is a unique equilibrium denoted by Kc = (Kch, Kcl ) with prices (qch, qcl ).
This market equilibrium is procyclical, since Kch > Kcl and qch > qcl ; moreover,
this equilibrium is generally constraint inefficient. To illustrate this inefficiency,
consider a social planner who has the interest of maximizing the total expected
under an aggregate form of constraint (2.25) :
E[Ks(qs −Rs + ρ)] ≤ E[qs]E, (2.28)
which yields the optimal allocation (Koh, Kol ), and Koh < Kch and Kol > Kcl .21 This
is said that the total expected output in market equilibrium can be ameliorated
by reducing the aggregate credit volume in “boom” and increasing the aggregate
credit volume in “recession”. The result shows that the complete market do not
sufficiently stabilize credit fluctuations, as banks allocate too much borrowing
capacity to good states and too little to bad states.
At last, GR12 propose that, under mild conditions, by imposing an up-
per bound on credit in the good state, the regulator can restore the optimality
in the market. They also argue that the term “counter-cyclical capital buffer”
should be banned, since the standard notion of minimum capital as a buffer is
for absorbing losses and it is in the perspective of micro-prudential. Therefore,
the right term would be “Counter-cyclical Capital Ratio”, as its role is no longer
absorb losses but must be influencing the volume of bank lending. Furthermore,
the micro-prudential policy such as Basel II doesn’t work in this context because
it is procyclical by nature, we will investigate this effect in section 3.2. Shleifer
and Vishny (2010) also introduces a theoretical model to explain the cyclical be-
havior of credit and investment and identifies this is one of the key factors of the
instability of universal banking system.
2.3.2 Risk-sensitive regulation
Basel II introduced a menu of approaches to determine capital requirements,
which depends on the sophistication of a bank’s activities and on its internal risk
management capabilities. The standardized approach is based on external credit
ratings to refine the risk weights of the 1988 Accord (Basel I), but leaves the
capital charges for loans to unrated firms essentially unchanged. The internal-
rating based (IRB) approach allows banks to assign an exposure to different
21Note that qs = F
′(1−Ks).
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asset classes; within each class, banks assign a different internal grade to the
creditworthiness of borrowers. This implies that banks need to estimate the
one-year ahead probability of default (PD) of each borrower in foundation IRB
approach, and in the advanced IRB approach, they need to estimate the loss
given default (LGD), the exposure at default (EAD) and maturity (M) for each
borrower (for foundation IRB approach, these three variables are taken directly
from supervisors).
The issue of risk-sensitive regulation (Basel II) is that it may also amplify
the fluctuation of credit volume through the business cycle (Borio, Furfine, and
Lowe (2001) and Kashyap and Stein (2003)), which sows the seeds of the crisis
in the boom and impairs the lending capacity in downturn prolonging the crisis
period. For example, under the IRB approach of Basel II, capital requirements
are an increasing function of the four variables mentioned above. During the
booming period, these variables are low and determine a low capital requirement,
generating a massive credit growth and asset credit bubbles; however, during the
recession, these variables sharply increase along with a high requirement of capi-
tal and lead to a limitation in the supply of credit. Note that, in downturn, it is
difficult or costly for bank to raise new external capital, by maintaining the same
capital requirement ratio,22 it will be forced to reduce its lending activity, thereby
amplify the initial downturn. Some other papers also point out the potential im-
portance of the procyclical effects of risk-sensitive capital requirements before the
financial crisis, for example, Danielsson, Embrechts, Goodhart, Keating, Muen-
nich, Renault, and Shin (2001) and Gordy and Howells (2006). Adrian and Shin
(2011) shows that there is a strong positive link between the leverage growth and
assets growth in investment banking sector. This result is the consequence of the
countercyclical nature of the individual risk measure and the relevant regulatory
framework is based on this risk measure.23
In order to go into the details of shortcomings of this risk-sensitive capital
regulation, it is worth starting to point out the underlying economic goals of bank
capital regulation. As with any form of financial regulation, the purpose of bank
capital regulation is to minimize the market failure and make the financial system
more stable. From this perspective, for a social planner, it is quite reasonable
to increase the capital when the economic environment becomes bad. However,
this is not the only aspect that the social planner should care about, he should
also continue to put weight on those objectives of banks that were properly take
22The set of risk weights assigned to loans is unchanged.
23The risk measure mentioned here is the Value-at-Risk.
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into account at first place, for example, making positive net present value (NPV)
loans. This demonstrates a trade-off between bank’s riskiness and bank’s profit,
therefore, for any capital regulation only focus on the riskiness of bank would be
suboptimal. In contrast to this trade-off type logic, Basel II approach can be seen
as a single “risk curve”,24 which relates the capital charge solely to the riskiness
of loan portfolio. The problem with such a single once-and-for-all curve is that
this essentially takes the market failure as the only factor in the social planner’s
objective function and completely ignoring the importance of bank lending activ-
ity. This is the root that make capital requirements may inefficiently exacerbate
cyclical fluctuation in credit volume.
Why this “single risk curve” may lead to a inefficient procyclical effect?
For instance, consider the economy is in downturn, and this will generate two
effects. First, there is a loss on existing loan positions, thereby eroding bank’s
capital. Second, the existing non-default loans are likely to become riskier, which
says the variables in the IRB approaches have sharply increased for these loans.
Thus, the capital requirement under this “single risk curve” will go up. This
will further tighten the overall capital constraint, putting additional downward
pressure on lending activity. In terms of economic efficiency, the key factor of
interest is the shadow value of bank capital. As in Repullo (2012), this shadow
value of bank capital is the Lagrange multiplier of capital availability constraint
λ, which measures the variation of social welfare (including the positive NPV
lending opportunity) resulting from a marginal variation in the scarcity of capital.
A higher λ indicates that the bank capital becomes more scarce and, hence, more
severe issues of underinvestment in terms of lending, and ultimately in terms
of social welfare. If a time-fixing capital requirement ratio has implemented
through the whole business cycle; during the crisis, λ will increase25, it leads to
a excessive low lending activities generating an inefficient procyclicality effect.
From the perspective of the tradeoff mentioned above, this risk-sensitive capital
regulation would be suboptimal.
Cyclical adjustment of capital requirements. Repullo (2012) explicitly in-
troduces a social planner whose objective function has indeed considered the
tradeoff mentioned above. This paper shows that the optimal capital require-
ments are greater than the capital that banks are willing to hold voluntarily if
there is no capital requirement imposed on them. This is because when bank fail-
ures entails a social cost, and this effect won’t be taken into account when banks’
24In Basel II, capital requirement ratio is time-fixing.
25Since, during the crisis, a negative shock will take place at the supply side of bank capital,
and implies a higher scarcity of bank capital relative to positive BNP lending opportunities.
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managers make their decisions. Moreover, when a negative shock to the aggregate
bank capital supply, which could be interpreted as the result of a downturn in
the economy that produces losses to the banks’ loan portfolio and consequently
reduces their capital. This leads to a higher shadow value of bank capital, which
implies a shrink of banks’ lending in order to economize on scarce bank capi-
tal; moreover, the optimal capital requirement is deceasing in λ, the intuition is
that the optimal way to accommodate the shock in the aggregate supply of bank
capital is to reduce capital requirements in order to avoid the sharp reduction
in aggregate investment. Therefore, the optimal capital requirements should be
cyclical adjustable, to avoid the bank lending to bear the entire brunt of the
adjustment. The paper also offers a comparison of cyclical adjustment of cap-
ital requirements and time-fixing capital requirements facing a 25% decrease of
aggregate bank capital supply:
Cyclical adjustment Time-fixing
Aggregate investment Ia > If
Social welfare Sa > Sf
The compassion table clearly states that in terms of aggregate investment
and social welfare, the cyclical adjustment capital requirements is more efficient
than the one for time-fixing capital requirement à la Basel II. This concludes that
the countercyclical capital requirements in Basel III is a good start for dealing
the procyclical effects in the economy.
Repullo and Suarez (2012) presents a dynamic equilibrium model and
business cycle is characterized by a Markov process that determines probability
of default. In their model, they restrict that banks are unable to access the equity
markets every period. As in Kashyap and Stein (2003) and Repullo (2012), they
introduce a social cost of bank failure,26 and claim that when this social cost
is small, even the Basel II is significantly more procyclical then Basel I, but,
is still more efficient in social welfare sense. When this cost is becoming high,
again, they show that Basel III points in the right direction, with higher but less
cyclically-varying capital requirements.
26Note that if there is no social cost of bank failure, it is unnecessary to introduce capital
requirement, which is shown by Repullo (2012)
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2.4 Cross-sectional dimension of macroprudential policy
2.4.1 Interbank activities and contagion
It is well known that the interbank lending can reduce individual FI’s liquidity
problem in the whole financial system (Battacharya and Gale (1987)). Decentral-
ized interbank lending usually implies that banks have incentives to monitor each
other. However, due to the implicit government guarantees (Lender of Last Re-
sort), a moral hazard issue may arise in this market and destroy peer-monitoring
among banks. Based on these effect, Rochet and Tirole (1996), one of the first
papers (see Goldstein and Pauzner (1996)), take into account the contagion ef-
fect between banks. That is to say if a single bank is about to fail, due to the
interbank linkage, the balance sheet of the other banks, which lent to it, will be
weakened and thus in a danger of failure.
Allen and Gale (2000) presents a model where the optimal allocation can
be decentralized by a competitive banking sector and then explain how a small
shock on a few banks spread to the rest of the financial system and provide the
microeconomic foundations for financial contagion. More precisely, the model
is based on the Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Allen and Gale (1994) and Allen
and Gale (1998) (in section 2), the key difference is that there are 4 different
banks A, B, C and D constitute as a financial system. For each bank, it receives
different liquidity shocks, and there are two equally likely states S1 and Ss. The
corresponding realization of the liquidity preference shocks are given in the table
below:
A B C D
S1 λH λL λH λL
S2 λL λH λL λH
.
The average fraction of early consumers be denoted by q = (λH+λL)/2, al
and as are the per capital amount invested in the long and short asset respectively.
So, the representative bank i holds an investment portfolio (ais, ail) = (as, al) and
offers a deposit contract (Ci1, Ci2) = (C1, C2). In the same logic with BDD model,
a planner choose to make each bank has as = qC1 units of the short asset, which
provide qC1 units early consumption. If the state S1 is realized at interim date, so
banks A and C each have an excess demand for (λH − q)C1 units of consumption
and banks B and D each have an excess supply of (q − λL)C1 = (λH − q)C1
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units of consumption. By reallocating this consumption, each bank’s needs can
be satisfied. At date 2, an opposite direction transaction will be taken place in
order to satisfy the needs for the late consumption.
Suppose a complete markets and an exchange of deposits is allowed at
t = 0.27 Assume every bank i holds an aggregate deposit 3(λH − q)/2 in others
banks j 6= i, since this aggregate deposit is equally divided in other banks and
every bank i holds di = (λH − q)/2 > 0 deposits in each of the bank j 6= i.
Consider the budget constraint of a bank which face a high liquidity
demand. It must pay C1 to the fraction λH of early consumers and dj = (λH −
q)/2 units of deposit to the other high demand bank. So, the total demand for
repayment is [λH + (λH − q)/2]C1. On the other side, it has as units of the short
asset and aggregate deposit 3(λH − q)/2 in the other banks. Thus, the budget
constraint must be satisfied is
[λH + (λH − q)/2]C1 = as + 3(λH − q)/2,
which can be simplified as planner’s choice qC1 = as. Banks with low demand for
liquidity must pay C1 to a fraction λL to satisfy early consumer and the deposits
of 2 high demand banks (λH − q). It has as units of short asset at hand, so the
budget constraint that must be satisfied is
[λL + (λH − q)]C1 = as.
Since λH − q = q− λL, this equation simplifies to the planner’s constraint qC1 =
as. In both cases, the interbank activities allow banks to meet the demands of
their early consumption needs without liquidating long asset. At the final date,
all the banks liquidate their remaining asset and it is easy to show that if the
budget constraints at interim date are satisfied, the budget constraints at the
final date are automatically satisfied too, (1− q)C2 = Ral. Thus, by reallocating
deposits among the different banks, it is possible for banks to satisfy their budget
constraints in each state S and at each date t = 0, 1, 2 while providing their
deposits with the first-best consumption allocation through a standard deposit
contract.
Since the complete market assumption may not be realistic in some cases,
an incomplete market structure case may raise in this case. Specifically, each bank
27The complete market refers to the each bank has an access to the other banks in the system,
which means that the deposits can be circulated between banks without any difficulties.
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holds deposits only in one adjacent bank (see figure below). That is said that
bank A can hold deposits in bank B, bank B can hold deposits in bank and so on.
By assuming that the bank holds di = (λH − q) deposits in the adjacent bank at
the first date, that is, the bank A holds (λH − q) deposits in bank B, and so on.
Note that, the market structure has the property that every bank with a high
liquidity shocks has deposits in a bank with low liquidity shocks, and vice versa.
In this scenario, the results show that the first best allocation can be reached
by shuffling deposits through the interbank market, even if the interbank deposit
market is incomplete.
A → B
↑ ↓
D ← C
Now, a state S3 has been introduced to “perturb” the model. In this
state, the aggregate demand for liquidity is greater than the system’s ability to
supply liquidity. The market structure is the same in the previous incomplete
markets case. Note that, the probability of state S3 converges to zero, so it
will not change the allocation at date 0. The liquidity shocks among banks is
summarized as follow:
A B C D
S3 q +  q q q
.
In state S3, every bank has the previous average demand for liquidity q
except for bank A where the demand for liquidity is higher q+ . The crucial fact
is that the expected demand for liquidity across all for banks is slightly higher
than in state S1 and S2. This perturbation can be interpreted as a banking
crisis in bank A. At the equilibrium, consumers will optimally decide whether to
withdraw early or late, early consumers always withdraw at interim date; late
consumers will withdraw at interim date or final date depending on which gives
them the larger amount of consumption. Bank may liquidate their long asset in
order to meet the demand for liquidity. The following analysis is focused on state
S3, assuming the allocations consistent with the first best at date 0.
If a bank can meet the demands of every depositor who wants to withdraw
(including other banks) by using only its liquidity asset, this bank is said to be
solvent. If a bank can meet the demands of its depositors but only by liquidating
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some of the long asset, this bank is said to be insolvent. If a bank cannnot meet
the demands of its depositors by liquidating all its long assets, this bank is said to
be bankrupt. On the left side of bank’s balance sheet, each bank has three different
assets, short asset, deposit as adjacent bank and long asset. However, the cost
of obtaining current consumption (interim date) in terms of future consumption
(final date) is different. The cheapest is short term asset, since one unit short asset
is worth one unit consumption all the time, so the cost of obtaining liquidity by
selling short asset is 1. Similarly, by liquidating one unit of deposits, the bank give
up C2 units of future consumption and obtains C1 units of present consumption.
So, the cost of obtaining by liquidating deposits is C2/C1. From the equation
(2.2), we know that C2/C1 > 1. Finally, cost of obtaining liquidity by liquidating
long asset is R/l.28 Therefore, the liquidation pecking order is short assets will
be liquidated before it liquidates deposits in other bank before liquidate its long
assets:29
1 < C2
C1
<
R
l
. (2.29)
Let vi denotes the value of representative bank’s deposits in bank i at
interim date. If vi is lower then the value of deposits at interim date, C1, if the
bank is not bankrupt; then all the depositors will withdraw as much as then can
at interim date. In particular, the other banks will be seeking to withdraw their
claims on the bank at the same time, then the value is of vi must be determined
simultaneously
vi =
as + lal + (λH − q)vi−1
1 + (λH − q) , (2.30)
where vi−1 is the value of the adjacent bank’s deposit. The denominator of
equation (2.30) is consumers in bank i hold 1 deposit and the bank which take
bank i as a adjacent bank hold (λH − q) deposits. The sum of the two multiply
by the bank i’s deposit value, vi, is the value of liabilities of bank i. The value
of liabilities must be equal to the value of assets, which is the sum of the value
of short asset, the liquidation value of long assets and the value of deposits in
adjacent bank i− 1. Note that the assets value is the same as the numerator of
equation (2.30). vi can be determined if vi−1 = C1, but if vi−1 < C1, we need
another equation which include the value of vi−2, and so on.30
28This is the same as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), since early liquidation of long asset
only yields l per unit invested ex ante.
29Without loss of generality, C2C2 <
R
l , is held by assumption, since one can always choose l
sufficiently small.
30Note that this value of vi−2 is the deposit value of the bank i − 2. This is the adjacent
bank of bank i− 1.
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Suppose that a bank is insolvent and the late consumers will not run the
bank since they can obtain at least C1 at final date. So, the bank has to keep at
least (1 − λ)C1/R units of long asset satisfy the late consumers. Therefore, the
amount of consumption obtained by liquidating the long asset without causing a
run is
b(λ) ≡ l(al − (1− λ)C1/R), (2.31)
where b(λ) is called as the bank’s buffer.
The bank A can meet its demand for liquidity without help from the
other banks if and only if its buffer can cover the additional withdraw:
b(q + ) ≥ C1. (2.32)
However, this condition can be satisfied only in the case  > 0 is small enough.
For large value of , the condition in (2.32) will be violated, and bank A will go
bankrupt. The condition of bank A will go bankrupt is
b(q + ) < C1. (2.33)
Although they have deposits in adjacent bank B, these deposit are of no use as
long as the value of deposits in bank A is vA = C1. Once the bank A bankrupt,
there will be a contagion effect on bank D. From equation (2.30), bank D will
suffer a loss when cross holdings of deposits are liquidated. If  is not too large,
the bank D may be insolvent to meet its demands of liquidity by liquidating
some of long assets. If  is large enough, the contagion effect will devour bank
D’s buffer, then bank D will go bankrupt too. The liquidation of long assets in
bank D will causes a loss in bank C, and with initial , the contagion effect will
make bank C go bankrupt too. The initial losses has a snow ball effect as the
contagion matters from bank to bank and the more losses have accumulated from
liquidating the long assets.
Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) analyze the risk of contagion runs
through the payment system and focus on the interbank market exposes the
system to a coordination failure. However, Allen and Gale (2000) shows that
interbank markets provide optimal liquidity insurance when banks are subject
to idiosyncratic shocks and focus on the aggregate liquidity shocks may lead to a
contagion among these banks. Both of them have the similar summing-up, they
show that each bank’s level of buffer is a key determinant of contagion and the
failure of one bank has an impact on the propagation of systemic crisis. At last,
they also show that the systemic crisis is triggered by cross-holding of assets and
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liabilities among banks.
Interbank network model. One of the most pervasive aspects of the contem-
porary financial system is the rich network of interconnections among financial
institutions. Although the financial liabilities owed by one firm to another are
usually modeled as unidirectional obligations dependent only on the financial
health of the issuing bank, in reality, the liability structure of corporate obliga-
tions is invariably much more intricate. The value of most banks is dependent
on the payoffs they receive from their claims on other banks. The value of these
claims depends, in turn, on the financial health of yet other banks in the system.
Moreover, linkages between banks can be cyclical. A default by bank A on its
obligations to bank B may lead B to default on its obligations to bank C. A
default by C may, in turn, have a feedback effect on A. This example illustrates
a general feature of financial system architectures, which is cyclical interdepen-
dence. In Eisenberg and Noe (2001) (Hereafter EN01), the paper has considered
the problem of finding a clearing mechanism in cases in which this sort of cyclical
interdependence is present. Unlike Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas, Parigi, and
Rochet (2000), they focus on the liquidity issue of banks, this paper is mainly
focus on the solvency problem of the banks.
More precisely, in EN02 model, there are N nodes. Each of these nodes is
to be thought of as a bank, participating in the clearing network. The structure of
liabilities is represented as n×n liabilities matrix L, where Lij > 0 represents the
nominal liability of bank i to node j. A bank has no liabilities to itself, so Lii = 0,
for all i = 1, ... , N . Let ei be the exogenous operating cash flow received by
bank i. A financial system is thus a pair (L, e) consisting of a nominal matrix
L and an operating cash flow vector e. Let qi represent the total dollar payment
by bank i to the other banks in the system. Let q = (q1, q2, ... , qn) represent
the vector of total payments made by the banks. Let di represent total nominal
obligation of banki to all other banks, that is,
di =
n∑
j=1
Lij,
Let d = (d1, d2, ... , dn) represent the associated vector, which term the total
obligation vector. Let
Πij =

Lij
di
if di > 0
0 otherwise
,
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and let Π31 represent the corresponding matrix, which is the relative liabilities
matrix. This matrix captures the nominal liability of one bank to another in the
system as a proportion of debtor bank’s total liabilities. Due to the assumption
of that all debt claims have equal priority, the total payments received by i are
equal to ∑nj=1 Πjiqj. Then the terminal wealth of bank i is
n∑
j=1
ΠTijqj + ei − qi,
or in matrix notation a vector of terminal wealth is
(ΠT − I)p+ e,
and a financial system (L, e) can be described by the corresponding triple (Π, d,
e).
Intuitively, a clearing vector should satisfy these three criteria, a) limited
liability, which requires that the total payments made by a bank must never
exceed the cash flow available in the bank; b) the priority of debt claims, which
requires that stockholders in the bank receive no value until the bank is able
to completely pay off all of its outstanding liabilities; c) proportionality, which
requires that if default occurs, all claimant banks are paid by the defaulting bank
in proportion to the size of their nominal claim on firms assets. Therefore, we
have the following definition.
Definition 1. A clearing payment vector for the system (Π, d, e) is a vector q∗
such that for all i ∈ N
q∗i = min[di, max(
n∑
j=1
pijiq
∗
j + ei, 0)].
Thus, the clearing payment vector directly gives us two important in-
sights: for a given structure of liabilities and bank values (Π, d, e) it tells us
which banks in the system are insolvent (q∗i < di) and it tells us the recovery rate
for each defaulting bank ( q
∗
i
di
).
EN01 has proved that under mild regularity condition this clearing pay-
ment vector is unique and always exists. They have also developed a fictitious
31By the construction of matrix Π, we have ∀i, ∑nj=1 Πij = 1.
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default algorithm to find this clearing vector. Note that, this paper does not
tell us which bank is the most systemically important bank and only take into
account the solvency problem in the model, meanwhile to obtain a rich interbank
data will not be a easy task. Therefore, all these issues limit the usefulness of the
model. Demange (2012) elaborates the network model further, in the paper she
identifies a threat index which may help to assess the contributions of individual
banks to the risk in the system. Gautier, He, and Souissi (2010) combines Morris
and Shin (2009) and EN01, they incorporate the liquidity problem into a network
model. See also Gourieroux, Heam, and Monfort (2012).
Numerical example.(EN01 - Fictitious default algorithm) To illustrate the key
concepts of the network model, consider a banking system composed three hypo-
thetical banks in which liabilities matrix is given by:
L =

0 1 1
0 0 1
1 0 0

The columns of L refer to the claims each bank has on each of the re-
maining two banks. For example, bank 3 holds claim of 1 with bank 1 and a
claim of 1 with bank 2. The rows of L represents the liabilities vis-à-vis the other
banks in the system. In this example, bank 1 has liabilities of 1 against bank 1
and bank 2. Total interbank liabilities of banks toward the rest of the system
are therefore given by the vector d = (2, 1, 1), where the three components cor-
respond to total liabilities of bank 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Assume that we can
summarize the net wealth of the banks that is generated from all other activities
by a vector e = (12 , 0, 0).
The normalized liability matrix Π is given by
Π =

0 12
1
2
0 0 1
1 0 0

Note that Π′d provides each bank’s total interbank assets. To determine
the clearing vector associated with the above structure on the interbank market,
let us first assume that all banks fulfill all their interbank liabilities. Under this
assumption, the net value of a given bank can be derived as the sum of its full
interbank income plus its outside net wealth, minus its total promised interbank
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payment to other banks:
0 0 1
1
2 0 0
1
2 1 0
×

2
1
1
+

1
2
0
0
−

2
1
1
 =

−12
0
1

We arrive at a negative net value for bank 1 which is therefore insolvent.
We refer to this as a fundamental default.
Lets assume that other banks fulfill their obligations towards bank 1
which implies that bank 1’s net value before any interbank payment is 32 . This
amount, given the assumed proportional sharing rule, is allocated to bank 2 and
3, then the following banks’ net wealth:
0 0 1
1
2 0 0
1
2 1 0
×

3
2
1
1
+

1
2
0
0
−

3
2
1
1
 =

0
−14
3
4

The resulting net value of bank 2 is negative. The insolvency of bank
1 reduces the interbank claim of bank 2 to such an extent that it fails to keep
its interbank promises (bank 2 is only able to pay 34 rather than 1), and become
insolvent as well. That is what we call a contagious default. Applying again the
proportional sharing rule we obtain
0 0 1
1
2 0 0
1
2 1 0
×

3
2
3
4
1
+

1
2
0
0
−

3
2
3
4
1
 =

0
0
1
2

The outcome of the network model is a clearing vector which makes all
interbank claims consistent. In this example, this vector is q∗ = (32 ,
3
4 , 1)
′ and is
unique.
2.4.2 Fire-sales externalities
Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin (2005), building on EN02, incorporate the required
capital ratio on banks to show the limited capacity of the financial markets to
absorb sales of assets, where the price repercussion of asset sales have important
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adverse welfare consequences (in line with the cash-in-the-market pricing (Allen
and Gale (1994) and Allen and Gale (1998)) presented in the section 2.3). The
mechanism is that when banks have to satisfy their capital ratio, sometimes they
have to liquidate part of their long term assets, given that the market’s demand for
long tern assets (illiquid assets) is less than perfect elastic, henceforth marked-to-
market asset prices decrease. This low level of prices may endogenously generate
another round of asset sales, which depresses prices further and induce further
sales. Since the assets are marked-to-market, an small initial shock may generate
contagious failures in the whole system. Diamond and Rajan (2005) study the
fact that the inefficient liquidation of long term assets may leads to an analogous
effect, different from Diamond and Dybvig (1983), they find that bank runs are
triggered by the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet. The shortage of aggregate
liquidity that such liquidations bring about can generate contagious failures in
the banking system. Note that, in the first paper, banks liquidate their long
term assets is in the purpose of satisfying the required capital ratio, however, the
second one is subject to a bank run.
Fire sales externality. From GR12 we have seen that banks may issue exces-
sive loans during boom periods. However, this excessive loans issued is directly
followed by an over-borrowing ex-ante, as shown in Lorenzoni (2008), which gen-
erate a pecuniary externality since the atomistic banks do not take into account
the effect of asset sales on prices, and this pecuniary externality has a negative
effect on social welfare. The basic idea of fire sale externality is as follow. An
increase in ex-ante investment will imply an increase in ex-post sale of assets
during crisis, therefore lower the price of asset. If the seller of asset has a larger
marginal utility than the buyer and the insurance market is missing, this ex-ante
investment generates a negative pecuniary externality. This implies that equilib-
rium is constrained inefficient and there is an over-borrowing and over-investment
ex-ante, which provide a rationale for appropriate regulation - macroprudential
regulation.
Building on KM97, in the model of Lorenzoni (2008), there are two sec-
tors, banking sector and traditional sector which are similar as described in GR12
and there are three dates t = 0, 1, 2. Investors receive an large endowment, w,
of dollars at all dates and have the preference C0 + C1 + C2. banks are endowed
of dollars, e, at date 0 and have the preference C2. They can borrow or save
between dates 0 and 1 subject to constraints below. For simplicity there is no
borrowing-saving between dates 1 and 2. At date 1, the states s ∈ {h, l︸︷︷︸
crisis
} is
realized with probability λh and λl respectively.
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Banks invest k0 units of capital good at date 0, which yields cash flow
Rh, Rl at date 1. At interim date, bank chooses a continuation size, k1s, depends
on the realization of the state; if k1s−k0 > 0, then bank makes new investment, if
k1s−k0 < 0, then bank sells his capital on the market. At date 2, the continuation
size yields Ak1s dollars, where A > 1. The capital is also subject to maintenance
costs γ at date 1 (as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998)), that is said the capital is
productive only if this cost is paid, otherwise it will be fully depreciated. Denote
qS as the capital price at interim date on the market, assume qs > γ, so one
always has the willingness to pay this maintenance cost. Therefore, the net cash
flow is denoted as fs = Rs − γ, and by assumption, fl < 0 and fh > 0 and large,
so that there are asset sales in crisis but not in good state.
At date 1, investor can also convert capital to consumption good with
technology F (k¯1s) and assume F
′(0) = 1 < A and F ′(k¯1s) is bounded below by
q > γ. As described above, capital traded in a competitive market at price qs. If
k1s > k0, we have k¯1s = 0 and the price qs = 1; if k1s < k0, we have qs = F
′(k¯1s)
and k¯1s = k0 − k1s. Note that the market clearing condition is
qs = F
′( [k0 − k1s]+︸ ︷︷ ︸
nonnegative part
). (2.34)
Bank borrows from investors using a contingent and safe debt contracts
(b1sk0), which is normalized by capital for simplicity. b1sk0 is the promised re-
payment in state s and total amount borrowed is Σsλsb1sk0. Therefore, bank’s
budget constraints are
Date 0 : k0 ≤ w + Σsλsb1sk0Date 1 : qsk1s ≤ w1s ≡ (qs + fs − b1s)k0 . (2.35)
Due to the presence of financial friction on both sides of bank (limited access to
external funds for banks) and investor (limited ability for banks to insure ex-ante
aggregate liquidity shocks), these imply
b1s ∈ [0, qs − γ]. (2.36)
Therefore, banks have an optimization problem: maxb1s ΣsλsAk1s, subject to
constraints (2.35)-(2.36) for each state s. Since this optimization problem is
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linear in net worth, and the problem can be reformulated as
z0 ≡ max{b1s∈[0,qs−γ]}
1
1− Σsλsb1s︸ ︷︷ ︸
k0 per w
Σsλsz1s(qs + fs − b1s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
w1s per k0
, (2.37)
where z1s = Aqs is the date 1’s marginal return on net worth, since at date 1,
bank can buy capital at the price qs, one dollar of internal funds can thus be
leveraged by a factor 1
qs
, at date 2 this investment gives A per unit of capital.
Similarly at date 0, one extra dollar of internal funds can be leveraged by a factor
of 1/(1− Σsλsb1s) and capital invested gives a random net payoff (qs + fs − b1s)
at date 1, which will be reinvested at rate of return z1s. Averaging across states
we obtain expression (2.37). The optimal debt choice is given by the first-order-
condition with respect to b1s, when z0 > z1s the bank will choose b1s = (qs − γ),
when z0 < z1s the bank will choose b1s = 0, and an interior choice will only arise
if z0 = z1s.
Now, consider the asset market at date 1. The net investment by the
banks is derived the date 1’s budget constraint from equation (2.35)
k1s − k0 = fs − b1s
qs
k0. (2.38)
Note that, as fl < 0 and fh > 0 and large, in good state, banks are asset
buyer because k1h > k0 and qh = 1; however, in crisis state, banks are asset seller
because k1l < k0 and ql < 1. Under mild condition, in state of crisis, two equations
(2.34) and (2.38) ensure a unique intersection between these two curve. Since the
equation (2.38) characterize a negative relationship between asset prices, ql and
the net supply of asset, k0 − k1l, we obtain again the same result as in Allen and
Gale (2005). Importantly, the date 0’s budget constraint in equation (2.35) gives
an explanation for an increase in debt increases the initial investment
k0 =
w
1− Σsλsb1s ,
and leads to an increase in ex-ante borrowing increases a loss in crisis period,
−(fl − b1l)k0 and to a fall in equilibrium price. This is the fire sales in the crisis
state.
In competitive equilibrium the price of asset is lower in crisis state than
good state, qcl < qch = 1. Define the debt capacity in high state as, ρˆ = λh(1− γ)
and the ratio of outside borrowing to total investment as, ρ = Σsλsb1s. Note
that only in the case that ρ > ρˆ, the bank will borrow against profit in the crisis
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state.
Now turn to the social planner’s perspective. Different from market equi-
librium, the social planner takes into account the relation between the financial
contract and the equilibrium price on the capital market. That is the social plan-
ner’s problem will include the constraint (2.34). On top of that, planner will put
another minimum utility constraint for investor to attain the constrained optimal-
ity. That is to make banks better off keeping investors as good as in equilibrium.
So, the main difference from market equilibrium is that the planner takes into
account effect of b1s and k0 on qs. Denote ρc = Σsλsb1s the date 0 borrowing in
equilibrium and ρ∗ = Σsλsb1s the date 0 borrowing under social planner’s pro-
gram. Then ρ∗ ≤ ρc, and there is a overborrowing effect in market equilibrium
caused by the pecuniary externalities. The intuition is as follows. For a reduction
in k0 by a corresponding reduction in initial borrowing leads to a reduction in fire
sales in the crisis and dql > 0. This implies a transfer of (k0 − k1l)dql > 0 from
investors to banks, in order to keep investors have the same utility, banks have to
compensate investors ex-ante for this loss with a date 0 transfer λl(k0 − k1l)dql.
So the banks will loose a part of marginal return on net worth at date 0 for an
amount of z0λl(k0− k1l)dql, but they will gain a marginal return on net worth at
date 1 for an amount z1lλl(k0− k1l)dql. In case of z1l < z0, the net gain from less
borrowing ex-ante is (z1l − z0)λl(k0 − k1l)dql.
Other papers have also stressed this point such as in Korinek (2011) and
Bianchi (2011). The former shows that the banks can buy an insurance against
the aggregate uncertainty but this insurance is costly. The latter provides a quan-
titative assessment of macroeconomic and welfare implications of overborrowing
and allows for the evaluation of the benefits of policy measures to correct these
externalities. All these suggest a macroprudential regulation tool to deal with
the banks liquidity in order to prevent fire sales externalities.
Liquidity regulation. A lesson we learnt from the recent financial crisis is that
the rapid expansion of credit has been largely funded by short-term funding, and
this exposes banks to liquidity risk. Some economists have proposed a price rule as
liquidity regulation to make the banks to internalize the fire sales externalities in
the market. Perotti and Suarez (2011) propose a Pigouvian approach to liquidity
regulation, which aimed at equating private and social liquidity cost by imposing
a tax on short-term debt. The model compares the first order condition of market
case and social optimal case, in order to make individual banks internalize the
externalities issued on others, the paper propose a Pigouvian tax which is equal
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to extra term in the first order condition in social optimal case.32 Alternatively
speaking, this tax imposed on individual banks can make the private marginal
cost equals to the social marginal cost to help to attain the efficiency in the
market case. By imposing such a tax, market equilibrium can be corrected to
coincide with the social optimal. This is what so called price-based approach in
liquidity regulation.
In addition to this, there are also two quantity-based instruments such
as liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio have been introduced in
Basel III. Both liquidity ratios have the objective to lower the probabilities that
a bank runs into a liquidity difficulties. More precisely, net stable funding ratio
is aiming at the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet, which impose an upper
bound on short-term debt to reduce overall liquidity risk. Liquidity coverage ratio
requires bank to maintain a level of high-quality assets that can be converted into
cash needs to meet its liquidity needs for on month. So, the overall purpose is to
encourage the banks to hold higher liquidity buffers (+ higher quality) and lower
maturity risk. An open question will be raised here, according to Malherbe (2012),
should the liquidity coverage ratio also be set in a counter-cyclical manner? The
argument is that when one hold liquidity buffer during the crisis (during which
banks will anticipate a low price of asset) will worsen the adverse selection on the
secondary market, which generate negative externality on other banks; however
during the booming period, holding a fractional liquidity buffer may affect the
credit volume and also absorb the losses without fire saling the asset to satisfy
the capital requirement (Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin (2005)).
2.4.3 Shadow banking system, securitization and regulatory arbitrage
Shadow banking system. The shadow banking system played a crucial role
during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2010)
provide an excellent detailed description of the shadow banking system. Unlike
the traditional banking system which has the guarantee of the public-sector, the
shadow banking system was presumed to be safe due to the liquidity and credit
support provided by the private sector. This view underpinned the perceived
risk-free, highly liquid nature of most AAA-rated assets that collateralized credit
repos and shadow banks’ liabilities more broadly. However, once the solvency
of private sector support providers started to be questioned, the confidence that
32This extra term is just the externality term.
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underpinned the stability of the shadow banking system vanished. This failure of
the support from private sector comes mainly from the underestimation of asset
price correlations This is because the shadow banking system can reduce their
idiosyncratic risk by trading or securitizing the loans to diversify their portfolio.
Consequently, this behavior exposes the portfolio to systematic shocks. So what
is shadow banking system? A shadow bank is defined as a credit intermedia-
tion includes all the activities in the traditional credit intermediation that are
not directly subject to the prudential regulation of banks; therefore they do not
directly and explicitly benefited from official guarantees. The shadow banking
system decomposes the simple process of deposit-funded, hold-to-maturity lend-
ing conducted by banks into a more complex, wholesales-funded, securitization-
based lending process. Through this intermediation process, the shadow banking
system transforms risky, long-term loans (e.g. sub-prime mortgages) into seem-
ingly risk-free and short-term, money like instruments, etc. However, it makes
the financial system become more unstable and fragile in the sense that not only
FIs are expose to an aggregate uncertainty but there also have an opportunity
for FIs to evade prudential regulation.
Securitization and asset diversification. Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny
(2011) explicitly present a shadow banking model where FIs can securitize their
risky assets in order to diversify their portfolio to reduce the idiosyncratic risk.
By doing so, more fixed return can be pleadged by FIs and they can issue more
safe debt to infinite risk averse investors, whose wealth is large enough, to ex-
pand their balance sheet size. Note that these debts are backed on the risk-free
return and these fix repayment projects can be used as collateral. By assuming
a rational expectation framework, the paper shows that the shadow banking sys-
tem is stable and favorable for the economy which improves the social welfare.
The model explains the famous funding by Adrian and Shin (2011) as mentioned
above, that the leverage and assets of intermediaries grow together; and explains
how diversification of idiosyncratic through securitization is accompanied by the
concentration of systemic risks on the book of FIs as in Acharya, schnabl, and
Suarez (2010). When investors and FIs are local thinker, that is to say that both
agents neglect the worst scenario in the states of world, the expansion of risky
assets and concentration of risks in the FIs create financial fragility and make
the whole system unstable. Note that the neglected risks can be interpreted as
the widely perceived risk free nature of highly rated structure credit product,
such as the AAA tranches of ABS (Asset Backed Security). Coval, Jurek, and
Stafford (2009) point out that these AAA tranches behave like catastrophe bonds
that load on a systemic risk state. In such a systemic risk state, on one hand,
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the underestimation of assets correlation enable FIs to hold insufficient amount
of liquidity and capital against the supports that underpinned the stability of
the shadow banking system. On the other hand, investors may overestimate the
value of private liquidity and credit support, the result is an excess supply of
cheap credit (In the model is presented as the more safe debts issued by FIs.).
Regulatory arbitrage. Since the cost of capital is very high, the FIs have a
strong incentive to evade the capital regulation. Kane (1988) states that the finan-
cial innovation is mostly spurred by financial regulation for regulatory arbitrage
purposes, which gives an explanation for a big build-up in shadow banking system,
since such capital regulation can be bypassed by the shadow banking system as
in Acharya, schnabl, and Suarez (2010). This paper focuses on the economics of
ABCP (Asset Backed Commercial Paper) and documents that commercial banks
set up conduits to securitize assets while insuring the newly securitized assets
using credit guarantees structured to reduce bank capital requirement. The intu-
ition is that the traditional banks may get rid of high risk assets by securitizating
them through shadow banking system, only get back the high-rated tranches such
as AAA tranches and the rest of them are sold on the market, usually these AAA
tranches are assigned a risk weight which is much lower than the initial assets,
therefore these banks have been required a relatively low capital level. Plantin
(2012) establish the optimal regulation in response to the regulatory arbitrage.
The model shows that if it is impossible to regulate shadow banking system at all,
then relaxing capital requirement for commercial banks so as to shrink shadow
activities may be more desirable then tightening them. Again, this is because
if a high level of capital requirement is imposed in banking sector, it will drive
banks to go to the opaque shadow banking activities, which in turn increase the
financial fragility.
2.5 Systemic and systematic Risk Measures
In this section, I will present the different systemic risk measures. Here, I
distinguish the measures by two categories. The first one measures the exposure
of FIs given a systematic shock in the system. From a theoretical point of view, it
is akin to a Beta computed within the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The
other category measures the contagion risk of one FI to the whole financial system
or the contagion risk among FIs in the financial system. For a complete survey
of risk measures, see Bisias, Flood, Lo, and Valavanis (2012); and an interesting
56
comparison of systemic risk measures, see Benoit, Colletaz, Hurlin, and Perignon
(2012).
2.5.1 Systemic risk measures
To begin this chapter, I first present a risk measure that is very popular
in academia and also in the industry, called Value-at-Risk (V aR). Recall that
V aRiqis implicitly defined as the q quantile, i.e.,
P(X i ≤ V aRiq) = q,
where X i is the variable of intermediation i for which the V aRiqis defined. Note
that V aRiq is typically a negative number. In the industry, this measure helps
risk manager to ensure that risks are not taken beyond the level at which the
intermediation can absorb the losses of a probable worst outcome. Therefore, it’s
not difficult to see that, this V aR only captures the individual risk and ignores the
risks that a given intermediation may issue to the whole financial system. After
the 2007-09 financial crisis, many economists and policy makers have turned their
attention from individual risks to systemic risk.33
2.5.1.1 Contagion to the whole system
CoVaR. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) (Hereafter AB11) propose a sys-
temic risk measure called CoV aR and this measure allow to measure what’s an
intermediation’s risk contribution to the whole financial system. In AB11, au-
thors use ∆CoV aR, which is the difference between the V aR of the financial
system conditional on a given FI being in a tail event and the V aR of the fi-
nancial system conditional on this FI in a median state, to capture the marginal
contribution of systemic risk.
Definition 2. We denote by CoV aRsys|iq the VaR of the financial system condi-
tional on some event C(X i) of intermediation i. That is CoV aRsys|iq is implicitly
defined by the q-quantile of conditional probability distribution:
P(Xsys ≤ CoV aRsys|C(Xi)q |C(X i)) = q.
33Another very popular individual risk measure is Expected Shortfall (ES). Unlike V aR, ES
tells you how much the intermediation will loss given the variable of intermediation is already
under its V aR.
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We denote intermediation i’s contribution to j by
∆CoV aRsys|iq = CoV aR
sys|Xi=V aRiq
q − CoV aRsys|Xi=Medianiq .
Later on, we focus on the conditioning event {X i = V aRiq} and simplify
the notation to CoV aRsys|iq . Note that, the direction of conditioning matters for
this measure of systemic risk. In AB11, they calculate the intermediation i’s
systemic risk contribution by making financial system conditional on one specific
intermediation being under distress. The intuition by doing that is that we want
to see what’s the impact has been given to the system when one intermediation
is under distress. The variable of intermediation i, X i, is defined as follow.
As mentioned earlier, we are in a financial system where balance sheets
are marked to market, changes in assets prices show up immediately on balance
sheets. Therefore, it is preferred to use market data to stress this question, an
alternative objective by using market data is to try to make an early warning
through market34. The paper focuses the analysis on the V aRiq and CoV aRiq of
returns of market-valued total financial assets. More formally, denote by MEit
the market value of an intermediation i’s total equity, and by LEV it the ratio of
total assets to book equity35. We define the return of market valued total asset,
X i, by
X it = Log(MEit ∗ LEV it )− Log(MEit−1 ∗ LEV it−1),
and the financial system’s return is given by
Xsystemt = Σi
Ait−1
ΣjAjt−1
X it .
Therefore, the return of financial market is the asset weighted sum of return of
each intermediation in the system.
In AB11, they have proposed 7 state variables to estimate time-varying
CoV aRt and V aRt. Those are:
34However, one could use supervisory data to compute the V aRiq and CoV aRiq from a broader
definition of total assets which could include off-balance sheet items, exposure from derivative
contracts, and other claims that are not properly captured by the accounting value of total
asset. Another issue is that, accounting rule can be different across countries, and this makes
regulation more difficult for supervises.
35It is the leverage of intermediation i. Note that the leverage doesn’t have same frequency
as market capitalization on market data, therefore, one can do a linear interpolation to make
the leverage has the same frequency as market capitalization, then make the product of these
two data to obtain total asset. Actually the total asset, here, is quasi-total asset. Alternatively,
one can keep the leverage unchanged between the dates of publishing the new data.
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i) VIX, which captures the implied volatility in the stock market.
ii) A short term liquidity spread, defined as the difference between the
three-month repo rate and the three-month bill rate, which measures short-
term liquidity risk. The three-month general collateral repo rate is available
on Bloomberg, and The three-month Treasury rate is obtained from the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
iii) The change in the three-month Treasury bill rate from the Federal
Reserve Boards H.15. By using the change in the three-month Treasury bill rate,
not the level, since the change is most significant in explaining the tails of financial
sector market-valued asset returns.
iv) The change in the slope of the yield curve, measured by the yield
spread between the ten-year Treasury rate and the three-month bill rate obtained
from the Federal Reserve Boards H.15 release.
v) The change in the credit spread between BAA-rated bonds and the
Treasury rate (with the same maturity of ten years) from the Federal Reserve
Boards H.15 release.
Note that iv) and v) are two fixed-income factors that capture the time
variation in the tails of asset returns.
Then introduce two variables to control for the following equity market
returns:
vi) The weekly equity market return.
vii) The one-year cumulative real estate sector return is the value weighted
average of real estate companies (SIC code 65-66) from CRSP.
These state variables are well specified to capture time variation in con-
ditional moments of asset returns, and are liquid and easily traded. However, a
big shortcoming by using these variables is that it makes the results less robust.
Imagine, if we add or delete one variable may affect the final results of quantile
regression, then the results of measure.
They are many different ways to calculate V aR, one is to use GARCH
family to estimate the conditional volatility of the return of underlying variable36.
36 see Ergun and Girardi (2012).
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Another method to compute V aR is the quantile regression. To capture time
variation in the joint distribution of X i and Xsystem, we can estimate the condi-
tional distribution as a function of state variables. Indicating the time-varying
V aRt with a subscript t and estimate it conditional on a vector of state variables
Mt. The one week lag of the state variables is denoted by Mt−1. Then run the
following quantile regressions in the weekly data (where i is the intermediation
i):
X it = αi + βiMt−1 + it, (2.39)
where it is the idiosyncratic shock for intermediation i at time t. Then, generate
the predicted values from this regression to obtain:
V aRit = αiq + βiqMt−1, (2.40)
where αiq and βiq are two estimated coefficients by the q-quantile regression. Par-
ticularly, we can set q = 1%.
As V aR, there are many different ways to do the estimation. Here, again,
the quantile regression methodology has been proposed to calculate CoV aR. Run
the following quantile regression:
Xsystemt = αi + βiMt−1 + γiX it + 
i,system
t , (2.41)
replacing the estimated coefficients and the individual Value-at-risk, we obtain:
CoV aRit[X i = V aRit] = αiq + βiqMt−1 + γiqV aRiq,
and therefore ∆CoV aR can be obtained as follow
∆CoV aRit = CoV aRit[X i = V aRit]− CoV aR[X i = Median[X i]].
An attractive feature of CoV aR is that it can be easily adopted for other
“co-risk measures”. One of them is co-expected-shortfall, Co − ES. Expected
Shortfall has a number of advantages relative to V aR and can be calculated as a
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sum of V aRs. I denote the CoESiq, the Expected Shortfall of the financial system
conditional on X i ≤ V aRiq of intermediation i. That is, CoESiq is defined by the
expectation over the q-tail of the conditional probability distribution:
E[Xsystem|Xsystem ≤ CoV aRiq].
Expected Shortfall is a coherent risk measure, since it satisfies 4 axioms,
positive homogeneity, sub-additivity, monotonicity, translation invariance37.
Multi-CoVaR. Cao (2012) extends this standard CoV aR measure by proposing
a multi-CoV aR measure. The intuition behind this extension is that during
the financial crisis, several FIs may have being in financial distress at the same
time, therefore the author can put several FIs in the conditional part of standard
CoV aR definition. This measure is so called “Multi-CoV aR”.
Definition 3. Denote by CoV aR1,..,Sq,t the V aR of financial system conditional
on some event {C(X1t ), ..., C(XSt )} of a set of intermediations {1, ..., S} at time
t. That is CoV aR1,..,Sq,t for financial system and confidence level q when the set
of intermediations {1, ..., S} is on some event {C(X1t ), ..., C(XSt )} at time t is
defined by:
P(Xsys ≤ CoV aR1,...,Sq,t |C(X1t ), ..., C(XSt )) = q, (2.42)
and the set of intermediations {1, 2, ..., S}’s contribution to financial system is
denoted by:
∆CoV aR1,...Sq,t = CoV aR
X1=V aR1q ,...,XS=V aRSq
q,t − CoV aRX
1=Median1,...,XS=MedianS
q,t .
(2.43)
Different from previous case, the author focuses on the case where the condition-
ing event is described by {X it ≤ V aRiq,t}38 for i = 1, ..., S. Hence ∆CoV aR1,...Sq,t
denotes the difference between the V aR of financial system conditional on a set of
financial intermediations {1, ..., S} being in a tail event and the V aR of financial
system conditional on the set of financial intermediations {1, ..., S} being in a
median state at time t.
Note that, this measure captures a spillover effect, which is characterized
37SeeArtzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1997) for details.
38Ergun and Girardi (2012) propose a method to capture more severe distress events that
are farther in the tail.
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by the contribution of systemic risk of a set of FIs is in distress to the financial
system. This measure has two advantages. First, it allows to calculate the total
contribution of systemic risk in the financial system, with this total contribution,
one can apply an allocating rule to attribute the total risk to each intermediation.
This total systemic risk is characterized by when all the intermediations are in
distress, what is its effect to the system Value at Risk. Suppose there are N
intermediations in the system, the total contribution of systemic risk is given
by:
P(Xsys ≤ CoV aR1,...,Nq,t |C(X1t ), ..., C(XNt )) = q, (2.44)
and
∆CoV aR1,...Nq,t = CoV aR
X1=V aR1q ,...,XN=V aRNq
q,t − CoV aRX
1=Median1,...,XN=MedianN
q,t .
(2.45)
Secondly, it allows to calculate the marginal contribution of intermediation i for
a given set of intermediations S is already in distress. Denote ∆i(S) the marginal
systemic risk contribution of one specific intermediation i is determined by:
∆i(S) = ∆CoV aR(S ∪ {i})−∆CoV aR(S), for S ⊂ N, i /∈ S. (2.46)
This measure has another advantage, that is to inform the regulators
that which distressed intermediation should be bailed-out during the financial
crisis. For example, in September 2008, Lehman Brother and AIG are both
in financial distress at the same time and then Federal reserve have decided
to bailout AIG. However, based on Multi-CoV aR one can calculate ∆(S) for
both LB and AIG and to bailout the one has a larger marginal contribution of
systemic risk. Interestingly, this measure also provide us the systemic importance
of different class, which can be seen as different sectors in the financial system, or
different regions in the financial system, etc. Such information is also very useful
for regulators to maintain the stability of financial system as a whole.
Shapley value. The Shapley value methodology was initially proposed in the
circumstance of cooperative games (see Shapley (1953)), in which a group of
players generates a share “value” (e.g. wealth, cost) for a group as a whole.
The Shapley value of a player in a game turns out to be his expected marginal
contribution over the set of all permutations on the set of players. For example,
a group of agents would like to connect to a server in order to benefit a high
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speed functioning of their own PC, however, the maintain of the server is costly,
the Shapley value is a fair and efficient allocation rule to share the costs among
agents and the Shapley value of an agent is his expected marginal contribution
over all possible set of the agents.
In order to apply the Shapley value methodology to a financial system,
it is sufficient to define a so-called “characteristic function”. This function is
unchanged over the set of all permutations on the set of intermediations and map
each subsystem into a risk measure. The characteristic function, v, should accept
as input anyone of the 2N − 1 subsystems39 of intermediations and should deliver
the system-wide risk measures when applied to the entire system.
The derivation of Shapley values involves the following process.
There are N players, which are financial intermediations. Let v : 2N →
R+ be a function defining the systemic risk for each subset of N , where N de-
notes the entire financial system. v is assumed to be monotone (i.e. v(S) ≥
v(S ′) for all S ′ ⊆ S ⊆ N), and v(φ) = 0. The objective is to find non-negative
systemic risk attribution {Shi}i∈N such that:
Axiom 1 (Additivity/Efficiency): Σi∈NShi = v(N),
Axiom 2 (Dummy axiom): If i is such that ∆i(S) = v({i}) for all i /∈ S,
then Shi = v({i}),
Axiom 3 (Symmetry): If i 6= j such that ∆i(S) = ∆j(S) for all i, j /∈ S,
then Shi = Shj,
Axiom 4 (Linearity): Suppose v(S) = v1(S) + v2(S) where v1 and v2 are
also non-negative monotone functions with v1(φ) = v2(φ) = 0, and {Sh1i }i are
systemic risk shares for v1-risk and {Sh2i }i are systemic risk shares for v2-risk,
then Shi = Sh1i + Sh2i , for all i, defines the systemic risk shares for v-risk.
There is a unique way to satisfy axioms 1, 2, 3 and 4, called Shapley
value and Shapley value for intermediation i is:
Shi(v) = ΣS⊆N\{i}
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n! (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)), (2.47)
39Since the empty set φ does not play a role in contributing the value.
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where n is the total number of intermediations and the sum extends over all sub-
sets S of N not containing intermediation i. This formula can be interpreted as
the expected marginal contribution of intermediation i over the set of all permu-
tations on the set of intermediations.
Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2010) use individual risk measures,
such as Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall40 to be the characteristic function,
to capture the intermediation’s systemic risk importance by implementing Shap-
ley value methodology as an allocation rule. On top of that, the paper examines
different drivers of systemic importance and their interactions and illustrate how
the allocation methodology can be used as a basis of policy intervention with
macroprudential objectives.
Drehmann and Tarashev (2011) aim at combining the literature on (a)
banks’ systemic importance and (b) interbank networks.41 It explores two dif-
ferent approaches to measure systemic importance: a) bank’s participation in
systemic events which is referred to as the participation approach (PA) and 2)
banks’ contribution to systemic risk considering interbank network which is re-
ferred to as generalized contribution approach (GCA). Here, the participation
approach is the same as in Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2010). In this ap-
proach, we have vP (S)−vP (S−{i}) = E(Li|systemic event), which depends on i
but not on S (the second axiom of Shapley value), and Li is the loss of institution
i . Therefore one can obtain:
Shi(N, vP )−ShVi(N−{k}, vP ) = Shk(N, vP )−Shk(N−{i}, vP ) = 0. (2.48)
The first equality in this expression (2.48) holds due to the fairness cri-
terion of Shapley value, which means that the increment of the Shapley value
on institution i caused by the presence of institution k equals the increment of
the Shapley value of institution k caused by the presence of institution i.42 The
second equality in expression (2.48) means that the presence of institution i have
no effect on the Shapley value of institution k and vice versa. Then the Shapley
value of bank i is simply the loss it is expected to generate conditional on the sys-
temic events: Shi(vP ) = E(Li|systemic event). Note that, this is the systematic
40This is a modified version of Expected Shortfall, since the conditional part of the measure
is the whole system is in distress instead of the individual is in distress.
41Here, I refer the bank as intermediation (FI) in the previous cases.
42This result is from Mascolell, Whinston, and Green (1995).
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risk measure, and not systemic risk (In the paper, the authors call it participation
approach), and we will see later this measure is in the same spirit as in Huang,
Zhou, and Zhu (2010) and ?.
To closer to the original idea behind Shapley value, which means that
the we should measure the risk that a bank generates on its own as well as
this bank’s contributions to the risk in each subsystem of other banks. Then,
GCA suggests that, when we evaluate the risk of a subsystem from which bank
i is excluded, we cannot simply consider the risk that this bank generates when
entire system is in place. The characteristic function of this approach is: vG(S) ≡
E(∑i∈S LSi |∑i=S LSi ≥ threshold) for any S ⊆ Σ.
At the entire system level, this two approaches coincide, as vG(Σ) =
vP (Σ) = ES(Σ). But the allocation of this system-wide risk differs between the
two approaches for two important reasons. First, vG allows the losses incurred
by the non-bank creditors of bank i to depend on the subsystem considered: LSi .
Here, default is distinguished by fundamental default and contagion default as
presented in EN01, thus the probability of default of one bank is equal to the sum
of fundamental PD and contagion PD. To construct probability distribution of
losses, we implement Eisenberg and Noe’s clearing algorithm in each approach,
only one time in PA (in the case of entire system is in place) and 2n − 1 times
in GCA (for each subsystem in a system with n banks, empty set is excluded).
Second difference between vP and vG is due to the fact that, vG incorporates
conditioning events that changes with sub system. Thus, in contrast to vP , vG
measures risk as the expected shortfall in each subsystem: v3(S) = ES(S). This
leads to the following special case of the general Shapley value formula in (2.47):
Shi(v) = ΣS⊆N\{i}
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n! (ES(S ∪ {i})− ES(S)). (2.49)
In contrast to the PA, the increment of systemic risk that is caused by
the joint presence of two banks is split into equal halves, which GCA attributes
to each of these banks. Or formally:
ShVi(N, vG)− ShVi(N − {k}, vG) = ShVk(N, vG)− ShVk(N − {i}, vG) > 0.
(2.50)
The strict inequality indicates that, vG does convey the extent to which
one bank affects the riskiness of another. That is vG captures the contribution
of this interbank link to systemic risk and splits it equally between bank i and
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bank k. By extension, a Shapley value under vG attributes the risk created by
an interbank link equally to the interbank lender and the interbank borrower. A
natural question will be raised here. As ES(S) is a coherent measure and satisfies
the subadditivity axiom (see Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1997)), the
last term in expression (2.49) (ES(S ∪ {i}) − ES(S)) could be negative, which
violate the assumption that the characteristic function should be monotone. To
overcome this potential drawback, Cao (2012) proposes to use Multi-CoV aR
as the characteristic function to allocate the contagion risk of the banks in the
system. The intuition is that when there is two banks which are in distress, its
systemic risk contribution should be greater than only one of these two banks is in
distress and so on. The paper shows that, by the additivity of Shapley value, the
estimated aggregate systemic risk is efficiently distributed to each bank; however,
the standard CoV aR measure may under-estimate the systemic risk during the
boom and over-estimate the systemic risk during the recession.
2.5.1.2 Bilateral contagion risk
Joint probability of default (Jpod). Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) pro-
pose a methodology to capture inter-linkages effects between banks, which they
call CIMDO. CIMDO is based on a copula formula and it is a non-parametric
method, which extracts the link between events rather than predetermining laws
of motion. The objective of the methodology is to find the joint distribution,
which best fits a prior joint distribution according to the information criteria and
is consistent with the probability of distress for each bank. The latter are calcu-
lated through a market based approach, which considers that the financial health
of an institution is reflected in the CDS spreads. Two concerns with the use of
CDS spreads have to do with how liquid these markets are and the amount of
trading noise, which can bias the results. It follows 4 steps of modeling banking
system’s stability and distress dependence. Step1, we conceptualize the bank-
ing system as a portfolio of banks. Step2, for each of the banks included in the
portfolio, we obtain empirical measurements of probabilities of distress (PoDs).
Step3, Making use of the Consistent Information Multivariate Density Optimiza-
tion (CIMDO) methodology and taking as input variables the individual banks’
PoDs estimated in the previous step, we cover the banking system’s multivariate
density (BSMD). Step4, based on BSMD, we estimate the proposed banking sta-
bility measures (BSMs), such as the probability of default of bank A given that
the bank B is default.
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Granger causality networks. Billion, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon
(2010) propose two econometric measures of systemic risk that capture the in-
terconnectedness among the monthly returns of hedge funds, banks, brokers, and
insurance companies based on principal components analysis (PCA) and Granger-
causality tests. The authors find that all four sectors have become highly inter-
related over the past decade, increasing the level of systemic risk in the finance
and insurance industries. Their measures can also identify and quantify financial
crisis periods, and seem to contain predictive power for the current financial cri-
sis. Their philosophy is that statistical relation-ships between returns can yield
valuable indirect information about the build-up of systemic risk.
CoVaR. Note that CoV aR measure can also provide us that bilateral contagion
risk between banks. We can slightly change the definition 2 by proposing bank j’s
V aR conditional on bank i is already in distress, Pr(Xj ≤ CoV aRj|C(Xi)q |C(X i)) =
q. In this case, CoV aR measure implies the bank i’s risk contribution to the bank
j.
2.5.2 Systematic risk measures
MES. Acharya, Pederson, Phillipon, and Richardson (2010) and Brownlees and
Engle (2011) propose that each FI’s exposure to a systematic event can be cap-
tured by Marginal Expected Shortfall. More precisely, let N denote the set of
firms in the economy. The return generated in the system at time t can be
measured by the value weighted average asset return of all firms, which is mar-
ket return (The same in AB11). This approach starts from a description of the
bivariate process of FIs and market returns:
Xmt = σmtmt
Xit = σρitit +
√
1− ρ2itξit
(mt, ξit) ∼ F.
Note that ρit is the correlation between FI i’s return and market return at time t.
σit and σmt are respectively FI i’s return volatility and market return volatility.
The disturbances, mt and ξit are independent and identically distributed over
time and have zero mean unit variance and zero covariance. However, they are
not assumed to be independent.
Straightforward algebra shows us that this measure can be decomposed
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in a function of 1) Volatility, 2) Correlation and 3) Tails expectations of the
standardized innovations distribution:
MESit−1 = Et−1(Xit|Xmt ≤ C)
= σit︸︷︷︸
volatility
ρit︸︷︷︸
correlation
Et−1(mt|mt ≤ C/σmt)it︸ ︷︷ ︸
tail expectation
+
σit︸︷︷︸
volatility
√
1− ρ2it︸ ︷︷ ︸
correlation
Et−1(ξit|mt ≤ C/σmt)it︸ ︷︷ ︸
tail expectation
.
And the conditional probability of a systemic event is:
Pt−1(rmt ≤ C) = P(mt ≤ C/σmt).
Notice that in this framework, such probability is time varying: the higher the
volatility the higher the probability of observing a loss above fixed threshold.
From a theoretical point of view, it is akin to a Beta computed within
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The difference rests on the fact that
the MES measures a so-called “tail-Beta”, which is a projection of FI’s return to
a space where the market return is lower than a specific threshold. By contrast,
in the CAPM, the Beta is simply the projection of a FI’s return to the market
return, without any threshold. An economic interpretation about this measure
is that, what is the loss of one specific FI in case of a large loss happened in
the financial system. Now we can see that, this measure is in the same spirit of
Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2010).
The estimation of MES is proceed as follow. In wide world of GARCH
specifications, TGARCH is picked to model the volatility in order to capture a
so-called “leverage effect”. The evolution of the conditional variance dynamics in
this model is given by:
σ2t = ωG + αGr2t−1 + γGr2t−1I−t−1 + βGσ2t−1,
with I−t−1 = rt ≤ 0. The model is estimated by Quasi-MLE which guaranties the
consistency of the estimator. We have:
√
T (θˆMLE − θo) ∼ N(0, J−10 I0J−10 ),
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with Iˆ = 1
T
∑
St(θˆ)S
′
t(θˆ) and Jˆ = 1T
∑ ∂2logL
∂θ∂′θ is the Hessian of total log-likelihood
function. The time varying correlation is modeled by using DCC approach. Cor-
relation matrix is given by:
Pt = diag(Qt)−
1
2Qtdiag(Qt)−
1
2 ,
and DCC specification is defined as:
Qt = (1− αC − βC)S + αC∗t−1∗t−1 + βCQt−1.
We use the estimation method mentioned above for this dynamic conditional
correlation. The last part need to be estimated is Conditional Expected Tail:
Et−1(mt|mt ≤ κ) and Et−1(ξit|mt ≤ κ).
A non-parametric kernel estimation approach is implemented to improve the ef-
ficiency of estimators. Let
Kh(t) =
ˆ t/h
∞
k(u)du,
where k(u) is a kernel function and h is a positive bandwidth. Therefore, we
have
Eˆh(mt|mt ≤ κ) =
1
n
∑n
t=1 mtKh(mt − κ)
Pˆh
,
and
Eˆh(ξit|mt ≤ κ) =
1
n
∑n
t=1 ξitKh(mt − κ)
Pˆh
,
where Pˆ = 1
n
∑n
t−1Kh(mt − κ). An advantage of non-paramretric estimator de-
fined above is tat they are smooth function of cutoff point κ which, in turn, deliver
smooth estimates of MES as a function of C/σmt.
Distressed Insurance Premium. The Distressed Insurance Premium (DIP)
is proposed as an ex ante systemic risk metric by Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2010)
and it represents a hypothetical insurance premium against a systematic financial
distress, defined as total losses that exceed a given threshold, say 15%, of total
FI liabilities. The methodology is general and can apply to any pre-selected
group of FIs with public tradable equity and CDS contracts. Each FI’s marginal
contribution to systemic risk is a function of size, probability of default (PoD),
and asset correlation. The last two components need to be estimated from market
data.
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Let Li denote the loss of institution i’s liability with i = 1, ..., N ; and L = ΣNi=1Li
is the total loss of portfolio. Then the distress insurance premium (DIP) is given
by the risk-neutral expectation of the loss exceeding certain threshold level:
DIP = EQ[L|L ≥ threshold],
and this DIP formula can be implemented with Monte Carlo simulation Huang,
Zhou, and Zhu (2009). The marginal contribution of the systematic DIP can be
characterized by
∂DIP
∂Li
≡ EQ[Li|L ≥ threshold].
Again, from the property of the measure, this measure is equivalent to Marginal
Expected Shortfall (MES).
SRISK. The SRISK is proposed by Acharya, Engle, and Richardson (2012) and
Brownlees and Engle (2011) extends the MES in order to take into account the
balance sheet data - the liabilities of the FI. The SRISK corresponds to the
expected capital shortfall of a given FI, conditional on the whole financial system
is in a systematic event. In this perspective, The FI with the largest capital losses
are supposed to be the one which has the largest exposure to this systematic
distress. Acharya, Engle, and Richardson (2012) define the SRISK as;
SRISKit = max[0; kDit − (1− k)Wit(1− LRMESit)],
where k is the prudential capital ratio, Dit is the quarterly book value of total
liabilities, andWit is the daily market capitalization or market value of equity and
LRMESit is the long-run marginal expected shortfall.43 Note that, the SRISK
measure is increasing in liabilities and decreasing in capital, so it can be seen as
an implicit increasing function of the quasi-leverage (capital/debt).
CoVaR. Note that CoV aR measure can also provide us that systematic exposure
of banks. We can slightly change the definition 2 by proposing bank i’s V aR con-
ditional on the whole is already in distress, Pr(X i ≤ CoV aRi|C(Xsys)q |C(Xsys)) =
q. In this case, CoV aR measure implies the bank i’s exposure to the systematic
event.
43Acharya, Engle, and Richardson (2012) propose to approximate this LRMES using the
daily MES as LRMES ' 1− exp(18×MESit).
70
2.6 Macroprudential policy and Monetary policy
Farhi and Tirole (2012) study a collective moral hazard problem in the banking
system. They show that imperfect targeting of distressed institutions in times
of crisis makes private leverage choices among banks strategic complements. If
authorities are perceived to be tough during the crisis period, each bank has an
incentive to issue less short-term debt or hold more liquidity reserves. On the
other hand, if the central bank is perceived to be “kind”, banks have an incentive
to engage in maturity mismatch, which induces each individual bank to issue
more short-term debt and invest in long-run illiquid assets. In addition, they
show that under the policy response, banks choose the correlation of their shock
with that of other banks (Acharya (2009)). A “kind” central bank is referred
to be the one that will lower the interest rate when there is a severe shock in
the economy. However, this policy not only raises the issue we have seen above,
but also sow the seeds for the next crisis, because more unworthy projects will
be financed since the borrowing cost is reduced and it exposes banks to future
liquidity problems. Due to the time-inconsistency problem, that a “kind” central
bank will be always there at crisis time.
Farhi and Tirole (2012) also propose a transfer policy to boost the banks’
wealth when an aggregate shock occurs. The mechanism is similar to Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), when a bank’s wealth is
high, they have more chance to get funds from outside investors which prevents
a “credit rationing”; or is strengthens bank’s margin constraint as in equation
(2.9), thereby stabilizing asset prices. However, in reality policy makers are less
well informed, so they cannot detect which banks are those banks which received
a shock. So, the interest rate policy is then always part of the optimal policy
mix. Direct transfer policy is only optimal in Farhi and Tirole (2012) if a large
fraction of FIs is affected by the crisis.
Stein (2011) also points out that FI may issue too much short-term debt
and may generate negative fire-sales externalities. This is because FIs only con-
sider the benefit that they gain from such behavior, however, they do not inter-
nalize the social cost that they generated from doing so. In a crisis period, FIs are
forced to sell their assets at fire-sale price to honor their short-term debt causing
a negative externality on other banks as in Lorenzoni (2008).
In this context, a monetary policy based approach - “cap-and-trade” of
money-creation permits can implement the optimal outcome. This approach is
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characterized by the reserve requirements on FIs, and the price of these permits
- the interest rate on reserves44 - reveals information about banks’ investment
opportunities to the regulator. For example, when the price of the permits goes
up, this suggests that banks in the aggregate have strong investment opportu-
nities, and so the regulator should loosen the cap by putting more permits into
the system. The paper states that, if there are only commercial banks in the
economy that play a role of lenders, the conventional monetary policy can be
used to regulate this externality efficiently, but this view is far away from the
modern financial system. So when large shadow banking system is present in the
economy, some additional regulatory measures have to be imposed.
Beau, Clerc, and Mojon (2012) use a DSGE model and focus on the
price stability to illustrate the interactions between macroprudential policy and
monetary policy. Specifically, this paper mainly focuses on the time-dimension
of macroprudential policy, and authors consider that this macroprudential policy
is designed to lean against the wind of booms and busts financial cycles. If the
inflation cycle and booms/busts cycle are positively correlated then standard
monetary policy and macroprudential policy are complementary. If these two
cycles are negatively correlated then the two types of policy are conflicting. The
compatibility of the two policies depends very much on the type of shocks; the
demand shocks lead to complementarities and supply shocks lead to conflicts.
2.7 Conclusion
I would like to close this survey by noting that the study of systemic risk should
not be treated in isolation. As we have seen in the main body of the article,
many mechanisms behind systemic risk are triggered by financial friction in the
economy, and these frictions often come with the asymmetric information between
the agents in the economy; therefore it is hard for us to achieve the first-best
allocation. How to design an efficient regime to cope with this agency cost is at
the core of the research in this domain.
44Can be seen as the outside opportunity of these reserves.
Chapter 3
Multi-CoVaR and Shapley value: A Systemic Risk
Measure
3.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has demonstrated the adverse effects of a large scale
breakdown of financial intermediation both for other banks as well as for the
rest of the economy. This is embodied in after the failure of Lehman Brother,
the entire financial market has become extremely volatile, at the same time, the
manufacture industry was deeply impacted. The concern that a specific bank
defaults would trigger a domino effect in the financial sector is often brought
forward to justify large scale government intervention and bailouts of failed in-
stitutions. But this increases the burden on taxpayers and sows the seeds of the
next crisis.1 The failure of a bank causes these externalities because financial in-
stitutions are directly linked through interbank loans and derivatives. However,
before the 2007-2009 financial crisis, banking regulation was based on individual
risk, that is to say the adverse consequences that a bank brings for other banks as
well as the economy as a whole was not considered by the regulator. Moving to-
wards a new regulation framework, economic researchers and regulators propose
to implement a macroprudential policy, which aims to mitigate the risk of the
financial system as a whole (systemic risk) and to stabilize the financial system.
To efficiently regulate systemic risk in banking sector need two steps: 1) measure
each institution’s marginal systemic risk contribution to the whole system; 2)
based on these measures, propose an efficient requirement standard to resist the
1See Farhi and Tirole (2012).
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systemic risk.2 In this paper, I mainly focus on the first step of macro-prudential
regulation and propose a new methodology to measure the institution’s marginal
systemic risk contribution.
The methodology proposed in this paper is complementary to Adrian
and Brunnermeier (2011) CoVaR methodology, which is one of the most popular
systemic risk measures in the literature. In Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011),
authors use ∆CoV aR, which is the difference between the V aR of the financial
system conditional on a given financial institution being in a tail event and the
V aR of financial system conditional on this financial institution being in a nor-
mal state, to capture the marginal contribution of systemic risk. Note that the
V aR of the financial system conditional on a given financial institution being
in a tail event is also known as CoV aR. However, a specific feature of modern
financial crisis is that there may be several institutions in financial distress at
the same time, as a result, it is difficult to accurately measure a specific institu-
tion’s systemic risk contribution taken in isolation while the effect could channel
through other financial institutions themselves in distress at the same time. As
a consequence, I modify the standard ∆CoV aR to the multi-∆CoV aR. Unlike
the standard ∆CoV aR, multi-∆CoV aR is the difference between the V aR of
financial system conditional on a given set of financial institutions being in a tail
event and the V aR of the financial system conditional on this set of financial
institutions being in a normal state. With this complementary extension, multi-
∆CoV aR captures the systemic risk contribution of several distressed financial
institutions at the same time; furthermore it can capture the marginal systemic
risk contribution of an institution that just joined the “distressed club” by taking
the difference of the multi-∆CoV aR of the set including the new one to the club
and the multi-∆CoV aR of the original set. Henceforth, given the specific feature
of modern financial crisis, multi-∆CoV aR can provide very useful information to
build a macroprudential regulation framework.
The property of multi-∆CoV aR is very useful for regulators. First, it
allows to calculate the total contribution of systemic risk in the financial system,
with this total contribution, one can apply an allocating rule to attribute the
total risk to each bank. This total systemic risk is measured by the systemic risk
contribution when all the institutions in the system are in distress. This total
systemic risk measure can be set as a benchmark for regulators, since the sum
of each institution’s systemic risk can never surpass (less than) this benchmark,
2Efficient requirement standard refers to the total systemic requirement can be implemented
at individual level without over or under-regulation.
74
otherwise there is an over-regulation (under-regulation) in the industry which may
hurt the real economy. Second, it allows to calculate the marginal contribution
of a bank for a given set of institutions is already in distress. This has the
advantage to inform the regulators that which distressed institution should be
bailed-out more urgently during the financial crisis. For example, in September
2008, Lehman Brother and AIG are both in financial distress at the same time
and then Federal reserve has decided to bailout AIG. However, based on multi-
CoV aR measure one can calculate the marginal contribution for both LB and
AIG and to bailout the one which has a larger marginal contribution of systemic
risk. The third, the multi-CoV aR can provide the systemic risk contribution of
different groups. Again, this property is very useful for the regulators. Put the
set of institutions differently for various sectors such as deposit banking sector,
insurance sector, investment banking sector or government-sponsored enterprise
(GSE), one can obtain the systemic risk contribution for these different sectors
and regulate each sector appropriately.
Another advantage of multi-∆CoV aR is that one can apply to Shapley
value methodology, which satisfies a set of axioms, to allocate systemic risk to
each financial institution. The Shapley value methodology was initially proposed
in the circumstance of cooperative games by Shapley (1953), in which a group of
players generates a shared “value” (e.g. wealth, cost) for a group as a whole. The
Shapley value of a player in a game turns out to be his expected marginal contri-
bution over the set of all permutations on the set of players. This methodology
can be applied in my setting, where financial institutions are connected via cor-
related high risk activities that trigger systemic risk in the system. The “value”
mentioned above is the systemic risk generated by financial institutions. The
additivity axiom of Shapley value states that the sum of each institution’s Shap-
ley value of systemic risk contribution is exactly equal to the multi-∆CoV aR
of all the financial institutions in the system being in financial distress, which
means that the Shapley value methodology allocates overall systemic risk in an
efficient way. This coincides with Gourieroux and Monfort (2011), who suggest
that systemic risk measures should be additive. While in the contrary, the sum
of each standard ∆CoV aR is larger then the multi-∆CoV aR of all the financial
institutions in the system being in financial distress; that is to say, if I regulate
financial institutions with the standard ∆CoV aR, I implicitly punish the whole
financial system, since the regulation is based on some systemic risk which does
not even exist. Therefore, it would decrease the credit volume of banks and hurt
the real economy.
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After introducing the allocation methodology of how to distribute the
systemic risk to each financial institution, I now turn to the estimation of the
multi-CoV aR. There are many possible ways to calculate it. In this paper, I
directly use the market returns of the financial system and of individual financial
institutions for multi-CoV aR calculation. For simplicity, at the very beginning,
I assume the returns of the financial system and financial institutions follow
a multi-t distribution to construct the distribution of financial system’s return
conditional on the returns of the financial institutions.3 To that purpose, I use
GARCH model and Dynamic Conditional correlation (DCC) (Engle (2002)) to
construct the variance-covariance matrix of the conditional distribution. I loosen
this assumption to calculate individual financial institution’s V aR: instead I use a
nonparametric bootstrap technology implemented in GARCH model proposed by
Pascual, Nieto, and Ruiz (2006) and Christofferson and GonCalves (2005). With
all the ingredient I need, then I apply Shapley value methodology to allocate
systemic to each financial institution.
I apply the methodology of calculating the systemic importance in two
banking panels, French panel and Chinese panel. Given these two banking sys-
tems, my measure provides the total systemic risk in the financial system and
marginal contribution of systemic risk for each financial institution. I find that
for both French and Chinese panels the overall systemic risk during the 2007-2009
financial crisis is larger than total systemic risk during the European sovereign
debt crisis at the peak, and Chinese banks have little impact from the European
crisis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I provide a literature
review in section 3.2. In section 3.3, I develop the methodology, illustrate the
differences with existing measures, show the properties of my measure and provide
the calculation method of the measure. In section 3.4, I present the econometric
framework and estimation. Section 3.5 gives the results and show the importance
of additivity . In section 3.6, I briefly propose a regulation tool based on this
measure. Section 3.7 concludes.
3The normal distribution has been criticized since its quantile function doesn’t capture the
fat tail events. I try to make distribution assumption as less as possible. In this case, I have
to assume the returns follow a multi-t distribution, however, I loosen this assumption when I
calculate the individual VaR.
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3.2 Literature review
This paper belongs to a growing empirical literature on systemic risk. The main
contribution of the paper is that I focus on the aggregate contagion4 risk of a
set of financial institutions and use an efficient allocation rule to attribute this
aggregate contagion risk to each financial institution in order to determine their
systemic importance. The efficient allocation means that the overall aggregate
contagion risk is all attributed to each financial institution without waste and
won’t be attributed by any risks that don’t exist, hence we have that the sum of
attributed risk to each financial institution equals the overall aggregate contagion
risk.
The most of empirical literature have particular interest are those that
treat explicitly the financial system as a portfolio of institutions. Lehar (2005)
uses a sample of international banks from 1988 to 2002, to estimate the dynam-
ics and correlations between bank asset portfolios. After the 2007-2009 financial
crisis, two strands of the literature have been emerged. The first strand of the lit-
erature captures the bank’s sensitivity to a systematic shock in the whole financial
system. In Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2010), they compute first the total market loss
when a systematic shock takes place and then attribute this loss to each financial
institution to capture the systemic importance. Similarly, ? proposed a measure
called “Marginal Expected Shortfall” (MES); this measure allows to investigate
what is the loss of one specific institution in case of a large loss in the financial
system. From a theoretical point of view, it is akin to a Beta computed within
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The difference rests on the fact that
the MES measures a so-called “tail-Beta”, which is a projection of institution’s
return to a space where the market return is lower than a specific threshold. In ?,
the authors construct an econometric framework to compute the MES. In their
model, the MES is consist of 3 parts: the volatility of institutions’ market cap-
italization return, their correlation and the conditional tail expectation. Adrian
and Brunnermeier (2011) also suggest a measure exposure-CoV aR to capture this
effect. Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmard (2011) propose a measure to gauge
a bank’s exposure to sector-wide deleveraging. This specific measure is focusing
on the fire-sale effect in the financial market.
Another strand of the literature gauges systemic risk by the contagion
4Some papers are focusing on the exposure of banks when a systematic shock happens, e.g.
Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2010); ?; others are focusing on the contagion, e.g. Segoviano and
Goodhart (2009); Billion, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2010); however Greenwood, Landier,
and Thesmard (2011) allows to distinguish these two risks.
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through the financial market. This contagion is twofold. On the one hand, this
contagion could be considered as the bilateral contagion, which means one bank’s
sensitivity to a shock of another bank and vice verca. Segoviano and Goodhart
(2009) propose a methodology to capture such inter-linkages contagion. The ob-
jective of the methodology is to find the joint distribution, which best fits a prior
joint distribution according to the information criteria and is consistent with the
probability of distress for each bank. This gives the probability of default of one
bank given another bank is in distress. In Billion, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon
(2010), they propose a measure of connectedness based on principal-component
analysis and Granger-causality networks. They find that financial institutions are
highly interrelated over the past decade. On the other hand, this contagion could
be considered as the contagion of a bank to the whole financial system, however,
one can argue that this is also the contribution of financial institutions to overall
systemic risk. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) use the CoV aR measure to char-
acterize one bank’s systemic risk contribution to the financial system. In their
framework, this measure is the Value at Risk of the whole financial sector condi-
tional on a given institution being in distress. Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis
(2010) and ? use individual risk measures to capture an institution’s systemic
importance by implementing Shapley value methodology; they also focus on the
contribution of institutions to systemic risk. However, in this paper, I use a sys-
temic risk measure to capture the systemic importance of institutions and then
allocate the measure by Shapley value methodology. In Greenwood, Landier, and
Thesmard (2011), their method also allows to capture one bank’s contribution to
the overall deleveraging risk, but, again, their measure is specifically focused on
the fire-sale effect.
There are also two very useful survey about the systemic risk measures
Benoit, Colletaz, Hurlin, and Perignon (2012) and Bisias, Flood, Lo, and Vala-
vanis (2012).
3.3 Multi-CoVaR and Shapley value methodology
In this section, I present how the Shapley value methodology can be applied to
the CoVaR measure and its properties.
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3.3.1 Remind CoVaR
Recall that Value-at-Risk (V aR) is defined as the solution to
P(rt ≤ V aRqt ) = q,
V aRqt is the q-quantile of the return rt. Note that, with this definition, V aRqt is
typically a negative number.
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) defined CoV aRsys|iq,t as the V aR of fi-
nancial system conditional on some event C(rit) of institution i at time t. That is,
the CoV aRsys|iq,t for financial system and confidence level q when the institution i
is on some event C(ri) at time t is defined by:
P(rsyst ≤ CoV aRsys|C(r
i
t)
q,t |C(rit)) = q, (3.1)
and institution i’s contribution to system is measured by:
∆CoV aRsys|iq,t = CoV aR
sys|rit∈{adverse caseit}
q,t − CoV aRsys|r
i
t∈{normal caseit}
q,t . (3.2)
In practice, they focus on {ri = V aRiq} as the conditioning event and sim-
plify the notation CoV aRsys|r
i=V aRiq
q = CoV aRiq and ∆CoV aRsys|iq = ∆CoV aRiq,
meanwhile they focus on {ri = Mediani} in the normal case as the conditioning
event, CoV aRsys|r
i=Mediani
q,t . Hence, ∆CoV aRiq denotes the difference between the
V aR of financial system conditional on the financial institution i being in a tail
event and the V aR of financial system conditional on the financial institution i
being in a normal state. Note that, they also define the system returns as the
weighted sum of individual returns at each time t.
3.3.2 Multi-CoVaR
After remind the definition of CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) above.
They propose ∆CoV aR as a systemic measure to quantify the risk spillover ef-
fects, what is the impact on the financial system if one specific institution is
in financial distress. However, during the financial crisis, I have seen that sev-
eral financial institutions may have been in financial distress at the same time,
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therefore an interesting extension of CoVaR can be defined as follow:
Definition 4. I denote by CoV aR1,...,Sq,t the V aR of the financial system condi-
tional on some event {C(r1t ), . . . , C(rSt )} of a set of institutions {1, . . . , S} at time
t. That is CoV aR1,...,Sq,t for financial system and confidence level q when the set of
institutions {1, . . . , S} is on some event {C(r1t ), . . . , C(rSt )} at time t is defined
by:
P(rsyst ≤ CoV aR1,...,Sq,t |C(r1t ), . . . , C(rSt )) = q, (3.3)
and the set of institutions {1, 2, ..., S}’s contribution to financial system is denoted
by:
∆CoV aR1,...,Sq,t = CoV aR
r1≤V aR1q ,...,rS≤V aRSq
q,t − CoV aR−ασ
1
t≤r1t≤ασ1t ,...,−ασSt ≤rSt ≤ασSt
q,t .
(3.4)
Unlike above, I focus on {rit ≤ V aRiq,t}, for i = 1, ..., S, in the adverse case
as the conditioning event and simplify the notation, CoV aRsys|r
1
t≤V aR1q,t,...,rSt ≤V aRSq,t
q,t =
ACoV aRSq,t; I focus on {−ασit ≤ rit ≤ ασit}, for i = 1, . . . , S, in the normal case as
the conditioning event and simplify the notation, CoV aRsys|−ασ
1
t≤r1t≤ασit,...,−ασSt ≤rSt ≤ασSt
q,t =
NCoV aRSq,t. Note that the normal case is characterized as an α-standard de-
viation around the mode, where I assume the mode is 0 and σit is the con-
ditional standard deviation of institution i. It is straightforward to see that,
∆CoV aRsys|1,...,Sq = ACoV aRSq,t−NCoV aRSq,t, letting ∆CoV aRsys|1,...,Sq = ∆CoV aRSq .
Hence ∆CoV aRSq,t denotes the difference between the V aR of financial system
conditional on a set of financial institutions {1, . . . , S} being in a tail event and the
V aR of financial system conditional on the set of financial institutions {1, . . . , S}
being in a normal state at time t.5
The economics of multi-CoV aR are quite similar to those of standard
CoV aR. Both of them quantifies the spillover effects by measuring institution(s)
add(s) to the global risk of the financial system. The spillover effects are embodied
in several ways. First, if several banks are selling off their mark-to-market assets
to meet their obligations, it will lower the price of these assets and further decrease
the values of the banks who hold these assets, consequently it will hurt market
liquidity and harm banks ability of raising new fund and even more likely trigger
the insolvency problem of banks. This implies the second spillover effect, when
5Note that this is different from the initial definition of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011),
where they let the return exactly equals to its V aR as the adverse case and the return exactly
equals to its median as the normal case. See also Ergun and Girardi (2012), they have changed
the initial definition of conditional event in the standard CoVaR.
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several banks meet the insolvency problem at the same time, it will drag other
banks who hold direct debt contract of distressed banks into trouble, and this is
so called domino effect. Last, when GSIFIs are insolvent, the government will
intervene to bail-out these banks due to the “too-big-to-fail” effect and increase
the burden of taxpayers and sow the seeds for the next crisis. Note that, this
multi-CoV aR captures spillover effects, and measure the contribution of systemic
risk of a set of banks when it is in distress.
3.3.2.1 Calculation of Multi-CoVaR
As to the V aR for individual institutions, I compute ACoV aRSq,t and NCoV aRSq,t
for a set of institutions in the same spirit in order construct the ∆CoV aRSq,t
measure. The equation (3.3) can be reformulate as:
P(rsyst ≤ CoV aR1,...,Sq,t , C(r1t ), · · · , C(rSt ))
P(C(r1t ), · · · , C(rSt ))
= q. (3.5)
To compute ACoV aRSq,t, I replace the conditional event C(rit) by {rit ≤
V aRiq,t}. Since the individual risk measure V aRiq,t can be easily obtained,6 there-
fore I can calculate the denominator of equation (3.5), which generates a joint
probability qd, (d for denominator),
ˆ V aR1q,t
−∞
· · ·
ˆ V aRSq,t
−∞
DS,t(r1t , . . . , rSt )dr1t · · · drSt = qd, (3.6)
where DS,t(·) denotes the probability density function of a S-dimensional random
vector rS,t = (r1t , . . . , rSt )′. Hence, the numerator in the equation (3.5) can be
rewritten in the same way,
ˆ ACoV aRSq,t
−∞
ˆ V aR1q,t
−∞
· · ·
ˆ V aRSq,t
−∞
DS+1,t(rsyst , r1t , . . . , rSt )dr
sys
t dr
1
t · · · drSt = q × qd,
(3.7)
where DS+1,t(·) denotes the probability density function of a S + 1-dimensional
random vector rS+1,t = (rsyst , r1t , . . . , rSt )′. As the ACoV aRSq,t is the only unknown
in the equation (3.7), it can be solved numerically.
Regarding to the NCoV aRSq,t, the conditional event is {−ασit ≤ rit ≤
ασit} and the conditional standard deviation σit can be obtained by implementing
6I will present how to calculate the individual V aR in the next section.
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a GARCH process. The denominator of equation (3.5), in this case, gives,
ˆ ασ1t
−ασ1t
· · ·
ˆ ασSt
−ασSt
DS,t(r1t , . . . , rSt )dr1t · · · drSt = pd, (3.8)
and the numerator gives,
ˆ NCoV aRSq,t
−∞
ˆ ασ1t
−ασ1t
· · ·
ˆ ασSt
−ασSt
DS+1,t(r1t , . . . , rSt )dr
sys
t dr
1
t · · · drSt = q × pd, (3.9)
therefore, I can compute NCoV aRSq,t with the same procedure as for ACoV aRSq,t,
thus the ∆CoV aRSq,t is obtained by taking the difference between ACoV aRSq,t and
NCoV aRSq,t.
3.3.2.2 Properties of Multi-CoVaR
This measure has three advantages. First, it allows to calculate the total contri-
bution of systemic risk in the financial system, with this total contribution, one
can apply an allocating rule to attribute the total risk to each bank. This total
systemic risk is measured by the systemic risk contribution when all the institu-
tions in the system are in distress. Suppose there are N banks in the system, the
total contribution of systemic risk is given by:
P(Rsys ≤ CoV aR1,...,Nq,t |C(r1t ), ..., C(rNt )) = q, (3.10)
and
∆CoV aRNq,t = ACoV aRNq,t −NCoV aRNq,t. (3.11)
Note that the equation (3.10) characterizes an extreme case in the system, where
all the institutions are in financial distress, and the equation (3.11) gives the
related systemic risk contribution in this scenario, which is the overall systemic
risk contribution in the system. This total systemic risk measure can be set as
a benchmark for regulators, since the sum of each institution’s systemic risk can
never surpass (less than) this benchmark, otherwise there is an over-regulation
(under-regulation) in the industry which may hurt the real economy.
Secondly, it allows to calculate the marginal contribution of bank i for
a given set of institutions S is already in distress. Denote ∆i(S) the marginal
systemic risk contribution of one specific institution i is determined by:
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∆i(S) = ∆CoV aR(S ∪ {i})−∆CoV aR(S), for S ⊂ N, i /∈ S. (3.12)
The equation (3.12) has the advantage to inform the regulators that which dis-
tressed institution should be bailed-out more urgently during the financial crisis.
For example, in September 2008, Lehman Brother and AIG are both in financial
distress at the same time and then Federal reserve has decided to bailout AIG.
However, based on (3.12) one can calculate ∆(S) for both LB and AIG and to
bailout the one which has a larger marginal contribution of systemic risk.
The last, the multi-CoV aR can provide the systemic risk contribution of
different groups. Again, this property is very useful for the regulators. Put the
set of institutions S differently for various sectors in the financial system as de-
posit banking sector, insurance sector, investment banking sector or government-
sponsored enterprise (GSE), one can obtain the systemic risk contribution for
these different sectors and regulate each sector appropriately. Moreover, we can
put the different set of institutions as different regions or different countries to
analyze a geographical distinction of systemic risk contribution to better inform
the international establishment as OECD, IMF, and BIS etc.
On top of that, this extension about standard CoV aR allows us to imple-
ment Shapley value methodology to attribute the systemic risk to each financial
institution in the system, which has some related advantages to the design of
prudential regulation issue.
3.3.3 Shapley value
In this paper, the Shapley value plays a role as a systemic risk distributor, which
means that I use Shapley value methodology as an allocation rule to assign the
overall systemic risk contribution, as in (3.11), to each institution in the financial
system. An introduction of Shapley value is presented below.
The Shapley value methodology was initially proposed in the circum-
stance of cooperative games, in which a group of players generates a share “value”
(e.g. wealth, cost) for a group as a whole. The Shapley value of a player in a
game turns out to be his expected marginal contribution over the set of all per-
mutations on the set of players. For example, a group of agents would like to
connect to a server in order to benefit a high speed functioning of their own PC,
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however, the maintain of the server is costly, the Shapley value is a fair and effi-
cient allocation rule to share the maintaining costs among agents and the Shapley
value of an agent is his expected marginal contribution over all possible set of the
agents. This methodology can be applied in our case, where financial institutions
are connected in financial market with high correlated risk activities that trigger
systemic risk in the system. The “value” mentioned above is the systemic risk
generated by financial institutions (banks).
In order to apply the Shapley value methodology to a financial system, it
is sufficient to define a so-called “characteristic function”. As mentioned above, I
define this “characteristic function” as Multi-CoV aR. This function is the same
over the set of all permutations on the set of banks and map each subsystem into
a risk measure. The characteristic function, v, should accept as input anyone of
the 2N−1 subsystems7 of banks and should deliver the system-wide risk measures
when applied to the entire system.
The derivation of Shapley values involves the following process.
There are N players in a superadditive game, which are financial institu-
tions. Let v : 2N → R+ be a function defining the systemic risk for each subset of
N , and v(φ) = 0. The objective is to find non-negative systemic risk attribution
{Shi}i∈N such that:
• Axiom 1 (Additivity/Efficiency): Σi∈NShi = v(N),
• Axiom 2 (Dummy axiom): If i is such that ∆i(S) = v({i}) for all S such
that i /∈ S, then Shi = v({i}),
• Axiom 3 (Symmetry): If i 6= j such that ∆i(S) = ∆j(S) for all S such that
i, j /∈ S, then Shi = Shj,
• Axiom 4 (Linearity): Suppose v(S) = v1(S) + v2(S) where v1 and v2 and
assume v1(φ) = v2(φ) = 0, and {Sh1i }i are systemic risk shares for v1-risk
and {Sh2i }i are systemic risk shares for v2-risk, then Shi = Sh1i + Sh2i , for
all i, defines the systemic risk shares for v-risk.
There is a unique way to satisfy axioms 1, 2, 3 and 4, called Shapley value and
Shapley value for bank i is:
7Since the empty set φ does not play a role in contributing the value.
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Shi(v) = ΣS⊆N\{i}
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n! (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)), (3.13)
where n is the total number of banks and the sum extends over all subsets S of N
not containing bank i. This formula can be interpreted as the expected marginal
contribution of bank i over the set of all permutations on the set of banks.
Now, I am going to talk about the economic meaning of these axioms.
Axiom 1 states that the sum of of Shapley value equals the aggregated systemic
risk, this additivity property also called efficiency property, since the total sys-
temic risk can be attributed among banks with no loss and with no gain. This
property has a big advantage in macro-prudential policy, if macro-prudential tools
are based on some sub(super)-additivity systemic risk measures, given the linear
relationship between the macro-prudential regulation and systemic regulation,
supervisors will punish (subsidize) the economy for no reason. Axiom 2 says that
if the systemic risk of i is orthogonal of any other j 6= i’s systemic risks, then
the systemic risk share of i should be exactly equals to its systemic risk alone.
This is the case where standard CoVaR coincide with Shapley value methodology,
whereas the systemic risk of i is not orthogonal of any other institutions’ systemic
risks, this is the reason why the standard CoVaR is different from Shapley value
methodology. Axiom 3 enforces the fairness among players, for any two different
banks, if their marginal systemic risk contribution is the same for any subsets
S ⊂ N , then their Shapley value should be the same, therefore, they should be
charged the same as well. The last axiom suggests that this systemic risk can
be decomposed into two independent risks, for example these two risks are from
two different services in the bank. Then to obtain the systemic risk shares it is
sufficient to calculate the risk of each services and take the sum the the two. If
one can decompose this systemic risk, I can apply the Shapley value methodology
in a decentralized way.
3.4 Estimation
There are several ways to calculate CoV aR. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011)
propose to use quantile regression to estimate time-varying ∆CoV aR and V aR.
They use a set of state variables as regressors to estimate q-quantile parameters
to fit estimated CoV aR and V aR, a big advantage of this method is that they
do not consider any specific distribution on random variables in order to obtain
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the time-varying CoV aRt and V aRt. In this paper, I use another econometric
framework to illustrate the methodology presented above. In order to avoid the
process of which state variables should be selected,8 I work directly with the re-
turns of the individuals. To clarify the idea, I firstly identify which ingredients
are indispensable for calculating multi-CoV aR: 1) a probability density function
of the returns (both system and individuals), 2) the conditional volatility of in-
dividual returns to define the so called “normal case”, 3) the idiosyncratic risk
V aR to characterize the “adverse case” for individuals.
3.4.1 Multi-t distribution
From the equations (3.6)-(3.9), the key ingredient in computing multi-CoV aR
is the joint probability density function. An important stylized fact in financial
market is that the asset returns often have fatter tails than normal distribution,
and I assume the vector rS+1,t follows a multi-t distribution with mean 0 and
variance-covariance Σt (v for degree of freedom):

rsyst
r1t
...
rSt
 ∼ tv


0
0
...
0
 ,

σ2sys,t ρsys1,tσsys,tσ1,t · · · ρsysS,tσsys,tσS,t
ρ1sys,tσ1,tσsys,t σ
2
1,t · · · ρ1S,tσ1,tσS,t
... ... . . . ...
ρSsys,tσS,tσsys,t ρS1,tσS,tσ1,t · · · σ2S,t

 ,
where σi,t denotes the conditional volatility of i and ρij,t denotes the conditional
correlation between i and j. Therefore, to estimate the multi-t distribution in
each time t, it is sufficient to estimate the conditional volatilities and conditional
correlations. Note that, this is the only case where I make a distribution assump-
tion to calculate the multi-CoV aR.
3.4.2 Volatility
As mentioned before, I need to compute individual’s conditional volatility σit at
first place to calculate NCoV aRSq,t. To do so, I use the GARCH process. In
wide world of GARCH specifications, TGARCH is picked to model volatility to
capture so called “leverage effect”, which has the fact that a negative return
increases variance by more than a positive return of the same magnitude. I also
a diagnosis of this GARCH model to show that the model is well specified in the
8For different state variables selected, the results of quantile estimation may be different.
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Appendix. The evolution of the conditional variance dynamics in this model is
given by:
rt = tσt,
σ2t = ωG + αGr2t−1 + γGr2t−1I−t−1 + βGσ2t−1,
with I−t−1 = rt ≤ 0. The model is estimated by Quasi-MLE which guarantees the
consistency of the estimator. I have:
√
T (θˆMLE − θo) ∼ N(0, J−10 I0J−10 ),
with Iˆ = 1
T
∑
St(θˆ)S
′
t(θˆ) and Jˆ = 1T
∑ ∂2logL
∂θ∂′θ is the Hessian of total log-likelihood
function. Where θ = (αG, γG, βG).
3.4.3 Correlations
The time varying correlation is modeled by using DCC approach. Correlation
matrix is given by:
Pt = diag(Qt)−
1
2Qtdiag(Qt)−
1
2 ,
where Q is a so called pseudo-correlation matrix and it is positive defined. The
DCC specification is defined as:
Qt = (1− αC − βC)Q+ αC∗t−1∗
′
t−1 + βCQt−1,
where ∗t is the standardized returns with ∗t = diag(Q) × t, Q is an intercept
matrix with Q = E[∗t ∗
′
t ]. I use the estimation method mentioned above for this
dynamic conditional correlation.
3.4.4 Value-at-Risk
Instead of using a distribution based approach to calculate V aR, here, I loosen
the multi-t distribution assumption and use non-parametric bootstrap method-
ology to determine individuals V aR. The nonparametric bootstrap allows us
to estimate the sampling distribution of a statistic empirically without making
assumptions about the form of population, and without deriving the sampling
distribution explicitly. The key bootstrap concept is that the population is to the
sample as the sample is to the bootstrap sample. Then, I proceed the bootstrap
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technique in the following way.
For a given institution series of returns {ri,1, ..., ri,T}, consider a TGARCH
model as in the previous case, whose parameters have been estimated by Quasi-
MLE. Then I can obtain the standardized residuals, ˆi,t = ri,tσˆi,t , where σˆ
2
i,t =
ωˆiG + αˆiGr2i,t−1 + γˆiGr2i,t−1I−i,t−1 + βˆiGσ2i,t−1, and σˆ2i,1 is long-run variance of the sam-
ple.
To implement the bootstrap methodology, it is necessary to obtain boot-
strap replicates R∗i,T = {r∗i,1, ..., r∗i,T} that mimic the structure of original series
of size T . R∗i,T are obtained from following recursion (Pascual, Nieto, and Ruiz
(2006))
σˆ∗2i,t = ωˆiG + αˆiGr
∗2
i,t−1 + γˆiGr
∗2
i,t−1I
∗−
i,t−1 + βˆiGσˆ∗2i,t−1,
r∗i,t = ∗i,tσˆ∗i,t, for t = 1, ..., T,
where σˆ∗2i,1 = σˆ2i,1 and ∗i,t are random draws with replacement from the empirical
distribution of standardized residuals ˆi,t.9 This bootstrap method incorporate
uncertainty in the dynamics of conditional variance in order to make useful to
estimate V aR. Given the bootstrap series R∗i,T , I can obtain estimated bootstrap
parameters, {ωˆi,bG , αˆi,bG , γˆi,bG , βˆi,bG }, The bootstrap of historical values are obtained
from following recursions
σˆb∗2i,t = ωˆ
i,b
G + αˆ
i,b
G r
2
i,t−1 + γˆ
i,b
G r
2
i,t−1I
−
i,t−1 + βˆ
i,b
G σˆ
b∗2
i,t−1,
rˆb∗i,t = ∗i,tσˆb∗i,t for t = 1, ..., T,
where σˆb∗1 is the long-run variance of the bootstrap sample Rb∗T , note that the
historical values is based the original series of return and on the bootstrap pa-
rameters. I repeat the above procedure B times, and estimated V̂ aR∗
i
t(q) is
kth-order of series rˆb∗t , for b = 1, ..., B, where k = B × q.
3.5 Empirical Analysis
I apply the methodology and econometric framework described in the previous
sections and examine the systemic risk in in France banking system and China
banking system.
9It is necessary to sample with replacement, because one would otherwise simply reproduce
the original sample.
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French Panel Chinese Panel
Name Ticker Name Ticker
BNP Paribas BNP Industrial & Commercial Bank of China ICBC
Société Générale SoGen China Construction Bank CBC
Crédit Agricole CrdAgl Bank of China BC
Natixis Natixis Bank of Communications CCB
Crédit Mutuel CrdMtl China Merchants Bank CMBC
Table 3.1: Banking Panel.
3.5.1 Data
I study two different banking panels in this paper, French panel and Chinese
panel. I choose the top five French banks that are in the top 50 world banks
which based on the market capitalization as of January 20, 2012, as the French
banking system, from April 19, 2002 to June 29, 2012; and I also choose the
top five Chinese banks that are in this top 50 world banks panel, as my Chinese
banking system, from October 27, 2006 to June 29, 2012. I extract weekly returns
and market capitalization from Bloomberg. The goal is to analyze the systemic
risk in these two banking panels (table 3.1) in terms of market capitalization
returns separately.10
Figure 3.1 gives visual insights on the booms and busts of the French
and Chinese banking system. The figure shows the cumulative system returns
in both banking panels, from April 2002 to June 2012 for French panel (blue
line) and from October 2006 to June 2012 for Chinese panel (red line). The blue
line experiences a loss from the start to the mid 2003, and then had a steep
growth between mid 2003 and June 2007. Starting from July 2007, the fall of
financial market has been dramatic, with the large gains transforming into the
huge losses. The system hit the bottom in March 2009 and start a slow recovery
that is then interrupted by the 1st European crisis of May 2010 and 2nd European
crisis during the summer 2011. The red line also had a steep growth between the
beginning of the sample and the early 2008, however, they incurred the losses
just several months after French panel faced the losses, this can be explained by
the geographical transfer of crisis have some lags. The Chinese system hit the
bottom in March 2009 and start a slow recovery that is interrupted only during
the 2nd European debt crisis.
10As There is no public data for BPCE (Group BPCE was founded in 2009) and Agriculture
Bank of China (It was listed on the Hong Kong stock exchanges in July 2010) during the
financial crisis 2007-2009, these two banks are not considered in this paper.
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Figure 3.1: Cumulative system market capitalization returns of France panel and
China panel.
Figure 3.2 and figure 3.3 show that QQ-plot of French panel and Chinese
Panel. In line with the stylized fact of financial data, there are fat tails on the
returns in both panels, therefore it is irrational to assume the returns of banks
follow a multi-normal distribution, which justify my previous assumption that
the returns follows a multi-t distribution. An interesting result found from these
2 figures is that French banks have much larger fat tails then Chinese banks,
this may be explained by the French banks are more affected by the 2007-2009
financial crisis than Chinese banks do.
3.5.2 Full sample estimation result
I used the methodology introduced in Section 3.3 and section 3.4 to analyze the
panels. TGARCH and DCC models are fitted on each bank over the whole sample
period and in this section I report information on the parameter estimates, fitted
series and check on the autocorrelations.
In table 3.2 I show all banks and the systems’ parameter estimates of the
TGARCH (left side) and the DCC (right side) models for both panel, note that
the DCC is each bank’s returns dynamic conditional correlation with the system
returns. The TGARCH parameters do not fluctuate much, but for Chinese banks,
they are less subject to the so called “leverage effect”. The point estimates are in
line with the typical TGRACH estimates, with slightly higher αs and γs together
with lower βs implying a higher level of unconditional kurtosis. Turning to the
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Figure 3.2: QQ-plot of market capitalization returns of French panel.
Figure 3.3: QQ-plot of market capitalization returns of Chinese panel.
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French Panel αG γG βG αC βC
FRA. System 0.13 0.07 0.79
BNP 0.12 0.10 0.77 0.03 0.96
SoGen 0.09 0.04 0.86 0.01 0.98
CrdAgl 0.05 0.04 0.91 0.05 0.94
Natixis 0.06 0.22 0.71 0.13 0.84
CrdMtl 0.04 0.03 0.92 0.01 0.98
Chinese Panel αG γG βG αC βC
CHN. System 0.06 0.05 0.85
ICBC 0.12 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.98
CBC 0.01 0.24 0.74 0.03 0.96
BC 0.11 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.98
CCB 0.02 0.00 0.97 0.30 0.50
CMBC 0.06 0.02 0.92 0.02 0.96
Table 3.2: TGARCH and DCC estimation results.
DCC, parameters are again close to the typical set of estimates. The diagnostic
of autocorrelations is provided in Appendix.
I provide the dynamics of volatility in figure 3.4. The blue line represents
the time varying system volatility and the red line represents the average time
varying of individuals volatilities of all banks in each panels. In Chinese panel,
the system volatility is always lower than the average volatility, this is due to the
diversification effect among banks. Moreover both average&system volatilities
are relative high during the crisis period to the post crisis period, however, the
magnitude of the volatilities are much lower than the French banks. Note that,
these two panels behave very differently during the European crisis period, this
is because the European debt crisis has a huge direct impact on French banks,
but has little impact for Chinese banks. In French panel, during the calm period
2003-mid 2007, both system and average volatilities stay at a low level meanwhile
there is a big spread between average volatility and system volatility; this is due
to diversification effect when market is in a good period. However, this spread
narrows down and volatility level increases sharply when financial crisis starts,
this is because of the co-movement of individuals returns and systemic return
when “things” are going bad. Therefore, it will be useful to investigate the
correlations of returns among banks.
Figure 3.5 displays average correlation by banks in each panel. In French
panel, there is an obvious trend of increasing in average correlation from calm
period to crisis period, which explains why the diversification effect plays little
role during the financial crisis. This implies that the sub-additivity property of
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Figure 3.4: Average and system volatility of French system and Chinese system.
93
risk measures may not hold in some cases, in my view, especially for the systemic
risk measures, because a large systemic risk often comes with a high correlation
among the agent in the system. It’s the same for Chinese panel, the level of
correlation increases after the crisis, but the magnitude of correlation in China is
larger than in French.
Figure 3.6 provides the average individual Value-at-Risk in French panel
and Chinese panel.11 The average individual VaRs are quite similar with the av-
erage volatility in term of evolution, which is in line with the model specification,
the return is product of volatility and the innovation. In French panel, during
the calm period, the level of individual VaR is low, because the volatility is low.
It sharply increased after the crisis, the average VaR almost grew 500% from the
bottom during 2004-2005 to the peak in March 2009, and attain a level around
−20% of return, which is almost twice larger than the peak in Chinese panel at
the same period.
3.5.3 Overall systemic risk and Systemic importance
Figure 3.7 shows that the overall systemic risk12 (represented in black line and its
level is on the right vertical axis), and its level was very low at the beginning of
the crisis. Then the total systemic risk moved up significantly after the failure of
Lehman Brother. After that, there has been a lot of panic in the market and the
total systemic risk reached the peak around 140% of loss in market capitalization
return as the overall systemic contribution in March 2009. Since the release of
US SCAP around early May 2009, the total systemic risk decrease quickly and
returned to the pre-Lehman level. The market has calmed down till the first
round of European sovereign debt crisis in May 2010, after the Greece receiving
the aid with 14.5 billions euros, the total systemic risk decreased. Almost a year
later, June 13 2011, Standard & Poor’s has downgraded Greek debt from B to
CCC, the total systemic risk raised sharply and reached the peak in summer 2011
around 100% of loss in return after 2007-2009 financial crisis.
11Throughout the whole paper, the confidence level is set as 5%.
12Delta-Multi CoVaR when all banks in the system are in financial distress, as formulated
in equations (3.10) and (3.11).
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Figure 3.5: Dynamic Conditional Correlation of French system and Chinese sys-
tem.
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Figure 3.6: Average individual VaR of French panel and Chinese Panel.
Notes: The VaR is calculated at the 5% confidence level and the bootstrap is
repeated 1000 times.
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Figure 3.7: Marginal Contribution of Systemic Risk and Total Systemic Risk in
French panel.
On the left side of the graph, the axis represents the importance of sys-
temic risk of each financial institution in percentage.13 The level of systemic im-
portance during the whole sample is quite consistent, there is not much variation
of weight of systemic importance among banks. BNP Paribas is the bank that
have the most systemic important weight, Crédit Agricole and Société Générale
are not too far from BNP Paribas. However, Natixis and Crédit Mutuel have the
lowest systemic important weight in the system.
In table 3.3, I provide the summary statistics of the estimated Shapley-
CoVaR series and Standard-CoVaR series for all banks in French panel. I first
compute the mean of each series in different time horizon to have a general idea
about the systemic importance among these banks, then I compute the standard
deviation of each series to see the variation of the systemic importance for each
bank. Note that the total risk in table 3.3 provides the benchmark for regulators
to implement systemic risk measures individually. This benchmark gives the
overall systemic risk contribution to the system when all banks are in distress.
So the number in “mean column” of table 3.3 can be interpreted as, consider
the number for BNP during the whole sample in Shapley-CoVaR case, BNP
contributes, in average, -0.106 (with 5% confidence level) of return of market
capitalization to the whole system; For standard-CoVaR measure, it contributes
more than previous case as -0.285 of return of market capitalization to the whole
system. Another interesting result shows in this table is that the more variation
(high standard deviation) of the systemic risk series in time horizon comes with
13This is achieved by the additivity of Shapley value.
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Figure 3.8: Marginal Contribution of Systemic Risk and Total Systemic Risk in
Chinese panel.
the more systemic importance of that series.
Figure 3.8 represent the same information as in figure 3.7 for Chinese
panel. Since the sample starts from the late 2006, the first peak for the total
risk corresponds to the so called “Chinese correction” in early 2007. The second
peak comes at the core of 2007-2009 financial crisis, but Chinese banking sys-
tem doesn’t suffer as much as French banking does, this is because the french
banks have more connections with U.S. banks. This figure shows us that the
most systemically important banks in China are the state banks for Industrial &
Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank and bank of China. How-
ever, two private banks, Bank of Communications and China Merchants Bank
have less systemic importance. In general, the magnitude of systemic risk is less
in China than in France. Table 3.4 reports the summary statistics of the esti-
mated Shapley-CoVaR series and Standard-CoVaR series for all banks in Chinese
panel.
3.5.4 Additivity
Table 3.3 and 3.4 show an interesting result, the sum of individual ∆CoV aR
is larger than the total systemic risk. This difference is quite small during the
good period, this is because the correlations between banks are very small at that
period. However, during the crisis period the correlations between banks increase
sharply, and this implies that sum of individual ∆CoV aR is greater than the
total systemic risk ∆CoV aR1,...,N . If the central planner regulate the systemic
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Shapley-CoVaR Std-CoVaR
Whole Sample
Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max
BNP -0.106 0.054 -0.048 -0.346 -0.285 0.178 -0.106 -0.989
SoGen -0.096 0.043 -0.045 -0.327 -0.278 0.175 -0.108 -0.990
CrdAgl -0.098 0.044 -0.054 -0.312 -0.254 0.185 -0.072 -0.990
Natixis -0.070 0.038 -0.023 -0.223 -0.194 0.157 -0.016 -0.843
CrdMtl -0.057 0.033 -0.017 -0.247 -0.086 0.078 -0.010 -0.429
Total Risk -0.427 0.207 -0.227 -1.418 -0.427 0.207 -0.227 -1.418
Financial Crisis
Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max
BNP -0.143 0.069 -0.071 -0.346 -0.366 0.216 -0.154 -0.989
SoGen -0.119 0.060 -0.055 -0.327 -0369 0.212 -0.149 -0.990
CrdAgl -0.124 0.058 -0.066 -0.312 -0.357 0.220 -0.112 -0.990
Natixis -0.094 0.041 -0.034 -0.223 -0.275 0.178 -0.057 -0.843
CrdMtl -0.075 0.044 -0.033 -0.247 -0.139 0.090 -0.041 -0.429
Total Risk -0.556 0.267 -0.294 -1.418 -0.556 0.267 -0.294 -1.418
European Crisis
Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max
BNP -0.130 0.048 -0.063 -0.237 -0.412 0.166 -0.176 -0.805
SoGen -0.102 0.042 -0.045 -0.204 -0.397 0.160 -0175 -0.772
CrdAgl -0.113 0.043 -0.054 -0.216 -0.389 0.163 -0.155 -0.767
Natixis -0.098 0.033 -0.050 -0.171 -0.319 0.155 -0.106 -0.692
CrdMtl -0.075 0.029 -0.028 -0.156 -0.138 0.068 -0.047 -0.299
Total Risk -0.518 0.191 -0.246 -0.947 -0.518 0.191 -0.246 -0.947
Table 3.3: Shapley-CoVaR and Standard CoVaR in French panel.
Notes: The whole sample period is from 4/19/2002 to 6/29/2012, the financial
crisis period is from 6/24/2007 to 4/23/2010 and the European crisis period is
from 5/1/2010 to 6/29/2012. The α-scale of deviation to define the normal case
is set α = 0.5. Shapley-CoVaR refers to the methodology proposed in this paper,
and Standard-CoVaR is proposes by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). Total risk
refers to the systemic risk contribution when all these 5 banks are in distress,
which is calculated by formulas (3.10) and (3.11). This is also the benchmark for
regulators to implement systemic risk measures individually.
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Shapley-CoVaR Std-CoVaR
Whole Sample
Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max
ICBC -0.063 0.011 -0.038 -0.106 -0.206 0.047 -0.146 -0.358
CBC -0.067 0.010 -0.043 -0.133 -0.179 0.039 -0.099 -0.350
BC -0.062 0.014 -0.042 -0.106 -0.174 0.041 -0.124 -0.315
CCB -0.049 0.012 -0.034 -0.105 -0.158 0.040 -0.090 -0.308
CMBC -0.053 0.012 -0.037 -0.090 -0.167 0.044 -0.133 -0.330
Total Risk -0.295 0.053 -0.228 -0.494 -0.295 0.053 -0.228 -0.494
Table 3.4: Shapley-CoVaR and Standard CoVaR in Chinese panel.
Notes: The whole sample period is from 11/3/2002 to 6/29/2012. The α-scale of
deviation to define the normal case is set α = 0.5. Shapley-CoVaR refers to the
methodology proposed in this paper, and Standard-CoVaR is proposes by Adrian
and Brunnermeier (2011). Total risk refers to the systemic risk contribution when
all these 5 banks are in distress, which is calculated by formulas (3.10) and (3.11).
This is also the benchmark for regulators to implement systemic risk measures
individually.
risk based on standard CoV aR that will punish the economy by over-regulating,
since it will charge more than it should be. Furthermore, it will limit the volume
of credit to the real economy, thus amplify the financial crisis and prolong the
recovery of the economy. Note that the amount of over-regulation can be very
significant, based on French system, the amount of over-regulation during the
2007-09 financial crisis and the European crisis are close to 100% of loss in return
which is even larger than the total systemic risk at both periods around 50% of
loss in return.
In the Shapley-CoVaR case of table 3.3 and 3.4, the sum of individuals’
average measures is exactly equal to the total risk. This is in line with Tarashev,
Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2010) and ?, based on Shapley value methodology, this
systemic risk measure has a additive property, which is desirable from an opera-
tional perspective, since prudential requirements can be a linear transformation
of the marginal contribution if the systemic risk measure is additive. Therefore, it
allows the Macro-Prudential tools can be implemented at individual levels. Note
that, the “Distressed Insurance Premium” and the “Marginal Expected Shortfall”
also have additive property, but these measures are focusing on the exposure of
individual institution when a systematic shock take place, they do not measuring
the contagion (externality) that an institution contribute to the financial system.
However, the systemic risk measure proposed in this paper captures the exter-
nality that a specific institutions contribute to the whole system efficiently.
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3.6 Regulation
The macroprudential framework deals with systemic risk in both the time di-
mension (procyclicality) and the cross-sectional dimension (contagion). I have
developed a systemic risk measure to deal with the latter, now, let’s focus on
the former. Adrian and Shin (2011) shows that the procyclical leverage follows
directly from the countercyclical nature of risk measure. To weaken the procycli-
cality effect in the economy, one can change the characteristic of the proportion
coefficient14 of the capital that intermediary holds per unit of risk measure. More
specifically, I propose a counter-cyclical coefficient to attain this goal. Based on
chapter 13 of Acharya and Richardson (2009) and the measure proposed above,
the systemic capital charge (SCC) as a macroprudential tool could be written
as:
SCC = λ︸︷︷︸
Countercyclical coefficient
× Sh(v)× Value,
where Sh(v) is the systemic risk contribution provide by multi-∆CoV aR and
Shapley value approach introduced in this paper.
This value can be market capitalization if one compute the measure by
capitalization and it can be also the asset if the measure is derived by asset.
The Sh(v) is the systemic importance of systemic risk expressed in percent of
value. However, how to choose the optimal counter-cyclical coefficient λ is still
not clear to regulators and economists, this can be put into the agenda of the
future research projects.
This macroprudential tool gives the incentives to financial institutions to
limit their holding on systemic risk since capital reserves is costly, and counter-
cyclical coefficient may weaken the procyclical effect in the economy.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper I propose a new systemic risk measure to identify financial institu-
tions’ systemic importance. I use Multi−CoV aR to calculate the total systemic
risk and then use the Shapley value methodology to efficiently allocate total sys-
14Under the 1996 Market Risk Amendment of Basel capital accord, this coefficient is equal
to three.
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temic risk to each financial institution. The additivity property of the Shapley
value ensures that the sum of each institution’s Shapley value of systemic risk
contribution is exactly equal to the Multi−∆CoV aR of all the financial institu-
tions in the system being in financial distress, hence the macroprudential policy
can potentially be efficiently implemented based on this measure.
However, there are also some future research tasks on the field. First,
on the strength of the methodology mentioned above, it is useful to construct a
forward looking framework. With TGARCH and DCC models, it is possible to
construct a forward looking conditional distribution, a forward looking individual
risk is also feasible, since bootstrap technology could deliver this outcome. Sec-
ond, what is the driving factors of systemic risk is needed, since if these driving
factors can be identified, it would be very useful for financial institutions to con-
trol their systemic risk and make the financial market more stable. Third, how to
design a countercyclical systemic capital charge can be also put into the agenda of
the future research projects. Because this countercyclical systemic capital charge
may weaken the procyclical effect in the economy.
Chapter 4
Debt maturities, Liquidity risk and Externality1
4.1 Introduction
The excessive reliance on short term funding by financial institutions has been
considered as the root of the fragility of the financial system as well as the cata-
lyst of the current financial crisis. Indeed many financial institutions were heavily
exposed to refinancing risks in wholesale debt markets, and caused externalities
on other institutions relying heavily on short term funds. As a result, individ-
ual funding decisions have an impact on other institutions, which increases the
vulnerability of the latter to liquidity crisis.
We develop a simple 3 periods model where banks are run by homogenous
bankers who have the same initial capital. Bankers have access to two types of
debt contract, long term and short term. The optimal decision of bank pins down
the debt maturity choice. On one hand, at the very beginning when banks choose
to issue short term debt to finance their projects, they know that they may have
to refinance it at interim stage that their refinancing cost will be high in case
of liquidity crisis. Therefore, their expected profits drop when the probability
of liquidity crisis increases. On the other hand, when they use long term debt,
they do not need refinancing. However, they may misbehave due to the lack of
incentives as they do not need to make interim repayment to creditors. But they
know that creditors will only accept the contracts ruling out their misbehavior.
This reduces the project size they are able to fund and their expected profit. So
the basic tradeoff between debt maturities is between liquidity risk of short term
1This article is a joint work with Zhao Li.
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debt and misbehavior of long term debt.
The project in our model is similar to the one in Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997). Banks are run by homogenous bankers who have the same initial capital.
Initially, bankers raise funds from the financial market to invest in a constant
return to scale risky project. Bankers have a moral hazard problem: they can
choose a high success probability project or a low success probability project
with some private benefits. To avoid bankers’ misbehavior, project sizes and
profits are limited. The initial funding market is liquid, there are enough savers
willing to supply short term or long term funds. These savers do not have outside
investment opportunities other than consumption. As a result, bankers can issue
initial debt contracts which just makes savers break even at 0 excess cost.
We introduce an interim aggregate macro shock in the model. This
macro shock affects the maturity of bankers’ projects. If the shock occurs, all
bankers’ projects yield nothing at the interim stage, but they can deliver the
same expected return at the final stage. If the shock does not occur, all bankers’
projects deliver immediately at the interim stage. At the initial stage, we assume
all agents know the probability of occurrence of this macro shock. Bankers’
maturity choice directly depends on this exogenously given macro shock.
If bankers choose to use short term debt to fund their initial project, they
have to refinance their initial debt when a macro shock occurs. Hit by the macro
shock, their projects yield nothing at interim stage. They have to wait until the
final stage to get the potential return. They can only rely on financial markets
to repay the initial debt, otherwise their projects would be wasted. However,
they may expose themselves to a liquidity crisis– the savers’ cash holding may
not be sufficient to meet the total refinancing needs. This means some bankers
have to resort to experts for refinancing. Experts are sophisticated investors who
have outside investment opportunities. As a result, these bankers are facing an
excess refinancing cost. Specifically, the likelihood of a liquidity crisis and the
excess refinancing cost during the crisis are both determined by the total amount
of short term debt that needs to be repaid.
If bankers choose to use long term debt to fund their initial project, they
do not need to make the interim repayment. Therefore, they do not have any
refinancing need at all. When hit by the macro shock, they just wait until the
final stage. However, consider the case in which the macro shock does not occur.
Some bankers may be lucky enough that their projects succeed and deliver a cash
flow at the interim stage. Since bankers can freely manage this cash without any
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interference by creditors, they would steal the whole cash flow generated and run
away. This misbehavior could happen between the interim stage and the final
stage. Notice that when short term debt is used, bankers have to make interim
repayment, thus they cannot misbehave in this way.
To characterize bankers’ private optimal choice of maturities, we analyze
the market equilibrium with short term debt and with long term debt. At the
market equilibrium with short term debt, we found that: when the probability
of a macro shock is small, 1. bankers issue a large amount of short term debt
at equilibrium, 2. The probability of occurring a liquidity crisis is large, 3. the
expected excess refinancing cost is large, 4. the equilibrium profit with short
term debt is also large. At the equilibrium with long term debt, we found that
the equilibrium profit is insensitive to the macro shock. In sum, when bankers
make their private optimal maturities choice, they will choose short term debt
when the probability of occurrence of a macro shock is small, and long term debt
otherwise.
The comparative statics results with short term debt could offer some
insights to understand the 2007 − 2009 financial crisis. Before the crisis, banks
relied heavily on short term debt because they expected the probability of facing
a macro shock to be small, hence expecting small refinancing needs at the interim
stage. Their equilibrium profit with short term debt was large. Consequently,
they issued a lot of short term debt, knowing that the probability of an interim
liquidity crisis and excess refinancing cost during the crisis would be high. How-
ever, the macro shock actually hit the economy, the liquidity crisis occurred due
to huge amount of short term debt needed to be refinanced, bankers’ refinancing
cost soared.
Finally, the competitive equilibrium with short term debt may not be
socially efficient. Bankers do not internalize the impact on the probability of
the liquidity crisis and excess refinancing cost due to their private borrowing
decisions. This may generate negative externalities to other banks and creditors.
The social planner takes into account the surplus obtained by experts during the
crisis refinancing and faces the same incentive compatibility constraint as bankers.
When this constraint is binding, the social planner makes the same decision as
bankers, there are no externalities. When this constraint is slack, social planner’s
choice of optimal debt is derived from her unconstrained program. Since she
considers individual bankers’ impact on probability of the liquidity crisis and
excess refinancing cost, the socially optimal debt amount will be lower than the
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one privately chosen by bankers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 describes some
related literature. Section 4.3 describes the baseline model. Section 4.4 charac-
terizes the optimal debt contract and the market equilibrium when bankers use
long-term debt financing and short-term debt financing, then studies bankers’
funding choice when s macro shock is exogenously given. Section 4.5 identifies
the negative externality caused by over-borrowing of short-term debt in the so-
cial case. Section 4.6 justifies some macroprudential regulation related to Basel
3 proposal. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Literature relevance
Our work is related to several strands of literature.
It is first related to the contributions of liquidity risk in the financial
system. In Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Bryant (1980), investors may face
a sudden preference shock, then a bank run may destroy the value of banking
sector. More precisely, they consider a framework of a fractional reserve system,
that banks finance profitable but illiquid projects. Lenders are uncertain about
their future liquidity preference. Compared to the market economy, banks can
efficiently pool resources together and insure the liquidity risk thus attain the
social optimal solution. However, there is also another possibility a lender may
have expectation that all the others may withdraw their funds together, thus the
rational behavior for her is also to withdraw immediately. If all lenders no mat-
ter their actual liquidity preference are doing so, the bank becomes bankrupted.
Morris and Shin (2001) have proposed a global game theory which can get rid
of the multiplicity of equilibrium in classical model of bank runs. Furthermore,
Rochet and Vives (2004) have proved that in a financial system, there does ex-
ist solvent but illiquid banks, which cause a coordination failure. More recently,
Morris and Shin (2009) have shown the evidence that 2007-2009 financial crisis
is a lack of liquidity, not a lack of capital, and showed that the illiquidity risk
is the difference between the total credit risk and solvency risk. Both Rochet
and Vives (2004) and Morris and Shin (2009) showed that liquidity risk may also
comes from a macro shock on fundamental that banks need to raise new fund or
fire-sale their asset to continue the project or meet their obligation to short term
investors. In Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), they studied a case where whether
the private liquidity supply can be efficient for the functioning of productive sec-
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tor. When there is no aggregate liquidity shock, the efficiency can be attained
if firms draw a credit line with intermediaries, which serves as a liquidity insur-
ance to against refinancing risk. However, if an aggregate shock take place, the
efficiency can only be achieved by government issuing treasury bond to provide
public liquidity supply. ? identified that the asymmetric information about asset
value may lead liquidity freeze in secondary market. In a recent paper by Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen (2009) have explained how liquidity risk hurts a financial
institution even a financial system as a whole. In our model, we first take this
liquidity exogenously given, than we formulate this liquidity risk as the cash in
the refinancing market is insufficient to roll-over initial debt, therefore banks have
to access to a more expansive market to raise funding and lose a part of project’s
NPV.
Second, our work is related to the strand of literature that stresses dis-
ciplinary role of short term debt. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) shows how the
issuance of demandable debt would reinforce bankers’ monitoring incentives by
making it easy for investors to penalize these bankers as soon as depositors began
to lose confidence in the bank or its policies. Myers (1977), Flannery (1994) and
Diamond and Rajan (2001) also pointed out the disciplinary role of short term
debt in financial intermediaries.
The third part of literature to which our paper is related to is the pecu-
niary externality caused by excessive accessibility in financial markets. Geanako-
plos and Polemarchakis (1986) argued that wealth distribution matters when
markets are incomplete, and pecuniary externalities generate wealth effect that
don’t net out. In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) and Lorenzoni (2008),
as insurance market is missing, then ex-ante investment generates net pecuniary
externalities, which implies competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient and
over-borrowing ex-ante. Gersbach and Rochet (2011) have shown that at market
equilibrium, the investment decision of banks is socially inefficient due to banks
do not internalize the impact of their decision on asset prices. The consequence
of this is that banks may over-invest when they receive a positive macro shock
and under-invest when they receive a negative macro shock, hence generating the
procyclicality effect. There are some other papers stress on this issue as well, for
example Korinek (2011) and Davila (2011) for a survey. Note that we do not
have fire-sale externality in our model, however, the pecuniary externality take
place since each banker acts atomistically when he raises fund ex-ant, he doesn’t
take into account his behavior may have some impacts on overall liquidity risk at
interim date. Therefore, market equilibrium is not socially efficient.
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Our paper is similar to Huberman and Repullo (2010) and Segura and
Suarez (2012). Huberman and Repullo (2010) consider a model where banks
could directly choose their project’s riskiness after the borrowing is done. In their
framework, short term debt may always dominate long term debt since it is the
only way to secure funding. Our work differs from which that we introduce some
uncertainties in economy2, thus, finance by short term debt or long term debt
is depend on the predictions of these uncertainties. Segura and Suarez (2012),
the authors consider a dynamic maturity problem that banks could choose the
maturity as well as the par value of debt. In their work, liquidity risk is due
to the sudden change of preference of the patient creditors, thus results in a
higher funding cost to banks. Moreover, market equilibrium is inefficient due to
pecuniary externalities in the market for funds during crises and their interaction
with banks’ refinancing constraints, which is characterized by a too short maturity
of debt. However, in our model, this inefficiency is captured by over reliance on
short term debt3 instead of short term debt it-self4.
4.3 The model
The model has 3 dates t = 0, 1, 2. There is a single good in this economy which
can be used for investing or consuming. There are two broad classes of agents:
bankers and creditors. All agents are risk neutral and they do not discount future
consumption.
4.3.1 Agents
Bankers and creditors take decisions in each period. Both classes of agents want
to maximize their expected utility. A continuum of measure 1 of homogenous
bankers own investment projects. They make the investment decision and they
can misbehave. Bankers enter into economy at t = 0 and can consume at t = 1, 2.
Creditors are divided into 3 groups: “patient” savers, “impatient” savers and
experts. Each creditor is endowed with 1 unit of good. “patient” savers enter
into economy at both t = 0 and consume at t = 2. “Impatient” savers can enter
into economy at t = 0 consume at t = 1 and enter into economy at t = 1 consume
at t = 2. A mass E continuum experts enters into economy at t = 0 and consume
2These uncertainties are maturity date of project and liquidity risk in interim date.
3This is exactly the over borrowing of short term debt.
4Note that short term debt have discipline role for bankers.
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both at t = 1, 2. To summarize, bankers can borrow at t = 0 from both types
of savers and experts, and can only borrow at t = 1 from “impatient”savers and
experts.
4.3.1.1 Bankers
At t = 0, each banker has the same endowment k and possesses a constant return
to scale risky investment project. Banker expands his investment size to i by
borrowing i− k from creditors. When the project matures, it delivers payoff:
y˜i =
 yi With probability p0 With probability 1− p .
Whether the project will succeed or fail is an idiosyncratic event among bankers.
There is no liquidation value or bankruptcy cost in the model. There is an interim
macro shock that affects the maturity of bankers’ projects. If the shock occurs,
all bankers projects yield nothing at the interim stage, but they can deliver the
same expected return at the final stage. If the shock does not occur, all bankers’
projects deliver immediately at the interim stage. At the initial stage, we assume
all agents know the probability of occurring this macro shock. Bankers’ maturities
choice directly depends on this exogenously given macro shock. At t = 0, the
probability of occurrence of the macro shock is α.
After borrowing the initial funds, bankers can misbehave. We assume
there are two kinds of moral hazard problems for 1 unit of investment. First,
bankers can choose a lower success probability p−4p in exchange of some private
benefits b. Second, bankers can perform asset substitution at t = 0. Specifically,
substitute the initial project to another one with 0 probability of success, but
bankers enjoy a unit private benefit δpy at t = 2. δ measures bankers’ “ability to
substitute”. Notice that, asset substitution is possible only if bankers choose to
borrow long term debt to finance the project, since “patient savers” do not ask
bankers for interim repayment.
4.3.1.2 Creditors
We assume at t = 0 the economy works well. The measure of entering savers and
experts are relatively large compared to the bankers’ investment needs. Notice
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that, at t = 0, bankers issue debt only to the savers. Since they do not have
outside investment opportunity, borrowing from them is “cheaper” than from
experts. Savers decide whether to lend their unit good to bankers or consume
it.
At t = 1, the measure of savers is an amount M˜ , which is random at
t = 0. It has a cumulative distribution function H on the interval [0,M ]. We
further assume that M is large relative to bankers’ refinancing needs at t = 1.
Experts enter into the economy with superior outside investment oppor-
tunities. There are E of experts in total and E is relatively large compared with
bankers’ refinancing needs. Each expert can use her unit of good to invest in
an outside project with a net return θ. This θ has a support [0, θ] and hetero-
geneously distributed across experts. We assume that the population of experts
with θ ≤ θˆ has a differentiable and strictly increasing distribution function F (θˆ),
with F (0) = 0 and F (θ) = 1. Define a function: G(x) = F−1[ 1
E
(x)] and G is
also differentiable and strictly increasing defining on [0, E], with G(0) = 0 and
G(E) = θ.
4.3.2 Uncertainties and information
As already introduced, bankers’ project maturity is affected by an exogenous
macro shock. With probability 1 − α, the shock does not occur and with prob-
ability α, the shock occurs. If the shock does not occur, all bankers’ projects
immediately deliver return at t = 1. If it occurs, all bankers’ project deliver
nothing at t = 1 and will deliver the same expected return at t = 2 unless initial
debt is repaid.
When bankers choose short term debt to fund their projects, they also
expose themselves to a liquidity crisis when the macro shock occurs. Since the
savers’ cash holding is random and distributed on [0,M ], it is possible that the
total amount of short term debt need to be refinanced exceeds the total cash can
be offered by the savers. Under this case, some bankers have to resort to experts
for refinancing. From t = 0’s point of view, bankers can calculate the probability
of this liquidity crisis. We will discuss it in details in the following section.
The only asymmetric information is our model is: bankers do not know
exactly the return of each expert’s outside investment opportunity. So, they
can not offer contracts extracting all surplus from experts. Besides this, we can
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consider we are in a perfect information world.
4.3.3 Interim refinancing
In this subsection, we study a representative banker’s interim refinancing decision
in detail.
When short term debt is used, the economy may suffer from a liquidity
crisis at t = 1. If the macro shock occurs, bankers need to refinance a total
amount of debt D1. t = 1’s savers could supply a total amount of liquidity M .
The refinancing market is perfect liquid ifM ≥ D1; it is illiquid ifM < D1. Under
the latter case, bankers have to resort to experts for refinancing the remaining
amount of debt D1 − M . The liquidity crisis is more likely to happen either
because bankers issue a large amount of short term debt ex ante or there are too
few savers ex post.
Given a realization M of M˜ (in the liquidity crisis case: M < D1),
Bankers refinance a proportion 1− γ = M
D1
of the total debt D1 from savers. For
the other proportion γ = D1−M
D1
of the total debt D1, bankers have to resort to
experts for refinancing.
From an ex ante point of view, the probability of liquidity crisis is:
β = Prob(M˜ < D1) = H(D1).
At t = 0, for 1 unit of debt that needs to be refinanced, a banker expects
the proportion he will refinance from “impatient” experts is:
[1− E(γ˜ | M˜ < D1)],
and the proportion he will refinance from experts is:
E(γ˜ | M˜ < D1),
in the liquidity crisis.
For conciseness, We don’t consider the total market freezing case.
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4.3.4 Debt Contracts
At t = 0, a representative banker can issue 2 kinds of debt contracts to finance
his project. First, the banker can issue long term debt contract: borrow i− k at
t = 0; repay dl at t = 2; creditors cannot claim anything until at the maturity
t = 2.
Second, the banker can issue short term debt contract: borrow i − k at
t = 0, repay d1 at t = 1. The cost of refinancing d1 depends on the aggregate
state. If there is no liquidity crisis, banker repays creditors (t = 1 savers) d02 at
t = 2. If liquidity crisis occurs, banker repays creditors (t = 1 savers and experts)
d12 at t = 2.
4.4 Equilibrium debt contract and maturity choice
To analyze bankers’ funding choice, we begin by analyzing bankers’ optimal debt
contract. First, we study the equilibrium with long term debt contract by char-
acterizing the optimal project size and maximum profit. Then, we analyze of
equilibrium of using short term debt. To end this section, we present the bankers’
equilibrium debt maturity choice. The main result we will present is: bankers
make their optimal maturity choice depending on their ex ante perception on the
probability of a macro shock. When bankers expect that there is a little chance
of macro shock will happen, they will borrow a big amount of short term debt
to fund their project in order to maximize their profit. However, once the macro
shock takes place, the likelihood of a liquidity crisis is very high and refinancing
cost become very high too.
4.4.1 Long term debt
When banker chooses to use long term debt to fund his project, he does not need
to make any interim repayment. This leaves the banker a chance to implement
asset substitution at t = 0,5 therefore, at t = 0, a contract to prevent asset
substitution is needed.
We consider an equilibrium “Substitution Prevent” debt contract. At
5This illustrates that long term debt lacks of disciplining role.
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t = 2, the face value of his long term debt is dl, thus a Substitution Prevent debt
contract should satisfies:
rl = yi− dl ≥ δyi.
In addition, we have to rule out the possibility that the banker “shirks” to
choose a low success probability project. banker’s incentive compatible constraint
is:
prl ≥ (p−4p)rl + bi,
which gives us: rl = yi− dl ≥ bi4p .
Initially, “patient” savers are willing to lend banker i− k if their lending
IR satisfies:
pdl ≥ i− k.
Since savers behave competitively, their IR constraint will be binding: dl = i−kp .
Denote ρ1 = py, and ρ0 = p(y− b4P ), we state the first proposition to characterize
long term debt equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Under the assumption A1 : δρ1 > ρ1− ρ0, the profit maximizing
size i∗ funded by long term debt is:
i∗ = k1− ρ1 + δρ1 .
Banker’s maximum profit is given by:
Πl = (py − 1)i∗ = (py − 1)k1− ρ1 + δρ1 =
ρ1 − 1
1− ρ1 + δρ1k.
.
Proof. Since “patient” savers have no outside investment opportunity and are risk
neutral, the banker will get all NPV from the project, which is: NPV = (py −
1)i. Moreover, since the project has constant return to scale, banker will always
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choose a size as large as possible to maximize project’s NPV. Since δy > b4p , the
maximum size is obtained by making the Substitution Prevent constraint binding:
yi − dl = δyi. Inserting “patient” savers’ binding IR dl = i−kp into this equation
gives us the maximum project size which rule out banker’s double moral hazard:
yi∗ − i∗−k
p
= δyi∗and i∗ = k1−ρ1+δρ1 . Inserting i
∗ into NPV gives the maximum
profit.
The economic intuitions are, 1.Asset substitution gives the banker higher
private benefit than “shirking” (δy > b4p). To rule out the banker’s ex post
substitution, he should be given even more rent than to rule out his “shirking”.
Anticipate this, the “patient” savers have a even lower incentive to lend, which
makes their IR even more tighten,
i∗ = k1− ρ1 + δρ1 <
k
1− ρ0 .
2. Notice that we have: ∂i∗
∂δ
< 0 and ∂Πl
∂δ
< 0. δ measures the banker’s “ability to
substitute”. If δ is high, it means the banker is very good at substituting. He can
transfer more money into his own pocket. To prevent substituting from happen-
ing, higher δ leads to tighter IR of savers. The reason is that the banker must get
a high compensation from substitution prevent contract when his substitution
ability is high. This leaves a lower stake to savers. So, they are not willing to
lend much. As a result, the debt amount and profit is low when banker’s ability
to steal is high.
4.4.2 Short term debt
When using short term debt, bankers can never implement any “asset substitu-
tion”. The reason is that they have to make interim repayment at t = 1 when
their project matures. The only money they had after making the repayment is
their own profit. This shows that short term debt has a disciplinary role vis à
vis the bankers. Creditors can prevent asset substitution by asking immediate
repayment. However, using short term debt may result in exposing the bankers
to an interim liquidity crisis. Remember that with probability β , the bankers
have to resort to experts for refinancing their short term debt when macro shock
occurs at t = 1.
We analyze a representative banker’s profit maximizing program at t = 0.
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We begin by formulating the program in a backward induction manner.
• At t=1
At t = 1, if the macro shock does not occur, banker’s project succeeds with a
probability p. In this case, he can repay d1 to initial “impatient” savers and get
the rest yi− d1. With a probability 1− p, banker’s project fails, both agents get
nothing.
We focus on the case where macro shock occurs and banker needs to
refinance his debt d1, otherwise initial savers take over his project.
At t = 1,the randomness of M˜ resolves, whose realization is M6. If
M > D1, the banker faces a perfectly liquid refinancing market. We assume that
banker has all bargaining power against savers, since he knows that the savers
do not have any outside option. Banker can refinance his debt d1 by promising a
repayment d02 to the savers at t = 2. The savers’ lending IR is given by:
pd02 ≥ d1. (4.1)
IfM < D1, the bankers face a market illiquidity (liquidity crisis). Bankers
can only refinance a total amount M from t = 1’s savers. For the other part of
debt D1−M , they have to resort to experts. Experts are financiers with outside
investment opportunities, bankers must pay excess cost to refinance this propor-
tion of debt. We characterize a market clearing excess cost paid by the bankers.
Notice that the aggregate demand for liquidity from experts is Φ = γD1. To clear
the market, we have to set the supply of liquidity S = Φ. Therefore, we have,
γD1 = Φ = S = F (θˆ)E.
To understand this condition, first notice that the bankers do not know
the net return of each expert’s outside investment opportunity. Denote θˆ as
the clearing market “price” for liquidity (excess cost to bankers) offered by the
bankers. Only experts with net opportunity return θ ≤ θˆ are willing to supply
their liquidity to bankers. Thus, the total liquidity supply is S = F (θˆ)E. Market
6Notice that, the state of world at t = 1 is characterized by thisM , and we assume everyone
knows it.
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clears if S = Φ.From the sector 3.1.2, we have: θˆ = G(γD1).
In the case of liquidity crisis M < D1, bankers Bertrand compete with
each other for the liquidity from savers. The result of the Bertrand competition
is that bankers also have to pay positive a excess refinancing cost to savers, which
is exactly θˆ. As a result, bankers pay the same excess refinancing cost to savers
and experts. Creditors’ lending IR in liquidity crisis is:
pd12 ≥ (1 + θˆ)d1. (4.2)
At t = 2, banker repays γd12 to experts and (1 − γ)d12 to savers. Their
returns after project success in different scenarios are: 1. r1 = yi − d1 if macro
shock does not occur; 2. r02 = yi − d02 if no liquidity crisis; 3. r12 = yi − d12 in
liquidity crisis.
• At t=0
At t = 0, the banker borrows i − k from the initial “impatient” savers7. The
“impatient” savers’ t = 0 lending IR is:
(1− α)pd1 + αd1 ≥ i− k. (4.3)
Since the banker has no incentive to leave creditors any extra rents, all
lending IRs are binding. Moreover, γ is a random variable γ˜ = γ(M˜,D1) = D1−M˜D1
at t = 0.
Although the banker can not substitute asset when short term debt is
used, he can still choose to “shirk”. To prevent this, the banker’s stake in the
project should satisfy IC constraint at t = 0:
p[(1− α)r1 + α(1− β)r02 + αβE(r12 | M˜ < D1)] ≥ (p−4p)[(1− α)r1 + α(1− β)r02
+αβE(r12 | M˜ < D1)] + bi.
7This is because we have assumed that at t = 0, there is a large amount of saver in the
market and bankers will never go to the experts to fund their projects.
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The interpretation of the IC is as follow. At t = 0, the banker’s expected
return is: (1− α)pr1 + α(1− β)pr02 + αβpE(r12 | M˜ < D1) if he does not “shirk”.
The term E(r12 | M˜ < D1) represents banker’s expected return under liquidity
crisis scenario. Since savers’ t = 1 cash holding is a random variable M˜ , the
occurrence of liquidity crisis is given by β = prob(M˜ < D1). The banker expects
he will refinance his debt at an excess cost E(θˆ | M˜ < D1). As a result, the
banker’s expected return in liquidity crisis is: pE(r12 | M˜ < D1). After some
modification, IC constraint boils down to:
ρ0i = p(y − b4p)i ≥ (1− α)pd1 + αd1 + αβE(θˆ | M˜ < D1)d1.
For simplification, we denote µ as the unit expected excess refinance
cost:
µ = E(θˆ | M˜ < D1) = E[G(γ˜D1) | M˜ < D1] =
ˆ D1
0
G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc,
where Hc is the distribution function of M˜ conditional on M˜ < D1. Based on
these 2 equations, we can further simplify individual banker’s IC:
ρ0i ≥ (1− α)pd1 + αd1 + αβµd1. (4.4)
It is obvious that refinancing during the liquidity crisis has a higher expected cost
to the banker. Notice that the expected net interest rate demanded by the savers
under no liquidity crisis scenario is: λ0 = E(d
0
2
d1
−1) = 1
p
−1 compared to the case
in liquidity crisis: λ1 = E[(d
1
2
d1
− 1)], we have:
λ1 = E[(
d12
d1
− 1) | M˜ < D1] = (1
p
− 1) + 1
p
E(θˆ | M˜ < D1) > 1
p
− 1 = λ0.
From savers’ IR constraints, we know that: d12 > d02 > d1. The limited liability
constraint for the banker is:
r12 = yi− E(d12 | M˜ < D1) ≥ 0. (4.5)
At t = 0, a representative banker chooses optimal project size i to maximize
expected profit:
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Πs = pyi− i− αβµd1 = (ρ1 − 1)i− αβµd1.
Note that, the banker cannot obtain the entire NPV generated from the project
(ρ1−1)i. Under liquidity crisis scenario, banker faces a illiquid refinancing market.
He expects that he has to refinance d1 with an expected excess cost µ. At t = 0,
this scenario occurs with a probability αβ. A part of the surplus has to be given
to creditors. The reason is that the banker cannot offer perfect discrimination
contracts to extract all surplus under liquidity crisis scenario.
A representative banker maximizes Πs subject to constraints (4.1) to
(4.5) and taking µ, β as given. To solve banker’s program, first note that IR
constraints (4.1) to (4.3) are binding, since the banker is not willing to leave
creditors any extra rents. The banker’s profit maximizing program is:
max Πs = ρ1i− i− αβµd1
st. ρ0i ≥ (1− α)pd1 + αd1 + αβµd1
yi− E(d12 | M˜ < D1) ≥ 0
d1 =
i− k
α + (1− α)p.
To solve the program, we introduce a lemma and a proposition.
Lemma 6. Under A2: ρ1 − 1 > max[max
α
P1(α)βµ , ρ0 + θ2 − p], A3: ρ1 − ρ0 <
1.The representative banker will choose the maximum project size. The size is
given by making his individual IC constraint binding. Moreover, the banker’s
limited liability constraint is strictly satisfied when his IC constraint is satisfied.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Proposition 7. Following Lemma 6, given an exogenous value of α, the rep-
resentative banker’s profit maximizing program in short term debt has a unique
solution:
1. i∗∗ = A(β,µ)
A(β,µ)−ρ0k,
2. Πs = ρ1−ρ0A(β,µ)−ρ0A(β, µ)k−k , where A(β, µ) = 1+P1(α)βµ and P1(α) =
α
α+p(1−α) ,
3. the optimal size and profit are both decreasing with β and µ.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
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The intuition is as following. Individual agent acts atomistically. At
t = 0, a banker makes optimal decision taking all other bankers’ choice as given.
The optimal decision of the banker depends on three uncertainties: 1) Macro
shock; 2) liquidity crisis; 3) expected excess refinancing cost in liquidity crisis.
The first uncertainty is determined by exogenous probability of a macro shock,
while the two latters are due to the randomness in savers’ cash supply at interim
date. When making private optimal decision, all these three uncertainties are
considered as given for the banker. Furthermore, A(β, µ) − ρ0 > 0 and the
multiplier A(β,µ)
A(β,µ)−ρ0 is greater than 1, which shows that the banker can lever her
wealth, and A(β, µ) is the marginal cost of the banker.
With the individual banker’s optimal solution, we can characterize the
competitive equilibrium in short term debt. To begin with, notice that β, µ8
are:
β = H(D1) , µ = E[θˆ | M˜ < D1] =
ˆ D1
0
G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc.
We then introduce the definition of the market equilibrium in short term
debt in our model:
• Competitive market equilibrium in short term debt9
Definition 8. Given an exogenous parameter α , and the function F and G, an
equilibrium in short term debt is a tuple (Ie, (βe, µe, γe)) satisfies:
1. Each banker chooses ie = A(βe,µe)
A(βe,µe)−ρ0k as the equilibrium project size
funded by short term debt. His equilibrium profit in short term debt is: Πes =
ρ1−ρ0
A(βe,µe)−ρ0A(β
e, µe)k − k.
2. The aggregate project size at t = 0 is:
8Under individual banker’s private optimal program, the banker takes the total amount of
short term debt issued at t = 0 as given. Each individual banker choose his best response,
namely his optimal investment size, given all other bankers’ choice of debt. In our model, each
banker behave atomistically, thus his individual choice of investment size or his individual level
of short term debt d1will not affect the total amount D1 prevailed in market.
9This equilibrium is a simple Cournot-Nash Equilibrium. At t = 0, each bankers calculate a
best response function to all other bankers’ decisions. Since the atomistic assumption, all other
bankers’ decisions contribute a total short term debt amount D1 . The best response function
is: i∗∗ = A(β(D1),µ(D1))A(β(D1),µ(D1))−ρ0 k . To solve the equilibrium, we take into account I
∗∗ and β(D1) ,
µ(D1) and the expected clear-market condition µ = E[γ˜G(γ˜D1) | M˜ < D1] in t = 1.
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Ie = A(β
e, µe)
A(βe, µe)− ρ0K.
The aggregate face value of debt at t = 1 is:
De1 =
P1(α)
α
(Ie −K).
“Impatient” savers lend bankers Ie − K at t = 0 in exchange for repayment
De1 =
P1(α)
α
(Ie −K)10 at t = 1. Probability of liquidity crisis is βe = H(De1).
3. At t = 1, the refinancing market clears in a way that, without liquidity
crisis, savers supply De1 in exchange for t = 2’s repayment D02e =
De1
p
. In liquidity
crisis, savers and experts jointly supply an amount of De1 liquidity in exchange
for t = 2’s repayment D12e =
(1+µe)De1
p
; experts supply an amount γeDe1, savers
supply an amount (1− γe)De1, with γe = E(D
e
1−M˜
De1
|M < De1). Excess refinancing
cost in liquidity crisis µe =
´ De1
0 G(γ(M˜,D
e
1)De1)dHc.
We propose the main result in this section:
Proposition 9. The market equilibrium in short term debt characterized by tuple
(Ie, (βe, µe, γe)) exists and is unique.
Proof. See appendix B.3.
The comparative static analysis of change in probability of a macro shock on
equilibrium outcomes are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 10. Comparative statics: the short term debt equilibrium outcomes:
De1, βe, µe response to the change in probability of a macro shock α is as follows:
1. ∂D
e
1
∂α
< 0: if α decreases, the equilibrium short term debt level at t = 1
increases;
2. ∂βe
∂α
< 0 : if α decreases, the equilibrium probability of liquidity crisis
increases;
3. ∂µe
∂α
< 0: if α deceases, the equilibrium expected excess cost to refinance
1 unit of debt in crisis increases.
10Note that, there is mass 1 bankers, thus K = k, ie = Ie and De1 = de1
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Proof. See appendix B.4.
Note that, α+(1−α)p characterizes the probability of all states at t = 1
that a banker has to repay the initial debt. Within these states, α denotes the
probability that a banker needs to repay the debt through refinancing, which
incurs a expected excess cost if liquidity crisis occurs. Thus, P1(α) = αα+(1−α)p
denotes the probability that banker has to repay the initial debt with a higher
expected cost. As a consequence, the macro shock α has a direct effect on P1(α),
which implies that the bankers will borrow a lot of short term debts when they
observe a small macro shock α, since the probability of refinancing their debt at
interim date is low. Meanwhile, an indirect effect is characterized by a large De1
gives a large probability of liquidity crisis βeand a large expected excess refinance
cost µe. Given the fact that the direct effect surpass the indirect effect, we can
obtain the following results.
Corollary 11. If M˜ is uniformly distributed on [0,M ] and F is uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, E], we have:
1. d
2De1
dα2 > 0
2. ∂Πes
∂α
< 0, If α decreases, the overall effect on individual banker’s equi-
librium profit in short term debt is Πes increases.
3. ∂ie
∂α
< 0, if α decreases, the individual banker will issue more short
term debt at t = 0, to expand their project size.
4. ∂Ie
∂α
< 0: since we assume that there is mass 1 of bankers, Ie and ie
coincides.
Proof. By directly taking derivatives.
The intuition is that a decreasing in α will have direct positive effect
on Πes. When α becomes smaller, directly P1(α) decreases. It means across all
t = 1 states that the probability of paying a high expected cost state decreases,
which implies that the project size and profit increase. The indirect effect of a
decreasing in α on ie and Πes works through βe and µe. From proposition 10, when
α decreases, both βe and µe increases. This says that if a macro shock had taken
place, they will face a high probability of liquidity crisis as well as a high excess
refiance cost. As the indirect effect is dominated by direct effect, these results
hold.
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Figure 4.1: Comparative statics in the short term debt equilibrium.
Notes: Here we set K = k = 1, ρ1 = 1.1, ρ0 = 0.7. p = 0.95, θ = 0.4, M = 2.5
and E = 2.5. Note that all these values satisfies the assumption A2 A3 and A4.
4.4.2.1 A numerical example
We now give a numerical example of proposition 10 and corollary 11.
The main theoretical foundation of the numerical result in given by
proposition 9. At equilibrium, Σ(De1) =
P1(α)K
α
[ 1+P1(α)
θ
2ME
(De1)2
1+P1(α) θ2ME (D
e
1)2−ρ0
− 1]−De1 = 0,
this gives us when α decreases De1 increases, we can see it very clearly in the
first graph. Given the parameter values and distribution assumptions, we have:
βe(α) = D
e
1(α)
M
= D
e
1(α)
2.5 and µ
e(α) = D
e
1(α)θ
2E =
0.4
2∗2.5D
e
1(α), after the arrange-
ment and insert into Σ(De1) = 0, which implies both βe and µe are decreasing
in α, as figure 4.1 shows. Further, we have: A(βe, µe) = 1 + P1(α) θ2MED
e2
1 =
1 + α
α+(1−α)∗0.95
0.4
2∗2.5∗2.5D
e2
1 . Moreover, we have:
Πes =
ρ1 − ρ0
A(βe, µe)− ρ0A(β
e, µe)k − k
= 1.4− 0.71 + α
α+(1−α)∗0.95
0.4
2∗2.5∗2.5D
e2
1 − ρ0
[1 + α
α + (1− α) ∗ 0.95
0.4
2 ∗ 2.5 ∗ 2.5D
e2
1 − ρ0]− 1.
By this equation and last graph, at equilibrium, the profit is decreasing in α.
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4.4.3 Market equilibrium maturity choice
To end this section, we analysis a representative banker’s equilibrium debt matu-
rity choice. We consider a case in which both debts are available, a representative
banker makes his private choice between the two maturities of debt.
Proposition 12. Under all the assumptions we make, the equilibrium maturities
choice can be characterized by
1. Long term debt can never completely dominate short term debt for all
α ∈ (0, 1).
2. If δ is large than the threshold δ2, δ2 < δ < 1: short term debt strictly
dominates long term debt, for all α ∈ (0, 1).
3. If δ belongs to an interim interval, δ1 < δ < δ2: there is a critical
value αec ∈ (0, 1) of the probability of macro shock at t = 1. A representative
banker will choose long term debt if α > αec and short term debt if α < αec at
t = 0, he knows the exogenous given probability α.
Proof. For δ1, δ2 and αcand the proof, see appendix B.6.
For a representative banker, using long term debt means that the sub-
stitution prevent contract is signed ex ante, and his project size and profit are
insensitive to α. Using short term debt, he exposes himself to interim liquidity
crisis and faces the risk of incurring excess cost of refinancing when there is macro
shock. His equilibrium profit in short term debt is decreasing in α, which makes
short term debt especially tempting for him when α is small. On the other hand,
we have an opposite effect when α is large.
4.4.3.1 A numerical example(continued)
Funding choice:
Equilibrium profit in Short term debt:
Πes = 1.1−0.71+ α
α+(1−α)∗0.8
0.4
2∗2.5∗2.5D
e2
1 −ρ0
[1 + α
α+(1−α)∗0.8
0.4
2∗2.5∗2.5D
e2
1 ]− 1
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Figure 4.2: Long term debt can never completely dominate short term debt.
Notes: Equilibrium long term debt: δ = 0.364. This graph coincides the first
point in proposition 12, the maximum profit of using long term debt is achieved
when assumption 1 holds with equality. In this case, long term debt dominates
short term debt for all α ∈ (0, 1).
Figure 4.3: short term debt strictly dominates long term debt.
Notes: Equilibrium long term debt: δ = 0.98. This graph illustrates the second
point in proposition 12, which tells us that if δ is too high, short term debt will
always dominates short term debt.
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Figure 4.4: Intermediate case.
Notes: Equilibrium long term debt:δ = 0.5. The last graph shows that if macro
shock is relatively small (large) short term debt (long term debt) is better than
long term debt (short term debt).
4.5 Social Welfare, externalities and funding choice
In this section, we introduce a social planner whose objective is to choose the
optimal debt maturity and level to maximize economy’s total surplus. At t = 0,
social planner receives the same information of α as individual bankers do. She
then chooses maturities by comparing total expected social surplus under these
two kinds of debts. When each program is launched, we assume that social
planner faces the same constraints as individual bankers. The result shows that
the competitive equilibrium in short term debt may be socially inefficient due to
the pecuniary externalities.
4.5.1 Social planner and externality
When using long term debt, there will be no inefficiency. Since the only agents
who obtain surplus are bankers, and they do not generate any externalities. Thus,
the market equilibrium in long term debt is also socially efficient under the con-
dition that the social planner also completely rules out the possibility of asset
substitution.
When using short term debt, different from individual bankers’ perspec-
tive, social planner does consider that individual bankers’ behavior will affect the
probability of liquidity crisis as well as the expected excess refinancing cost in
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crisis. When short term debt is used, both bankers and interim creditors will
appropriate some surplus. The social planner’s objective function is the sum of
bankers’ profit and creditors’ surplus.
Each Expert provided her 1 unit of money to banks in crisis obtains
the difference between the clearing-market excess cost and her individual outside
investment opportunity θ. Each savers can get expected surplus E(θˆ | M˜ < D1),
since they don’t have outside investment opportunities. The experts’ expected
total surplus is:
U = αH(D1)E{
ˆ γ˜D1
0
[G(γ˜D1)−G(x)]dx+ (1− γ˜)D1G(γ˜D1) | M˜ < D1},
and bankers’ expected total profit is expressed as:
Λ = (ρ1 − 1)I − αH(D1)E[G(γ˜D1) | M˜ < D1]D1.
The natural objective function of the social planner is :
W = U + Λ,
and, the social planner has to consider the IC constraint to prevent bankers’
misbehavior:
ρ0I ≥ [α + (1− α)p]D1 + αH(D1)E[G(γ˜D1) | M˜ < D1]D1.
There is an important difference from the individual banker’s program:
when social planner consider her social welfare maximization program, she inter-
nalizes the effect of individual bankers’ debt on the crisis probability β = H(D1)
and expected excess cost in crisis µ = E[G(γ˜D1) | M˜ < D1].
Therefore the social planner’s program can be written as:
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max
I
W = Λ + U
= (ρ1 − 1)I − αH(D1)E[G(γ˜D1) | M˜ < D1]D1
+αH(D1)E{
ˆ γ˜D1
0
[G(γ˜D1)−G(x)]dx+ (1− γ˜)D1G(γ˜D1) | M˜ < D1}
s.t. ρ0I ≥ [α + (1− α)p]D1 + αH(D1)E[G(γ˜D1) | M˜ < D1]D1,
where D1 = I−Kα+(1−α)p , γ˜ = γ(M˜,D1). We now solve the program and present the
following proposition to characterize the social optimal choice of Io.
Lemma 13. Following our assumption on distribution function:H and F is uni-
formly on [0,M ] and [0, θ], the social planner’s objective function is concave in
its argument I.
Proof. See Proof B.6.
Solve the program, we present the following proposition:
Proposition 14. For an exogenous macro shock α, compare to the total market
equilibrium of size Ie, the social planner will choose a level Io entails the following
properties:
1.When IC binds , social planner will choose exactly the same total short
term debt volume as in market equilibrium, there are no externalities Io = Ie.
2. When IC does not bind, social planner will choose Io < Ie as the
interior solution of her unconstrained maximization program, there are pecuniary
externalities.
3. There exists a critical value of α∗ . When α < α∗ Io = Ie there is no
externalities , social planner makes the same choice as individual banker. When
α > α∗, Io < Ie, due to the pecuniary externalites, social planner chooses a
smaller size. There is over-borrowing of short term debt.
Proof. See Proof B.7
The intuition for this result is: depending on the variation of α, when
IC binds, the social planner has to chose the project size given by IC. It exactly
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Figure 4.5: Numerical example in social welfare case.
coincides the the market equilibrium. When IC is slack, the social planner will
choose the project size as the interior solution of her unconstrained program. And
the reason for some values of α, which make the social planner’s IC constraints are
not binding is that she considers “more” costs than an individual banker does. Her
unconstrained program has interior solutions, while the bankers’ unconstrained
program only gives him the corner solution. The extra costs considered by social
planner changes her optimization program to a concave case from a linear program
in market equilibrium.
For α small, there will be no externalities. The reason is that even if
social planner does consider social marginal costs, which is different from the
individual bankers, her project size is always bounded by IC. For some large
α, given by the intersection of marginal gain and marginal cost, social planner’s
solution Io under unconstrained program and market solution’s Ie is different.
Therefore, there are externalities, and IC is not binding for these α.
Numerical example continued:
Notice that market equilibrium is not Pareto efficient. The reason is
that short term debt does create deviations in the social planner’s view, since
social planner considers individual banker’s short term debt’s contribution on
liquidity risk and excess refinancing cost. Under market equilibrium, individual
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bankers do not internalize their individual debt’s impact on liquidity risk and
excess refinancing cost. As a result, they over use short term debt up till their
individual IC constraint is binding. However, social planner takes into account
the whole cost of short term debt, higher marginal cost representing marginal
increasing in liquidity risk and marginal increasing in excess refinancing cost.
Thus, social planner, under some circumstance, will not use short term debt up
to the level given by IC binding, which gives a lower level of short term debt.
4.5.2 Social optimal maturity choice
In this section, we consider social planner’s maturity choice problem.
Proposition 15. For given α, we characterize the social optimal maturities
choice by
1.If A1 : δ < ρ1−ρ0ρ1 = δ1 holds, long term debt can never dominates short
term debt.
2. If δ is large than a δ′2, δ2 < δ < 1: for a social planner short term
debt strictly dominates long term debt, for all α ∈ (0, 1), compared to the market
equilibrium case, we have: δ′2 > δ2.
3. If δ belongs to an interim interval, δ1 < δ < δ
′
2: there is a critical
value αoc ∈ (0, 1) of the probability of macro shock at t = 1. Social planner will
choose long term debt if α > αoc and short term debt if α < αoc. Moreover, we
have αoc > αec. For α ∈ [αec, αoc ], social planner will use short term debt while
individual banker uses long term debt. If αec < α∗, externalities do not affect
maturities choice.
Proof. Directly follow Proposition 12 and 14.
4.6 Regulation
After 2007-2009 financial crisis, economists and regulators have realized the im-
portance of macroprudential policy, which aims to address two dimensions of
system-wide risk, first, the evolution of system-wide risk over time - the “time
dimension” and second, the distribution of risk in the financial system at a given
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point in time - the “cross-sectional dimension.” This paper gives an insight of reg-
ulation on the cross-sectional dimension of macroprudential policy, that banker’s
over borrowing of short term debt may cause externalities to other banks. To
mitigate this effect, Perotti and Suarez (2011) have proposed a Pigouvian tax on
the short term debt to internalize this externality and reduce the total size of the
short term debt on the market to attain to the socially optimal level. However,
the implementation of this externality correction tool is effective only in the case
that the externalities do exist, otherwise, the banking sector is punished for no
economic reason and constraint the banks’ credit volume, hence gives a negative
impact to the real economy.
4.7 conclusion
We have a model where banks choose their debt maturity structures, weighting
short term against long term debt. The basic tradeoff between these two different
debts is liquidity risk of short term debt versus misbehavior of long term debt.
When using short term debt, at the competitive equilibrium, 1) probability of an
interim liquidity crisis, 2) the expected excess refinancing cost during the crisis,
3) bank’s profit, decrease with the probability of the macro shock. In contrast,
when using long term debt, banks are insensitive to the macro shock. Then we
found, at the competitive equilibrium, bankers prefer short term debt (long term
debt) to long term debt (short term debt) when the probability of a macro shock
is low (high).
We also show that the competitive equilibrium with short term debt
is not socially efficient, bankers borrow too much since they do not internalize
their borrowing decision on the probability of having a liquidity crisis and on the
refinancing cost during the crisis. So, in order to attain the social optimum, we
have to reduce the reliance on short-term debt quantitatively. Therefore, a macro
prudential regulation is needed.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Appendix of chapter 2
A.1 Diagnostic of TGARCH model
I did a diagnosis of the TGARCH model to see whether these models are well
specified or not. The objective of variance modeling is to construct a variance
measure, which has the property that standardized squared returns, rit/σˆit have
no systematic autocorrelation.
We can see from graph that the standardized squared returns have no
autocerrelation as the sticks of different lags are all in their standard error banks.
Model is well specified in terms of in sample check.
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Figure A.1: Autocorrelation function of standardized innovations.
Appendix B
Appendix of chapter 3
B.1 Proof of lemma 6
Proof. From the binding IR constraints (4.3) , we have: d1 = i−kα+p(1−α) . Inserting it
into Πs, Πs = (ρ1 − 1)i− αβµ i−kα+p(1−α) .
∂Πs
∂i
= (ρ1 − 1)− αβµ 1
α+ p(1− α) = (ρ1 − 1)− P1(α)βµ,
where P1(α) = αα+p(1−α) . To guarantee
∂Πs
∂i > 0 always holds we have to assume:
ρ1 − 1 > max
α
P1(α)βµ.
As a result of this assumption, the bankers will choose their project size as much as
possible to maximize profit. Then, the maximum size is given by his individual IC
constraints.
To prove the second result, inserting (4.2) into (4.5) gives us:
ρ1i ≥ (1 + µ)d1.
From IC constraint (4.4), we have:
ρ1i ≥ (ρ1 − ρ0)i+ i− k + αβµd1.
If (ρ1 − ρ0)i+ i− k − (1 + µ− αβµ)d1 ≥ 0, then (IC)⇒ (LL).
144
145
(ρ1 − ρ0)i+ i− k − (1 + µ− αβµ) i− k
α+ p(1− α)
>
(ρ1 − ρ0) + α+ p(1− α)− (1 + µ− αβµ)
α+ p(1− α) (i− k).
To calculate µ, we have by our assumption on distribution function F :
µ = E[G(γ˜D1) | M˜ < D1] = D1θ2E .
max{µ − αβµ + 1} = θ2 + 1 and min{(ρ1 − ρ0) + α + p(1 − α)} = ρ1 − ρ0 + p. Thus
if assuming ρ1 − 1 > ρ0 + θ2 − p, we will have (IC) ⇒ (LL). Thus in all, if ρ1 − 1 >
max[max
α
P1(α)βµ , ρ0 + θ2 − p], we have the banker will always choose to maximize
project size, the size is exactly given by IC constraint and we can always neglect
banker’s LL constraint since it is implied by IC .
B.2 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Inserting d1 into Πs and IC, and use Lagrange method to solve banker’s profit
maximizing program, we have:
L = ρ1i− i− P1(α)βµi+ P1(α)βµk − ν(i− k + P1(α)βµi− P1(α)βµk − ρ0i),
∂L
∂i = ρ1 − 1− P1(α)βµ− ν(1 + P1(α)βµ− ρ0),
∂L
∂ν = i− k + P1(α)βµi+ P (α)βµk − ρ0i.
From A2, we know that ρ1 − 1 − P1(α)βµ > 0 , thus it must be: ν > 0 and
i− k + P1(α)βµi− P (α)βµk − ρ0i = 0. Thus, the optimal size in short term debt is:
i∗∗ = A(β, µ)
A(β, µ)− ρ0k,
where A(β, µ) = 1 + P1(α)βµ. The maximum profit is given by inserting i∗∗ into Πs:
Πs(β, µ) =
ρ1 − ρ0
A(β, µ)− ρ0A(β, µ)k − k.
It is easily seen that:
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∂i∗∗
∂µ
= −ρ0k[A(β, µ)− ρ0]2P1(α)β < 0,
∂Πs
∂µ
= −ρ0(ρ1 − ρ0)k[A(β, µ)− ρ0]2P1(α)β < 0.
The same we have: ∂i∗∗∂β < 0 ,
∂Πs
∂β < 0.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 9
Now, we give a brief prove of proposition 9.
Proof. For a µ, the optimal project size is given by the binding IC constraint :I∗∗ =
A(β,µ)
A(β,µ)−ρ0K. As a result:
D∗∗1 =
P1(α)
α
(I∗∗ −K) = P1(α)
α
1 + P1(α)βµ
1 + P1(α)βµ− ρ0K −
P1(α)
α
K.
Notice that by the clearing condition at t = 1 frictional refinancing market: µ =´ D1
0 G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc. Denote Hc as the conditional distribution function of M˜
conditional on M˜ < D1. β = H(D1), we have:
D1 =
P1(α)
α
1 + P1(α)H(D1)
´ D1
0 G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc
1 + P1(α)H(D1)
´ D1
0 G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc − ρ0
K − P1(α)
α
K (∗).
The market equilibrium De1 will be the solution of the above function (∗). First, we
prove there exists a solution for (∗) and define another function:
Σ(D1) =
P1(α)K
α
[
1 + P1(α)H(D1)
´ D1
0 G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc
1 + P1(α)H(D1)
´ D1
0 G(γ(M˜,D1)D)dHc − ρ0
− 1]−D1.
If no banker borrows anything, we have D1 = 0. Second, notice that when α = 0,
we are in the standard Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), the maximum project size for
an individual banker is: iˆ = k1−ρ0 , thus dˆ1 =
iˆ−k
p =
ρ0k
p(1−ρ0) . In aggregation, we have:
Iˆ = K1−ρ0 ,and Dˆ1 =
ρ0K
p(1−ρ0) . We consider our function Σ(D1) defined on [0, Dˆ1].
Let D1 → 0.
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Since β(0) = H(0) = 0 , µ(0) =
´ D1=0
0 G(0)dHc = 0 and ρ0 < 1, we have:
Σ(0) = P1(α)K
α
[ 11− ρ0 − 1] > 0.
We have: limD1→0Σ(D1) > 0
Let D1 → Dˆ1.
We can calculate: limD1→Dˆ1Σ(D1) =
P1(α)K
α [
A(Dˆ1)
A(Dˆ1)−ρ0 − 1] −
1
p
ρ0K
1−ρ0 , where
A(Dˆ1) = 1+P1(α)H(Dˆ1)
´ Dˆ1
0 G(γ(M˜, Dˆ1)Dˆ1)dHc. Since α+(1−α)p = p+(1−p)α > p
for all α ∈ (0, 1], we have:
P1(α)
α
= 1
α+ (1− α)p <
1
p
.
P1(α)K
α
[ A(Dˆ1)
A(Dˆ1)− ρ0
− 1]− 1
p
ρ0K
1− ρ0 =
P1(α)K
α
A(Dˆ1)
A(Dˆ1)− ρ0
− (P1(α)
α
K + 1
p
ρ0K
1− ρ0 )
<
P1(α)K
α
A(Dˆ1)
A(Dˆ1)− ρ0
− P1(α)K
α
(1 + ρ01− ρ0 )
= P1(α)K
α
[ A(Dˆ1)
A(Dˆ1)− ρ0
− 11− ρ0 ].
Moreover, for all α > 0, we have: A(Dˆ1) > 1, thus: [ A(Dˆ1)A(Dˆ1)−ρ0 −
1
1−ρ0 ] < 0. As a result,
we know that: limD1→Dˆ1Σ(D1) < 0. We could find an equilibrium level D
e
1 ∈ [0, Dˆ1)
to make Σ(De1) = 0, existence is proven.
To prove uniqueness solution of (∗), A(D1) = 1+P1(α)H(D1)
´ D1
0 G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc,
we have:
∂Σ(D1)
∂D1
= P1(α)K
α
−ρ0
[A(D1)− ρ0]2
∂A(D1)
∂D1
− 1.
Notice that γ(D1, D1) = D1−D1D1 = 0 , γ
′(M˜,D1) = M˜D21 > 0 , G
′
> 0 and
∂
´ D1
0 G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc
∂D1
> 0 (∗∗).
Combing these results, we have:
∂A(D1)
∂D1
=
∂[1 + P1(α)H(D1)
´ D1
0 G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc]
∂D1
> 0.
As a result:
148
∂Σ(D1)
∂D1
= P1(α)K
α
−ρ0
[A(D1)− ρ0]2
∂A(D1)
∂D1
− 1 < 0.
Thus Σ(D1) in monotonic decreasing, we prove the uniqueness of De1.
De1, βe = H(De1) , µe =
´ De1
0 G(γ˜D
e
1)dHc =
´ De1
0 G(γ(M˜,D
e
1)De1)dHc and
γe = E(D
e
1−M˜
De1
|M < De1) consisting the competitive equilibrium.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. First, we are going to calculate:
1. ∂D
e
1
∂α . From the proof of proposition 9, we have De1 is given by: Σ(De1) = 0.
Σ(De1, α) =
P1(α)K
α
[
1 + P1(α)H(De1)
´ De1
0 G(γ(M˜,D
e
1)De1)dHc
1 + P1(α)H(De1)
´ De1
0 G(γ(M˜,De1)De1)dHc − ρ0
− 1]−De1 = 0.
Applying implicit function theorem:
dDe1
dα
= −
∂Σ(De1,α)
∂α
∂Σ(De1,α)
∂De1
.
To calculate, define again: A(De1, α) = 1 + P1(α)H(De1)
´ De1
0 G(γ(M˜,D
e
1)De1)dHc , we
have:
∂Σ(De1, α)
∂α
= −(1− p)K[α+ (1− α)p]2 [
A(De1, α)
A(De1, α)− ρ0
− 1] + P1(α)K
α
−ρ0
[A(De1, α)− ρ0]2
∂A(De1, α)
∂α
< 0,
since ∂A(D
e
1,α)
∂α > 0 . As calculated in the last part of proof of proposition 9;
∂Σ(De1, α)
∂De1
= P1(α)K
α
−ρ0
[A(De1, α)− ρ0]2
∂A(De1, α)
∂De1
− 1 < 0,
since ∂A(D
e
1,α)
∂De1
> 0 holds from (∗∗) in proof of proposition 9. As a result, we have:
dDe1
dα
= −
∂Σ(De1,α)
∂α
∂Σ(De1,α)
∂De1
< 0.
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2. ∂βe∂α =
∂H(De1)
∂De1
∂De1
∂α < 0, since H
′
> 0.
3. ∂µe∂α =
∂µe
∂De1
∂De1
∂α =
∂
´De1
0 G(γ(M˜,De1)De1)dHc
∂De1
∂De1
∂α < 0.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. For case 1
A banker’s equilibrium profit in long term debt is given by:
Πl =
ρ1 − 1
1− ρ1 + δρ1k,
with the optimal project size in long term debt funding: i∗ = k1−ρ1+δρ1 . Notice that
A2: δ > ρ1−ρ0ρ1 holds and we know that
∂Πl
∂δ < 0. The maximum profit given by Πl is
just let IC and substitution prevent bind together.1
The equilibrium profit when short term debt is used is given by:
Πes(α) =
ρ1 − ρ0
Ae(α)− ρ0A
e(α)k − k,
where, equilibrium project size is given by: ie = A
e(α)
Ae(α)−ρ0k , and A
e(α) = 1 +
P1(α)βe(De1(α))µe(De1(α)).
From the comparative static results summarized in Corollary 11: ∂Π
e
s
∂α < 0, we
have:
max
α
Πes(α) = Πes(0) =
ρ1 − ρ0
Ae(0)− ρ0A
e(0)k − k = ρ1 − ρ01− ρ0 k − k =
ρ1 − 1
1− ρ0k.
As a result we have:
max
α
Πes(α) = maxΠl
δ
.
Under A1, we can not find δ such that Πl(δ) > Πes holds for all α ∈ [0, 1].
For case 2
We have min
α
Πes(α) = Πes(1) = ρ1−ρ0Ae(1)−ρ0A
e(1)k − k. If Πl = Πes(1), we can find
1The bankers’ substituting ability is lowest.
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a δ2, which is the solution of Πl(δ2) = Πes(1):
ρ1 − 1
1− ρ1 + δρ1k =
ρ1 − ρ0
Ae(1)− ρ0A
e(1)k − k.
We arrange equation and get:
δ2 =
ρ1 − 1
ρ1
[1 + A
e(1)− ρ0
ρ1 − 1− (A(1)− 1)(1 + ρ0 − ρ1) ].
Whether this δ2 < 1 or not depends on the distribution assumption of H , F and ρ1.
We simply assume we choose H , F and ρ1carefully enough and δ2 < 1. Then for any
δ ∈ (δ2, 1], we have
min
α
Πes(α) > Πl(δ),
which means, short term debt will strictly dominates long term debt for δ > δ2. If
bankers’ ability lies in this interval, they will use short term debt for no matter α.
For case 3
If δ ∈ (δ1, δ2). For this case, short term debt can not strictly dominates long
term debt for all α, for sure there will be cross for a α ∈ (0, 1). We denotes this αas αc.
Then we are going to find it. To make the short and long term debt’s profit equal,we
have:
ρ1 − ρ0
Ae(α)− ρ0A
e(α) = 1 + ρ1 − 11− (1− δ)ρ1 .
From this equation, we can get:
Ae(α) = δρ0ρ1
δρ1 − (ρ1 − ρ0)(1− ρ1 + δρ1) .
Under A1: δρ1 > ρ1 − ρ0, we have: δρ1 > ρ1 − ρ0 ⇒ ρ1 − 1 > (ρ1−ρ0)δρ1 (ρ1 − 1) ⇒
ρ0 > 1 + ρ0 − ρ1 + (ρ1−ρ0)δρ1 (ρ1 − 1) ⇒ δρ0ρ1 > δρ1(1 + ρ0 − ρ1) + (ρ1 − ρ0)(ρ1 − 1).
Under A3: ρ1 < ρ0 + 1, we have: δρ1(1 + ρ0 − ρ1) + (ρ1 − ρ0)(ρ1 − 1) > 0, thus
δρ0ρ1
δρ1(1+ρ0−ρ1)+(ρ1−ρ0)(ρ1−1) > 1, and
δρ0ρ1
δρ1(1+ρ0−ρ1)+(ρ1−ρ0)(ρ1−1) =
δρ0ρ1
δρ1−(ρ1−ρ0)(1−ρ1+δρ1) ,
which gives us:
Ae(α) = δρ0ρ1
δρ1 − (ρ1 − ρ0)(1− ρ1 + δρ1) > 1.
Because Ae(α) = 1 + P1(α)βe(α)µe(α), which means:
P1(α)βe(α)µe(α) =
(ρ1 − 1)(δρ1 + ρ0 − ρ1)
δρ1 − (ρ1 − ρ0)(1− ρ1 + δρ1) > 0.
After some rearrangements:
α = pη
pη + βe(α)µe(α)− η ,
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where η(δ) = (ρ1−1)(δρ1+ρ0−ρ1)δρ1−(ρ1−ρ0)(1−ρ1+δρ1) . α
e
c is the solution of this function
αec =
pη
pη + βe(αc)µe(αc)− η .
From the above derivation, when δ ∈ (δ1, δ2), we must have: αc ∈ (0, 1).
Last, by corollary 11: ∂Π
e
s
∂α < 0, this αec is unique. Πl is insensitive to α, thus
when α > αec, we have Πes < Πl; when α < αec, we have: Πes > Πl.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 13
Proof. First, notice that we can simplify the social planner’s objective function:
W = (ρ1 − 1)I − αH(D1)
ˆ D1
0
ˆ γ(M˜,D1)D1
0
G(x)dxdHc.
To check the social planner’s program is a well defined one, we direct check the case
that the distribution function H and F is uniformly on [0,M ] and [0, θ]. Thus we have:
H
′
> 0, F ′ > 0 and H ′′ = 0 , F ′′ = 0 , γ(M˜,D1) = D1−M˜D1 and D1 =
P1(α)
α (I −
K). ∂D1∂I =
P1(α)
α > 0 and
∂2D1
∂I2 = 0. Moreover, we have: G(γ(M˜,D1)D1) > 0 and
G
′(γ(M˜,D1)D1) > 02.
∂W
∂I
= (ρ1 − 1)− αH ′(D1)
ˆ D1
0
ˆ γ(M˜,D1)D1
0
G(x)dxdHc
∂D1
∂I
−αH(D1)
ˆ D1
0
[γ′(M˜,D1)D1 + γ(M˜,D1)]G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc
∂D1
∂I
,
and
∂2W
∂I2
= −αH ′(D1)
ˆ D1
0
[γ′(M˜,D1)D1 + γ(M˜,D1)]G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc(
∂D1
∂I
)2
−αH ′(D1)
ˆ D1
0
[γ′(M˜,D1)D1 + γ(M˜,D1)]G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc(
∂D1
∂I
)2
−αH(D1)
ˆ D1
0
[γ′′(M˜,D1)D1 + 2γ
′(M˜,D1)]G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc(
∂D1
∂I
)2
−αH(D1)
ˆ D1
0
[γ′(M˜,D1)D1 + γ(M˜,D1)]2G
′(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc(
∂D1
∂I
)2.
Something needs to be mentioned: γ′(M˜,D1) = M˜D21 > 0 and γ
′′(M˜,D1) = −2M˜D31 . But
2Since F is uniform on [0, θ], G = θ
E
x. actually G′ = θ
E
> 0
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we have: γ′′(M˜,D1)D1 + 2γ
′(M˜,D1) = − 2˜MD31 D1 + 2
M˜
D21
= 0. As a result of this, we can
claim that:
∂2W
∂I2
= −2αH ′(D1)
ˆ D1
0
[γ′(M˜,D1)D1 + γ(M˜,D1)]G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc(
∂D1
∂I
)2
−αH(D1)
ˆ D1
0
[γ′(M˜,D1)D1 + γ(M˜,D1)]2G
′(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc(
∂D1
∂I
)2.
∂2W
∂I2
< 0.
B.7 Proof of Proposition 14
Proof. Notice first the social planner’s well defined objective function is:
maxI W = (ρ1 − 1)I − αH(D1)
ˆ D1
0
ˆ γ(M˜,D1)D1
0
G(x)dxdHc.
Notice that as before, thisHc is actually a conditional distribution function (conditional
on M˜ < D1 ). And IC becomes:
ρ0I ≥ (1 + P1(α)H(D1)
ˆ D1
0
G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc)(I −K).
Notice that : D1 = I−Kα+(1−α)p by IR. We solve the program by Lagrangian method.
Denoting L the associated Lagrangian, and v by the multiplier.
L = (ρ1 − 1)I − αH(D1)
ˆ D1
0
ˆ γ(M˜,D1)D1
0
G(x)dxdHc
− ν{[1 + P1(α)H(D1)
ˆ D1
0
G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc](I −K)− ρ0I}.
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By Kuhn-Tucker theorem:
∂L
∂I
= (ρ1 − 1)− αH ′(D1)
ˆ D1
0
ˆ γ(M˜,D1)D1
0
G(x)dxdHc
∂D1
∂I
− αH(D1)
ˆ D1
0
[∂γ(M˜,D1)
∂I
D1 + γ(M˜,D1)]G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc
∂D1
∂I
− ν{[P1(α)H ′(D1)
ˆ D1
0
G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc
+P1(α)H(D1)
ˆ D1
0
[G′(γ(M˜,D1)D1)(
∂γ(M˜,D1)
∂I
D1 + γ(M˜,D1))dHc](I −K)∂D1
∂I
+[1 + P1(α)H(D1)
ˆ D1
0
G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc]− ρ0} = 0,
∂L
∂ν
= 1 + P1(α)H(D1)
ˆ D1
0
γ(M˜,D1)G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc](I −K)− ρ0I,
and ν{[1 + P1(α)H(D1)
´ D1
0 G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc](I − K) − ρ0I} = 0. Notice that:
γ(D1, D1) = 0.
To study social planner’s program: Given a value of α, we have the social
planner’s marginal benefit from issuing 1 unit of debt:ρ1 − 1, and her marginal cost
from issuing 1 unit of debt:
Marginal Cost = P1(α)H(D1)
ˆ D1
0
γ(M˜,D1)G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc
+ P1(α)H
′(D1)
ˆ D1
0
ˆ γ(M˜,D1)D1
0
G(x)dxdHc
+ P1(α)H(D1)
ˆ D1
0
[γ′(M˜,D1)D1]G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc.
Compared to the individual banker’s program, the marginal cost of issuing 1 unit of
debt is:
P1(α)H
′(D1)
ˆ D1
0
ˆ γ(M˜,D1)D1
0
G(x)dxdHc + P1(α)H(D1)
ˆ D1
0
G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc.
We study 2 cases: Case 1: If ν > 0, for all value of α we have IC constraints are
binding:
[1 + P1(α)H(D1)
ˆ D1
0
G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc](I −K) = ρ0I.
We denote the social planner’s solution if all IC constraints are binding as Do1. For all
α:
Io(α) =
1 + P1(α)H(Do1)
´ Do1
0 G(γ(M˜,Do1)Do1)dHc
1 + P1(α)H(Do1)
´ Do1
0 G(γ(M˜,Do1)Do1)dHc − ρ0
K.
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we have:
Do1 =
P1(α)
α
(Io−K) = P1(α)K
α
1 + P1(α)H(Do1)
´ Do1
0 G(γ(M˜,Do1)Do1)dHc
1 + P1(α)H(Do1)
´ Do1
0 G(γ(M˜,Do1)Do1)dHc − ρ0
−P1(α)K
α
.
As before, a simplified equation:
P1(α)K
α
[
1 + P1(α) θ2ME (D
o
1)2
1 + P1(α) θ2ME (D
o
1)2 − ρ0
− 1] = Do1,
exactly, coincides the market equilibrium program for all value of α. We can get
Io(α) = [α+ (1− α)p]Do1 +K.
Case 2: If ν = 0 for all value of α. We have IC constraints are all slack for all
state of α. Then for all α:
(ρ1 − 1) = αH ′(D1)
ˆ D1
0
ˆ γ(M˜,D1)D1
0
G(x)dxdHc
∂D1
∂I
+αH(D1)
ˆ D1
0
[γ′(M˜,D1)D1 + γ(M˜,D1)]G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc
∂D1
∂I
.
and IC constraint : [1+P1(α)H(D1)
´ D1
0 G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc](I−K)−ρ0I > 0. Notice
that D1 = P1(α)α (I −K), thus ∂D1∂I = P1(α)α .
ρ1 − 1 = P1(α)H(D1)
ˆ D1
0
γ(M˜,D1)G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc
+P1(α)H(D1)
ˆ D1
0
γ
′(M˜,D1)D1G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc
+P1(α)H
′(D1)
ˆ D1
0
ˆ γ(M˜,D1)D1
0
G(x)dxdHc.
Notice that the first 2 terms of the above equation can be written as: P1(α)H(D1)
´ D1
0 G(γ(M˜,D1)D1)dHc.
We denote the social planner’s solution if all IC constraints are slack as Do1. Then for
all α:
ρ1−1 = P1(α)H(Do1)
ˆ Do1
0
G(γ(M˜,Do1)Do1)dHc+P1(α)H
′(Do1)
ˆ Do1
0
ˆ γ(M˜,Do1)Do1
0
G(x)dxdHc.
By the assumption on distribution we can simplify it to:
Do1 =
√
3ME(ρ1 − 1)
2P1(α)θ
.
Solving this equation gives us: Do1 as a function of α. Again, we can get: Io =
[α+ (1−α)p]Do1 +K. We claim that social planner’s optimal choice of short term level:
Io1(α) = min{Io(α), Io(α)}.
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We denote the α make Io(α) = Io(α) happen as α∗. To make sure of this, we must
keep Io(α) and Io(α) cross and cross only once for α ∈ [0, 1], thus α∗ ∈ [0, 1] and it
is unique. Since we have already known that ∂Ie∂α < 0 and from the social planner’s
optimal program, we have ∂Io∂α < 1. And when α → 0, De1 binds by Dˆ1, thus Io = Ie
binds by I = K1−ρ0 . However, when α → 0, Do1 → ∞. Thus Io → ∞. Thus, to make
them cross, we need to restrict Io(0) < Io(0) = Ie(0) when α = 1. Moreover, when
α = 1, D1 = I − K. We can directly restrict parameter values to satisfy: Do(0) <
Do(0). From the above, we have: Do1(1) =
√
3ME(ρ1−1)
2θ and D
o
1(1) as the solution of
K[
1+ θ
2ME
(Do1)2
1+ θ
2ME
(Do1)2−ρ0
−1] = Do1, thus the final restriction on parameters (ρ1, ρ0, θ, p,M,E)
will be: √
3ME(ρ1 − 1)
2θ
< Do1(1),
and Do1(1) as the solution of K[
1+ θ
2ME
(Do1)2
1+ θ
2ME
(Do1)2−ρ0
− 1] = Do1. Since the social planner
consider extra cost than individual banker, which mean her unconstrained program’s
solution: Do1 has steep slope than the constrained one.(given by market equilibrium),
thus Do1(α) and Do(α) will cross only once.


Abstract: This thesis analysis the inefficiencies which may trigger the
systemic risks in the financial system and studies the related measures to quantify
such risks. The first article surveys the systemic risk in the financial system and
the related macro-prudential policy: 1) the pro-cyclicality effect is harmful to the
whole financial system as well as to the real economy; 2) the contagion risk among
financial institutions. The second article of thesis proposes a new systemic risk
measure to efficiently capture the systemic importance of each financial institution
within a given system. The term systemic risk refers to the contagion risk to which
each bank contributes to the financial system. The third article of thesis analysis
the debt structure in the banking sector. Banks choose their debt maturity
structure by weighting short term against long term debt. The externalities
caused by over borrowing in short term debt exist only when the probability of
macro shock is large.
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Résumé: Cette thèse analyse les sources d’inefficacité qui peuvent générer
un risque systémique au sein du system financiers et étudie les différentes mesures
associées. Le premier article présente une revue de la littérature sur le risque sys-
témique et la politique macroprudentielle : 1) les effets négatifs de la procyclicité
pour le système financier dans son ensemble ainsi que pour l’économie réelle ;
2) le risque de contagion entre institutions financières. Le second article de la
thèse propose une nouvelle mesure du risque systémique visant à capturer effi-
cacement l’importance systémique de chaque institution financière au sein d’un
système donné. Le troisième article de la thèse analyse la structure de la dette
des banques. Les banques choisissent la maturité de leur dette à court et/ou long
terme. Les externalités négatives générées par l’excès de financement de court
terme n’apparaissent que lorsque la probabilité d’un choc macroéconomique est
suffisamment large.
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